WEEKLY DAFootnotes #18
Bava Metzia 2-8; Issue #18
9-15 Kislev 5762 / 24-30 Nov. 2001
TWO BLIND MEN
"You shall not place a stumbling block in the way of the blind" (Vayikra 19:14).
Is the reference here to one who is literally blind or does it refer to another sort of blindness and to another sort of obstacle?
In our gemara we see this passage applied to assisting someone in the commission of a sin. How can we hire a shepherd to tend our sheep, asks the gemara, if shepherds are suspect of leading the sheep into privately owned fields where they do damage, and we are therefore guilty of "placing a stumbling block in the way of the blind?" This problem is easily solved by limiting suspicion of a shepherd to when he is tending his own sheep and is tempted to lead them to the nearest pasture even if it belongs to others. When he tends the sheep of others, on the other hand, he has no interest in saving time and will lead the sheep to distant, ownerless pastures. He will not indulge in theft for the benefit of those who hired him because "a person does not sin when there is nothing in it for him."
We do see, however, that the "blindness" in the above passage has a figurative meaning. Rambam (Laws of Murder and Self Preservation 12:14) includes in this prohibition the giving of damaging counsel to one who is "blind" in regard to a situation, and giving support to a sinner who is "blind" and fails to see the truth because of his heart's desires.
Does this figurative interpretation of blindness preclude the literal application?
The above citation from Rambam, which does not include the example of a literal stumbling block, has led some commentaries to conclude that while placing a stone in front of a blind man is a reprehensible act which brings upon the perpetrator the curse heard by our ancestor when they stood upon Mount Grizim and Mount Eyval (Devarim 17:18), it is not a violation of this command which refers only to figurative blindness.
Rabbi Meir Simcha Hacohen of Dvinsk, author of the "Ohr Somayach," gives the verse broader application in his "Meshech Chochma" commentary on Torah. He writes that both literal and figurative blindness are included in this passage.
All agree, however, that to limit this verse to its literal meaning only is a distortion. Such a distortion was the view of the Kutim (Samaritan converts to Judaism who were considered as Jews until their idol worshipping was exposed). The Kutim did not accept the Sages' interpretation of figurative blindness, and, by limiting the prohibition to literal blindness, they permitted assisting another in the commission of a sin (Rashi to Mesechta Chullin 3a).
Bava Metzia 5b
THE TENTH COMMANDMENT
"You shall not covet…anything that belongs to your neighbor" (Shmot 20:14).
This, the Tenth Commandment, is cited by Rabbi Acha of Difti as a challenge to a ruling of Rabbi Huna. Rabbi Huna ruled that if a shomer chinam (non-paid guardian) was the victim of theft, but he elects to compensate the owner rather than exempt himself by swearing that he was not irresponsible in his guarding, he must nevertheless take an oath that the object in question is no longer in his possession. The reason for this is that we suspect the shomer of coveting that object and trying to dishonestly acquire it from its owner, who is unwilling to sell it.
How can we accept his oath, asks Rabbi Acha of the Sage Ravina, if we suspect him of such dishonesty in violating the command of "you shall not covet"? Is he not equally suspect of dishonesty in his oath?
Ravina's response is that the general public interprets this commandment as coveting and taking something from its owner without paying. The shomer assumably does not see his plan as a violation of this commandment, for he offers payment. The oath can discourage him from going through with his plan, as we have no basis for assuming that he will swear falsely.
Does one indeed violate the Tenth Commandment when he deprives an owner of his possession yet pays for it?
There are two opposing answers to this question found in our classical sources. Tosefot here and in Sanhedrin (25b) takes the position that the interpretation of "You shall not covet" ascribed by Ravina to the general public is indeed the correct one. If the coveter pays for the object which he take from its reluctant owner, he has not violated this commandment. But if he fails to pay, then he violates both the commandment against coveting and the one against stealing.
Tosefot in Bava Kama (62a), however, states that even if he pays, he is guilty of trespassing "You shall not covet." Ravina only meant that, since most people don't realize that they have violated this command even if they pay, we cannot consider the shomer who is holding on to the object so dishonest such that his oath cannot be trusted.
This, too, is the position of Rambam (Laws of Theft 1:9) who writes that one who covets another's possession and pressures him into selling against his will has violated "You shall not covet" even if he pays him handsomely. For making plans on how to acquire it he is guilty of transgressing "You shall not desire" - the words added to this Tenth Commandment in their second appearance (Devarim 5:18). When he carries out those plans and acquires it, even though he pays and gets a grudging assent from the seller, he is guilty of "You shall not covet."
Bava Metzia 5b
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