Weekly DAFootnotes Bava Kama 58-64 Issue #9 Week of 6-12 Tishrei 5762 / September 23-29, 2001 By Rabbi Mendel Weinbach, Dean, Ohr Somayach Institutions ===================================== WHO GOES FIRST? “The righteous person is taken away from the evil to come.” (Yeshayahu 57:1) This passage is cited in our gemara as an explanation of why it is actually of benefit to the righteous person, the tzaddik, to be taken from this world before the sinners are when Hashem visits a collective disaster upon His people. Rashi explains this in terms of the tzaddik being spared the agony of witnessing that disaster. Other commentaries add that this is part of the Divine plan to remove the tzaddik from serving as a protective shield for his generation, which has reached the point of no return as regards Heavenly judgment. Maharsha offers a different approach: Should the tzaddik perish together with the sinners, it would give the wrong impression that he was as guilty as they. Hashem therefore takes him away from the world in advance of the punishment of the sinners, to make it clear that he does not share their guilt. (Had the tzaddik remained alive, he would have shared their fate because “once free rein is granted to the destroyer, it does not distinguish between the tzaddik and the sinner.”) It was this rule of Heavenly procedure, says Rabbi Yosef, which made it necessary for Moshe to warn his people on the eve of the Exodus from Egypt that “none of you shall go out of the door of his house until the morning” (Shmot 12:22). Since the firstborn of the Egyptians were being slaughtered, there was a general danger; therefore, Jews were required to seek refuge from this destructive force by remaining in their homes until daybreak, when they would finally embark on their road to total freedom from Egyptian bondage. Bava Kama 60a MONEY OR LIFE If one takes the property of another in order to save his life, is he obligated to make compensation? This was the halachic question facing King David in one of his battles against his Philistine enemies (Shmuel II 23). There was a “piece of ground full of lentils” in which the Philistines were hiding in ambush. One of David’s options called for setting fire to these crops, which belonged to Jews. But he was not certain whether to exercise this option, as he might be obligated to compensate the owners for the crops, even though they were being destroyed for the purpose of saving the lives of the king and his soldiers. His powerful desire for a decision on this matter by the Sanhedrin convened in Beit Lechem is described as a longing for water from the well in that city. Three of his warriors “broke through the camp of the Philistines and drew water out of the well.” They returned with the ruling of the Sanhedrin that, although compensation is generally required for destruction of property even if done for the sake of saving life, David, however, would be exempt from such payment because he, as king, had the right of eminent domain to expropriate for royal needs. David’s response was to refuse to drink the “water” which his courageous warriors had brought him. He did not wish to exploit his royal prerogative at the expense of the field’s owner, and he abandoned this option. This explanation of the gemara at hand is that of Tosefot and Rosh, who both posit that there is no question that a Jew may steal or destroy another’s property if his life depends on it; the only question, they hold, is whether one must make compensation. Other commentators, however, infer from Rashi’s commentary that the question was whether one may even save his life at the expense of taking from another person, even if he intends to repay him. One of these, Rabbi Yaakov Ettlinger in his Responsa Binyan Zion, suggests that even Tosefot would concede that it is forbidden to save a life at another’s expense where subsequent compensation is impossible. He applies this to prohibiting an autopsy even where this can save a life, as there is no way of restoring the dignity stolen from the deceased. This is in direct conflict with the ruling of Rabbi Yechezkel Landau in his Responsa “Noda B’yehuda” permitting autopsies when there is a clear case of saving life. Bava Kama 60b ===================================== If you like this e-mail please share it with a friend. ===================================== To subscribe to this list please e-mail DafYomi-subscribe@ohr.edu To unsubscribe e-mail DafYomi-unsubscribe@ohr.edu ===================================== (C) 2001 Ohr Somayach International - All rights reserved.