Weekly DAFootnotes Bava Batra 30-36 Issue #39 8-14 Iyar 5762 / 20-26 April 2002 By Rabbi Mendel Weinbach, Dean, Ohr Somayach Institutions ===================================== NEW! Don't miss the new book by Rav Mendel Weinbach "The Weekly Daf" on Daf Yomi by Targum/Feldheim ===================================== Sponsored by Kof-K www.kof-k.com | info@kof-k.com ===================================== THE SINGLE WITNESS A legal dilemma arose in the court of Rabbi Ami. The claimant produced a single witness who testified that he saw the defendant seize a bar of silver from his possession. The defendant in turn admitted to doing so, but made a counterclaim that it was a silver bar of which he was the true owner. Rabbi Ami was puzzled by what action to take in resolving this dispute until a solution was proposed by Rabbi Abba who was present. The basis for the aforementioned dilemma is a Torah passage dealing with the credibility of a single witness. "A single witness shall have no standing," says the Torah (Devarim 19:15), "as regards imposing upon a man guilt for a sin." This is interpreted by our Sages (Sifrei 19:87) as ruling out punishing a transgressor with death or lashes or making a damager liable for compensation to his victim on the basis of a single witness' testimony. Since the Torah specifically excludes these areas it is inferred that the single witness does have credibility in regard to requiring the defendant to take an oath. Should the defendant deny a claim against him which is supported by the testimony of this witness he is required to take an oath to contradict the witness, and if he refuses to do so he must pay. In the case before Rabbi Ami, the witness testified that the defendant had taken something which did not belong to him since it was undeniably in the possession of the claimant. In order to exonerate himself from this claim it is incumbent on the defendant to take an oath to counter the testimony of the witness. He is, however, unable to do so because he has admitted to seizing the silver bar. On the other hand, however, he cannot be convicted of the crime because there are not two witnesses testifying that it took place. Rabbi Abba came to the rescue by ruling that we must begin dealing with this case by applying the testimony of the witness to its limit — the imposing of an oath on the defendant. Since he is unable to take that oath he inexorably falls into the legal category of one who is unable to take an oath and is therefore compelled to pay, which in this case meant the return of the silver bar to the claimant. Bava Batra 34a ===================================== CAST UPON THE JUDGES The student of gemara who sometimes comes across an unfamiliar Aramaic word would have a much easier time figuring out its meaning if he could recall running into that term, or one very similar to it, in his weekly review of the Targum Onkeles translation of the Torah. Rashi frequently refers us to the Aramaic term used by Onkeles as a key to deducing what its Hebrew equivalent is. Following in the steps of his grandfather, Rashi's grandson, Rabbi Shmuel ben Meir (Rashbam), who took over for Rashi on Daf 29a when his grandfather passed away, similarly guides us in understanding the term "shuda" used by the Sage Shmuel in ruling on a legal problem. Reuven wrote two documents on the same day, one presenting a field as a gift to Shimon and another presenting the very same field as a gift to Levi. Outside of Yerushalayim it was not customary to record the hour of the writing of legal documents, so the hour of the writing was not considered a factor in deciding which of the two recipients was entitled to the field. In contrast to the ruling of the Sage Rav that the field in question should be divided between them, the Sage Shmuel ruled that we apply the principle of "shuda" of the judges. Rashbam refers us to the song of praise which Moshe and the Children of Israel sang to Hashem at the splitting of Yam Suf, in which they sang of "the chariots of Pharaoh and his army He cast into the sea" (Shmot 15:4). The translation of "cast" is rendered by Onkelos into "shadei" which leads us to the conclusion that what Shmuel proposed was "casting" the decision to the discretion of the judges. What this discretion means is a matter of dispute. Rashbam's view is that since we are not aware of who was the intended beneficiary we cast the matter to the judges to decide who they feel was the more likely recipient based on his relationship with the benefactor. The Tosefist Rabbeinu Tam, however, cites indicators from other gemaras to prove his point that the matter is left completely to the discretion of the judges to award the field to which of the parties they feel is most deserving. Bava Batra 35a ===================================== If you like this e-mail please share it with a friend. ===================================== To subscribe to this list please e-mail DafYomi-subscribe@ohr.edu To unsubscribe e-mail DafYomi-unsubscribe@ohr.edu Weekly DAFootnotes is now available as part of the Ohr Somayach Interactive AvantGo channel! See www.ohr.edu for details. ===================================== (C) 2002 Ohr Somayach International - All rights reserved.