Weekly DAFootnotes
Bava Metzia 9-15
Issue #19
16-22 Kislev 5762 /  1-7 Dec. 2001 
By Rabbi Mendel Weinbach, Dean, Ohr Somayach Institutions
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WHEN THERE IS NO CHOICE

"For the Children of Israel are My slaves and they are My 
slaves only." (Vayikra 25:55)

The implication of this Divine statement is that the Jewish 
people are "not slaves to slaves," and our gemara applies it 
to the right of an employee to quit his job even in the 
middle of the day.

In our Weekly Dafootnote of two weeks ago (Bava Kama 
114-119) we discussed the ramifications of this ruling upon 
the right of a Jew to commit himself to employment for a 
period exceeding three years, an issue raised by Tosefot 
here and discussed at length by the commentaries.

Although there is a difference of opinion as to whether the 
negative attitude of the Torah to willfully imposing slavery 
on oneself applies to an ordinary long-term employee, there 
certainly are situations in which there is a consensus that it 
is proper for a Jew to commit himself to employment even 
for more than three years.

Rambam (Avadim 1:1) points out that if a Jew has become 
extremely impoverished to the point of not owning even 
clothes, the Torah (Vayikra 25:39) permitted him to sell 
himself as a slave for economic survival.  That option no 
longer exists since the institution of a Jewish slave came to 
an end with the first exile of Jews from Eretz Yisrael.  The 
spirit of the law discouraging selling oneself which the 
Shulchan Aruch applies to long-term commitments can 
certainly not be more restrictive than the law itself, and if 
one reaches the point of desperation under which we would 
have allowed him to sell himself into slavery, he certainly is 
permitted even today to make a long-range commitment to 
ensure economic survival.

Bava Metzia 10a

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A SISTERLY STRATAGEM

"Say to wisdom — you are my sister." (Mishlei 7:4)

This passage from the wisdom of King Solomon is cited by 
our Sages (Kiddushin 30b) as an obligation to be as familiar 
with all of Torah as one is familiar with the knowledge that 
his sister is forbidden to him in marriage, so that when he is 
asked about some Torah information he should be able to 
respond without hesitation.

This assumption that every Jew is aware of the ban on 
marrying his sister is extended in our gemara to an 
awareness that any attempt to make kiddushin (betrothal) 
with her is an apparent exercise in futility because such an 
effort is ineffective.

Why then, the question arises, would one go through the 
motions of giving his sister money for the expressed 
purpose of kiddushin when he is aware that his action is 
meaningless?

The Sage Rav interprets the motive of the brother as an 
interest in having his sister serve as a guardian for the 
money.  Since he hesitates to directly ask her to watch the 
money for him for fear that she will refuse, he uses this 
stratagem.

The Sage Shmuel, on the other hand, views his motive as a 
desire to give his sister a present.  Since he cannot come 
right out and say it is a gift because of embarrassment, he 
does it this way.

The legal ramifications of the views are obvious:  According 
to Rav the sister is obligated to return the money to her 
brother upon demand.  According to Shmuel there is no 
such obligation since the money was given and received in 
the spirit of a gift.

Bava Metzia 15b

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