LIVING UP...

...to the Truth	

by Rabbi Dr. Dovid Gottlieb
Second Revised Edition

Originally Transcribed by Joshua Hermelin
Under the Title The Search for Truth

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The following text is being provided to you by Ohr Somayach Institutions, 
Jerusalem.  You may view it, download it, print it, and distribute it.  
However, the material is Copyright (C) 1996 by Rabbi Dr. Dovid Gottlieb.  
The text may not be used for commercial purposes or published in ANY form 
without the express written permission of the author.

Rabbi Dr. Gottlieb is a former professor of philosophy at Johns Hopkins 
University, is an internationally acclaimed lecturer and author of several 
books.  He is presently a senior lecturer at Ohr Somayach Institutions in 
Jerusalem.

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                   Preface to the Second Revised Edition

	In the last one and a half years a great deal of progress has been 
made on this manuscript. There are  three very obvious changes. Summaries 
have been inserted on almost every page so that the reader can have a 
running formulation of the points that have been made. In fact, it has been 
suggested to me that one might read the summaries through from beginning to 
end as a first pass through the manuscript in order to become familiar with 
the ground to be covered. This strikes me as an excellent idea. In 
addition, I have placed technical comments in brackets [ ]. These comments 
are designed for those with a background in philosophy, mathematics, or 
science - and for those with an intellectually adventuresome spirit. They 
can be skipped without missing anything essential to the argument. Also, 
the title has been changed to reflect my better understanding that the 
argument is based on the princeples of responsible living.
	Not so obvious is the care that has been taken to tighten the 
formulations, to make the expression of ideas consistent, to reorganize the 
flow of argument, and to correct mistakes. For the first time I think it is 
approaching the status of written work. On the way to a book, I would call 
it a second draft. Much work remains to be done. Chapters IV (True 
Predictions) and V (Archeology) need to be greatly expanded. A  substantial 
amount of documentation must be supplied. The quality of writing could be 
vastly improved. It still has the status of work in progress. I can only 
pray that just as G-d has enabled me to get this far, He will also make the 
further work possible.
	It is a pleasure to acknowledge the help of my colleagues and 
students at Ohr Somayach, especially the summer Jewish Learning Exchange of 
1995. Their critical attention revealed a number of problems and some 
outright mistakes which have been corrected. Taffy Gould provided expert 
editing advice. Jon Erlbaum read the majority of the manuscript with 
exquisite attention to both content and editing. Since I followed their 
advice selectively, I remain fully responsible for the remaining defects. 
Rabbi Dovid Gottlieb
Channukah, 5756
Jerusalem

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                                  PREFACE

	Joshua Hermelin has provided a very significant service in 
transcribing three of my lectures.  The material presented is complex and 
controversial.  Relying on verbal transmission is not ideal for careful 
perusal.  Having a written version which can be read at one's own pace, 
reviewed, consulted repeatedly, and used to compare different sections 
simultaneously, is a great benefit.  I hope to have it distributed when the 
lectures are presented in the future.
	It must be recognized that this is the transcription of material 
presented verbally.  Were I writing this material, the text would be 
substantially different.  There is much repetition, reformulation, and use 
of nearly equivalent but somewhat different expression.  In a written text 
more attention would be paid to precision, verbal consistency and economy.  
More important, certain matters receive very curtailed treatment due to the 
limitations of the particular audience to which the lectures were given.  
For example, the mention of Pascal's argument (and game theory in general)  
needs much more elaborate treatment (which I have done privately, but not 
presented in lecture).  Similarly, the treatment of archeology  needs great 
expansion.  Thus the reader should not regard this "text" as a complete 
argument, but rather as an outline of how the argument goes.  He can assess 
its internal logic and try to anticipate how it will be finished, but the 
whole scope of the argument is not yet present.  (Work is underway to put 
it in written form.)
	In spite of these limitations, the availability of the version of the 
lectures is a great step forward in making this material available to the 
thoughtful "quest for truth" as Joshua puts it.  If the lectures continue 
to have an impact it will be due in significant measure to his efforts.
	It is a pleasure to acknowledge comments of these who read this 
material, especially Professor David Wierderker and Dr. Yisroel Asher. I am 
especially indebted to Rabbi Eliezer Shapiro for his patience and expert 
help in preparing the manuscript.

Rabbi Dovid Gottlieb
Rosh Chodesh Iyar 5754
Jerusalem


(C) 1994-6 Rabbi Dr. Dovid Gottlieb All Rights Reserved. Printed In Israel

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                                  Foreword

Before you, the reader, embark on this most fascinating journey through 
significant events of the history of the Jewish people, with its purpose 
being the revelation of the verification of the Torah, and thus the truth 
of Judaism, it is relevant to first determine your objective, and 
subsequently your mind set in approaching this most significant of topics.  
It is apparent to me that there are people who although they attempt to, 
are unable to see the truth of events.  So, before continuing, we must 
determine how you evaluate new information.  It is crucial, especially in 
the area that we will be discussing, that you approach this information 
with an open mind, for if you do not, you will automatically reject the 
information that is being unmasked.  Before we continue, I am going to ask 
you a question, the purpose of which will not be understood until further 
in the foreword.  The question is this: Do you associate positive or 
negative feelings with the term 'wedding,' or, in different words, does the 
word 'wedding' generate in you feelings of joy or feelings of despair?
	Let me illustrate what I am trying to express in terms of an 
appropriate mind set that an individual must necessarily have before 
commencing reading of the essay at hand by way of a theorem.
	The theorem will go like this: Let E be an event such that E elicits 
an emotional response from the viewer.  Let's also suppose that there 
exists a certain truth to the quality of E.  Now, let there be two people, 
A and B, that are viewing E such that from the outset, person A will have 
an open mind towards E, and person B will not have an open mind towards E.  
Most likely, person A will be able to see the truth of E, and person B will 
not be able to see the truth of E.  That is our theorem.
	Now, let me depict this by way of example.  Let's suppose that the 
event in question here is a wedding.  Now, a wedding is a very emotional 
event that generally leaves strong emotional feelings in the heart and mind 
of the viewer.  I think it is fair to say that weddings can be considered 
to be events, or occasions, that are joyous.  That is the quality of truth 
to be attached to a wedding.  Now, there are two individuals at this 
wedding.  The first individual, person A, has no pre conceived prejudices 
towards weddings and arrives at the wedding with an objective mind set able 
to distinguish the quality of truth that we attached to a wedding, namely, 
joy.  The second individual, person B, has not necessarily had the best of 
experiences at weddings.  Person B has been divorced three times, and on 
person B's most recent attempt to get married, was left at the alter.  
Therefore, person B cannot be considered to have the appropriate mind set 
to decipher the quality of truth to the wedding: joy.  Most likely, Person 
A will be able to see the joy in the wedding, and thus the truth, and 
person B will not be able to see the joy in the wedding because he/she 
harbors negative feelings towards weddings, and thus, no matter how clear 
the quality of truth is at a wedding, person B will simply not be able to 
see it.  Person B will not be able to be objective, and thus will not see 
the truth.
	Similarly here with respect to this paper.  The event at hand is the 
essay.  The topic of the essay is the historical verification of the Torah 
- and in a sense, G-d, a topic that has been known to elicit quite powerful 
emotional responses from individuals throughout history.  There exists in 
this essay a certain quality of truth, namely, evidence and logical support 
that verifies the truth of the hypothesis.  Now, one can either approach 
this essay with an open mind, or one can approach it with a closed mind.  
Those who are reading this essay to investigate the truth, will undoubtedly 
be satisfied in the analysis that is done, and will likewise be able to see 
the truth that the essay attempts to show: the historical verification of 
the Torah.  However, there are those individuals who have made up their 
minds that there is no G-d, and who even after support and proof is given 
that validates G-ds existence and the Torah, will say "Well, that's fine, 
but I still don't believe."  Those individuals are not investigating for 
the truth.  Those individuals have already made up their minds whether or 
not there is a G-d, and thus the effort put into the proof is futile.  If 
there is a table in a room, and I say "Oh, wow, isn't that a nice table?" 
and you reply, "Tables do not exist.  However, occasionally I hallucinate 
and think that I see a table.  When this occurs I immediately go and lie 
down and try to regain composure."  I don't think that any proof I would 
give to you that tables indeed exist would sway you towards the truth.  If 
you are operating within this frame of mind, nothing I do will convince you 
that tables exist.
	Now, some may try to raise an objection to what we have said.  Some 
might say "Well, that's fine, and it makes a lot of sense, if you believe 
in the original premise as to the quality of truth to an event.  Maybe I 
disagree with that premise, maybe I don't think that events have any 
specific quality of truth.  Maybe I don't think weddings are joyous events 
at all."  Now, to this individual I have only one response.  You do believe 
that events have a certain quality of truth attached to their essences.  
Your intuition tells you they do.  Let's think back to the beginning of the 
foreword.  I asked you a seemingly out of place question about whether a 
wedding elicits in you feelings of joy or despair.  How did you answer that 
question?  You answered that a wedding gives you tremendous feelings of joy 
and happiness.  So, based on your own feelings, and your own intuition, the 
premise holds.  We are not simply raising an objection to hear ourselves 
speak.  We are not interested in raising objections to satisfy some need we 
have not to hear the truth.  Save that for the PC crowd in America.  We 
want to see that given certain circumstances, option A, option B or option 
X has more evidence and support in its favor than does any other option.  
And, based on your own intuition, the proposed theorem is most valid.  This 
is not me speaking for you and telling you what you are thinking.  This is 
your thoughts, your mind, your heart, your intellect, your emotions, and 
your intuition that have lent support to this thesis.
	I only hope that I have been able to convey to you, the reader, the 
importance of a proper frame of mind upon entering this most stimulating 
task that is ahead of you.  It is very easy to fool others, and even 
yourself, into truly believing that you have analyzed certain information 
or events objectively.  Yet, if one really is able to stand back, and give 
oneself that objective outlook, he has hurdled the most difficult step to 
belief.  In his book The Closing Of The American Mind, Allan Bloom writes 
"Yet if a student can -and this is most difficult and unusual-draw back, 
get a critical distance on what he clings to, come to doubt the ultimate 
value of what he loves, he has taken the first and most difficult step 
toward the philosophic conversion."  One can say or believe whatever one 
wants with respect to objectivity, but if one hasn't truly become objective 
in his analysis, he will never let go of a belief that he possesses.  Only 
you can determine the true frame of mind that you possess.  Whatever your 
mind set may be and whatever you decide to do in terms of proceeding, it is 
important to always keep in mind what we have discussed here in the 
foreword.  If at any time you seem overly skeptical of an argument, or seem 
to be rejecting an argument outright for reasons that do not necessarily 
seem altogether adequate in your eyes, refer back to this short foreword 
and try to determine for yourself if you are being entirely objective in 
your thoughts and analysis of what is written.  I can assure you that 
immense care has been taken in what has been written here in this essay, 
and that apparent deficiencies in the arguments can often be resolved by 
simple introspection on the part of you, the reader.


The best of luck in your quest for truth,


Joshua Hermelin

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Chapter I:  The Relevance of Religion

	The question is whether religion is relevant.  What I would really 
like to argue is that this question is an incoherent question.  The 
question makes no sense.  However, I am afraid that if I argue directly 
that the question has no sense, then you readers will take it as an excuse 
for not being able to answer the question.  You will think that I am 
ducking the question.  So, I am going to adopt the following  strategy.  I    
am going to first answer the question, and then I will tell you why this 
question is illegitimate.  So, everything that you read in the next couple 
of pages, put it on hold (even though it is something that we should all no 
doubt reflect upon), and afterwards, we will dissolve it with a little 
logic.
	So, the question is: Is religion, or in our case historical 
Traditional Judaism, relevant? Yes, of course it is.  Historical 
Traditional Judaism is relevant because given the concerns that people 
typically have, the Torah has a very good track record of producing 
results.
	Take for example the issue of quality of life.  Marriage and the 
family are still fairly popular institutions in the United States and the 
Western World.  No one goes into marriage looking for a divorce.  No one 
goes into marriage looking for the kinds of tensions and unhappiness which 
make people wish they had divorces. So, a stable and fulfilling family life 
is a goal for many people.  Those of you whom have had any contact with the 
Traditional Jewish community know very well that the Torah way of life has 
a very good track record for this.  Granted it is not ideal or perfect, but 
it has a very good track record in producing that kind of family life.  For 
example, the divorce rate is comparatively low vis-a-vis secular society, 
and quality of relationships between parents and children, and between 
husband and wife, is something of which the traditional Jewish community is 
very proud.  
 	A second area of concern  for quality of life is freedom from 
addictions.  I don't have to tell you that if we put together all the 
alcoholics and all the drug addicts, and include in the drugs the middle 
and upper class pills which are openly prescribed by doctors and which are 
perfectly legal and to which people are also addicted, we would have a 
large percentage of the population battling addictions.  If 10-15% of the 
population is addicted to alcohol, and another 5-10% are addicted to drugs 
in the sense that we described, we would be talking about approximately 20% 
of the population that has a problem with addictions.  The Torah community 
is very proud that it is relatively free of these addictions.  I say 
relatively free because again the record is not perfect.  No one is 
claiming that it is perfect, but vis-a-vis the general society, if you 
would observe the phenomena the way a sociologist would observe it, plot a 
curve, and do a statistical analysis of the information, you would see that 
the incidence is  much smaller.
	A third area of concern is crime. Everyone wants to live with as 
little crime as possible.  Again, Jewish Tradition is very proud that 
within Torah communities, crime, violent crime in particular, is almost 
unknown. Imagine interviewing the presiding police officer in a precinct in 
Williamsburg, Brooklyn, Borough Park, Flatbush, Monsey, Monroe, or any 
place where you have large concentrations of Traditional Jews. Ask him how 
many times he is called out on a murder charge, rape, assault and battery, 
mugging, child abuse,  etc.  The incidence of these sort of crimes in 
Orthodox communities is very low. 
	A fourth area is literacy. The rate of literacy in traditional 
communities for children with the capacity to read is 100%. And this 
usually means competence in two languages. This is far in excess of  the 
national or regional averages. 
	No one is claiming that the Torah way of life makes all its adherents 
perfect.  This is not being claimed and is obviously not true. In no way do 
we expect that to be the case.  However, what we do expect, and what we do 
find, is that it makes the Torah community significantly better than the 
average surrounding communities.  So much so, that if we return to our 
original question, in asking whether the Torah is relevant, and given the 
standard concerns for quality of life, then the answer is yes, the Torah is 
of course relevant.
 	A  fourth concern that most people share is the meaningfulness of 
life.  As Viktor Frankl said, we suffer from an existential vacuum, the 
angst, or the ennui that the existential philosophers have written about.  
We want to know where we are going, why we are going there, and what the 
importance of going in one particular direction or another is.  
	Meaningfulness is a function of relationships, of context, of 
consequences, and of connections.  In order to understand the meaning of 
one's life, one has to have a picture of the historical perspective of the 
past, a vision of the future, and how one's life relates to that historical 
perspective.  Judaism provides that kind of perspective.  There is not only 
a recording of important episodes of history, but there is also a view of 
the dynamics of history, the laws of history if you will, where it comes 
from, where it is going, and what its purpose is.  One can achieve for 
oneself a picture of one's own position in that flow or slot, and therefore 
the meaningfulness of what one does.  
	One does this not only by taking one's life vis-a-vis the outer 
environment, but also by taking different sections of one's own personal 
life.  For example, each year, or each crucial event whether it be birth, 
achieving adulthood, marriage, having children, or experiencing death.  
Each of these is a stage on an integrated path, so that each step on the 
path is related in a determinate way to the preceding steps, and 
contributes in a determinate way to the following steps, and hence gives 
oneself a clear picture of the meaning of each particular step.  There is 
an integration of life, a plan which enables one to organize all the 
details of life around a central theme, so that each detail contributes to 
the expression of that overall theme. Even though they are tiny details, 
they contribute to the overall impact of the theme which is trying to be 
expressed.  Likewise, that in turn confers a meaningfulness on those 
individual choices, and enhances the meaningfulness of life.  So, in so far 
as we are concerned about the meaningfulness of our lives, the Torah is 
again quite relevant.
	
SUMMARY
Judaism is relevant because it contributes to our goals - specifically to 
successful marriage, reduction in addictions and crime, universal literacy, 
and a meaningful life. 

	Finally, in addition to the Torah being beautiful, profound, noble, 
challenging, mind expanding et cetera, it is also true.   And since it is 
true, of course it is relevant. If I want to live successfully in the world 
around me, if I want my actions to be intelligently related to my ends, 
then I have to know the nature of reality.  I have to know the nature of 
the world that surrounds me.  To choose intelligently means to understand 
the characteristics of the world in which I live.  
	Also, not only is truth relevant to choosing means, but also in 
adopting ends themselves.  It is important to have accurate information of 
the world around you because it can often happen that a person espouses to 
a number of goals, and when he analyses the world around him, he finds that 
those goals are incompatible to one another.  One cannot simultaneously 
realize all his goals because the world does not  allow all of them.  If 
you realize one, you will therefore prevent yourself from realizing one of 
the others, and then a choice must be made.  Ignorance of the world can 
lead one to extend oneself and to commit one's efforts to goals which 
cannot be simultaneously realized, which is of course a tragedy.  
	Take for example the twin goals possessed by many people that Judaism 
should survive as a distinct culture because it has an important distinct 
contribution to make to the world, and simultaneously are  recommending a 
path of cultural compromise of some kind or other.  They are interested in 
some kind of accommodation with Western Civilization.  Now, if one studies 
history, in particular Jewish History, one will quickly come to the 
conclusion that those two goals are incompatible with one another.  This 
path of cultural compromise, of accommodation with host civilizations, is a 
path which has been tried many times in the past.  In each case it has 
resulted in cultural failure, complete cultural disintegration. [For the 
full argument on this point, see below Historical Verification of the 
Torah, Chapter V.]
	Similarly, someone who wants to simultaneously contribute to the 
moral maturation of mankind, and also wants to contribute to Western 
Civilization, for such a person the experience of Germany should give him 
second thoughts. Germany represented the flowering of Western Civilization. 
They were great in art, literature, science, poetry, music et cetera.  Yet, 
morally speaking, they were capable of sinking, in one decade, to the 
lowest depths that humanity has ever trod.  So, one has to ask whether 
Western Civilization, morally speaking, is only skin deep and does little 
if anything to tame the beast that rages within. (Perhaps it helps in 
creating that kind of bestiality?)  At any rate, surely those two goals  
have to be scrutinized  top see if they can be made to live together.  This 
is an example of how knowing the truth is crucial not only for choosing 
means to our ends, but also for choosing our ends intelligently by making 
sure that they are jointly realizable.
	
SUMMARY
Judaism is relevant because it  provides truth about the world which 
enables us to make fruitful decisions.
	
	So much for the treatment of the question in a serious fashion.  Now, 
what I want to tell you is the truth which is that the question is really 
no question, that it can't be asked, and that it is really incoherent.  
Why?
	What does relevance mean?  Relevance is a relative term.  Relevant to 
what?  When I say that something is relevant, what I mean is that it is 
relevant to some given concerns, goals and values. For example someone is 
applying for a job. Is that fact hat he is 5'2" tall relevant? It depends: 
if they want an accountant then no, but if they want a basketball player 
then yes! Every question of relevance presupposes a context of accepted 
goals and values. For me to ask whether religion is relevant is to measure 
religion against my goals and values.  But, this presupposes that I already 
have goals and values. We could raise the question: How were they chosen?  
How were they established and justified?  
	Even more fundamentally, the Torah doesn't allow itself to be a tool 
with which we can realize our extra -Jewish or our extra-Torah goals and 
values.  The reason is that the Torah itself provides a complete set of 
values.  The Torah itself dictates what shall be the goals of man.  Thus, 
the Torah contains its own complete standard of relevance. The only way in 
which I can ask if the Torah is relevant or not is to have already decided 
not to treat it as true, not to take it on its own terms, in terms of its 
own self-conception, but rather to set something else up as a standard of 
what shall or shall not be relevant. The Torah dictates for itself its own 
standards of relevance, and so to ask whether it is relevant or not is to 
ask an incoherent question. 
 	I'll give you an analogy. There is an international commission which 
determines the rules of international chess competition. Now when they 
publish the latest rules we cannot ask: "Are those rules really valid? Are 
they correct rules of chess?" We can't ask that because they determine the 
rules of chess. Similarly here, if the Torah is going to dictate what my 
ultimate values are, and what my ultimate goals are, and my ultimate values 
and goals are my standards of relevance, then I can no longer ask whether 
the Torah is relevant.  The Torah is that which determines relevance for 
everything else.  The Torah is that to which  other things have to be 
relevant, if they are to be relevant at all. The question then becomes not: 
Is the Torah relevant to me, to mankind, to society? and so forth, but the 
question then becomes: Am I relevant to the Torah?  Is my life a relevant 
life?  I become the subject matter of the question, not the one who asks of 
the question.  
	
SUMMARY
Relevance is relative to a standard set by our goals and values. To ask if 
religion is relevant is to evaluate religion by a standard external to 
religion itself. Judaism contains its own goals and values, and thus its 
own standard of relevance. Therefore it falsifies Judaism to assess its 
relevance to external standards. Judaism is the standard of relevance for 
everything else. 


	Now, this idea that the Torah can dictate goals and values is going 
to run counter to the intuition of many. Many people think that they think 
that values are relative. (Or rather many people think that they think 
that, because I am going to argue that they don't  really think it.) 
Relative values means that each person chooses his own values, each person 
makes his own commitments, no one can tell anyone else how they are going 
to live and what they should pursue. In short, the question of values, 
ethics and morals is purely a personal question, a subjective question.  I 
am not drawing fine distinctions between relativism, nihilism, subjectivism 
et cetera. Let's just lump it all together: there is no objective standard 
of right and wrong.  That, anyway, is what they think they think.  
	Now, I am not going to address this question philosophically simply 
because 2500 years of philosophical ethics has produced nothing  conclusive 
on the question.  We are still floundering around much as we were before 
Plato and Aristotle started the current tradition.  So, instead of arguing 
about the question philosophically, I am going to argue to you as people.  
I am going to argue what is called ad hominem.  I am going to argue that 
you yourselves do not hold this position.  You may think you do, you may 
have been taught  the phrases, but I can ferret out of you intuitions which 
are very much at variance with this conception.  I think that I will show 
you, unless one or two of my readers are very recalcitrant which I doubt, 
that you are believers in absolute universal binding values, and the only 
question is what particular values are the correct values. 
	So, let me argue to you, ad hominem, that you really do believe in 
this shockingly old fashioned thesis.  Consider the following two 
conflicts.  Number one, you have two conflicting desires.  You want to go 
to the rock concert and you want to go to the hockey game, but they are at 
the same time.  So, you have to decide what to do.  So you say "Well let's 
see, the concert costs $35, the ice hockey game costs $45, that one's 
farther away, this one would be more exciting, but that one happens more 
rarely, but this one my friend wants to go to, or that one not," and so on.  
You make up a calculation and you decide "Okay, I'm going to the concert." 
That is the first case.
	Now, the second case.  You have a rock concert to go to and you have 
a promise to keep, and there is a conflict and you cannot do both.  Again 
you weigh up that the rock concert only happens once a year, but then 
again, I made this promise, these people need it and so on.  Again, you 
weigh up all the factors, and you make a decision to go to the concert.  
That is the second case.
	Now let's suppose that in both cases, later, you feel as if you have 
made a mistake.  You go back over it and you say "No, I should not have 
made that decision, I should have made the other decision.  I wish I had 
made the other decision.  If I could do it all over again, I would do it 
the other way."
	Now, I suggest to you that in the case where you chose the rock 
concert over the promise (the second case), it is relevant, reasonable, and 
coherent that you feel guilty.  I am not saying that you have to feel 
guilty, or that you will feel guilty.  But, if a person does happen to feel 
guilty, it is a normal response to have that feeling.  Whereas, in the 
first case, where you chose the rock concert over the hockey game, if a 
person feels guilty in that circumstance, it is pathological. It is not 
logically relevant to feel guilty for having chosen the wrong one of your 
desires.  This is now not a point about psychology, but rather a point 
about logic.  The conflict of desires on the one hand, and the conflict of 
a desire with a recognized obligation on the other hand, produce the 
relevance of an entirely different kind of emotion - the logical relevance 
of the emotion.  This is an indication that we do not conceive of our 
obligations on a par with our desires, our inclinations, our feelings, and 
the rest of our subjectivity.  But, this is  merely indicating evidence.
	
SUMMARY
Many people think they believe that values are relative. But they recognize 
that a failure to live up to one's values makes guilt a relevant reaction, 
which is not the case for a failure to satisfy desires. This indicates that 
we experience our values differently from our desires.

	Let me argue the case directly now, the case for what you really 
think.  The following story appeared in the Wall Street Journal a number of 
years ago.  There was a student at a philosophy course who was assigned to 
write a paper on ethics.  He wrote a paper defending the thesis that there 
are no universal objective values.  Everyone can more or less do what one 
likes, choose one's own commitments and so on.  He received the paper back 
with an "F" on it.  He  went to the professor and  said: "Why did you fail 
me?"  The professor replied: "Because your wrong," and the student said: 
"Prove it!"  The professor  took out all the standard arguments that prove 
why there are objective values, and to each argument, the student  said: "I 
don't believe that...I'm not committed to that," or, "I don't accept 
that...that doesn't persuade me," and so on down the line.  After a half an 
hour, the student  said: "Well, see, you tried out all your arguments and I 
am unmoved."  The professor then replied "I'm going to fail you anyway, and 
not only that, I'm going to fail you in the course."  The student, feeling 
a little unsettled and worried,  said: "You can't do that!"  The professor  
replied: "Of course I can. I put an F right here, see?  Then, I sign my 
name over here.  There's nothing to it!"  The student then said: "No, no, 
you have no right to do that!"  
	What did the student say?  "You have no right to do that?"  This is 
the student  who has  denied the objectivity of value, thus denying the 
universality of value.  Who is he to tell the professor what rights he has?  
Suppose the professor says, "My value that I have chosen  is the following.  
I fail all those whom disagree with me, and I give A's to all those who 
agree with me."  Now, the student, given his position, cannot  criticize 
the professor because he has just defended the thesis that anybody can 
choose whatever values he likes.
	Now let me ask you: with whom do you agree in this story? Do you side 
with the student, or with the professor? I think we should side morally 
with the student - he is clearly a victim. But then what about his paper? 
His thesis that values are relative gives him no room to complain when he 
is treated unjustly! If the student wants to condemn the professor, he 
needs to have objective values which apply to the professor no matter what 
the professor thinks.
	If you reject objective values then you give up the ability to 
condemn even the most outrageous injustice. What can you say even to a 
Nazi? He will tell you: "You chose your values, I chose mine. Who are you 
to tell me what values to choose? You mollycoddle Jews; I kill them. The 
future will be decided by the stronger army!" When you protest that what he 
does is unjust, evil, you are only expressing your private choices. Why 
should that be of any relevance to him? 
	The fact is that there is a deep inconsistency here. When I want to 
stifle a nagging conscience, and when I want to throw off the ideals of a 
society with which I disagree, then I become a nihilist, I become a 
subjectivist, I become a relativist, everyone can choose their own their 
own values, and everyone makes their own commitments.  But, the minute that 
someone tries to interfere with me, the minute someone tries to limit my 
freedom, I then suddenly become a universalist, an absolutist: I trumpet my 
universal values and expect the other person to pay attention.  
	I don't merely fight it out with the Nazi, I don't believe that the 
reason Democracy should triumph over the Nazis is because we have more guns 
than they do. I brand the Nazi as evil!  Also, I expect all the people who 
have moral conceptions, and who are not evil themselves, to agree with me.  
When I declare the Nazi as evil, I don't think of myself as just letting 
off steam the way some philosophers would have it.  We want our own freedom 
that we expect other people to respect.  That being the case, we all 
believe in absolute, universal and binding values.  The only question is, 
which ones are they?
	
SUMMARY
The fact that people are willing to condemn injustice in others despite 
their choice of different values shows that people believe in universal 
objective values.

	So, which absolute, universal and binding values are the ones which 
we should believe in?   When you come down to cases there is a lot of 
difficult discussion, and that is where the real interesting and important 
issues lie.  Some people will say that it is patent: The absolute value and 
the absolute responsibility is not to interfere with other people.  But 
this is not so obvious.  Interference can be defined in a variety of ways.  
Take for example zoning laws. When someone buys a plot of land you tell 
him: "No! No two family houses, just one family houses."  The purchaser 
will respond: "But it's my plot of land, they are my bricks, I hired the 
workers, why can't I build whatever I like? I don't care about your desire 
to preserve a certain quality to the neighborhood."  
	Well that's too bad, because even though it is his land, he will 
still not be allowed to build whatever he wants. Social legislation in 
general is like this. You tell someone who owns his own restaurant that he 
has to serve the public indiscriminately.  But suppose he says "I only want 
to serve blue eyed people, I like blue-eyed people.  Brown-eyed people make 
me nervous."  Well that is too bad.  He can't keep brown eyed people out. 
Why not? What counts as freedom from interference is a difficult matter, 
and it is going to be discussed and debated because people have different 
ideas.  
	In any case the general point remains:  no one believes across the 
board in the subjectivity or the relativity of values.  That being the 
case, I hope that you can at least accept the possibility of a philosophy, 
like the Torah, which says that there is an objective, universal, binding 
standard.
 	People  may still try to argue as follows.  Values cannot be 
objective because in the last analysis, I have to choose my own values.  I 
have to make the choice.  You can talk to me, you can show me the relevant 
facts, you can ask me to read the important novels or philosophical works 
which will have an impact on me, but in the last analysis, I have to make 
the choice.  So, how could it possibly be objective?  How can there be a 
universal standard if everyone has to make his own choice?
	Now, that is nothing but a complete, irrelevant fallacy, and I will 
prove it to you. We will compare it with truth,  in particular with 
science. Suppose someone said: "There can't be an objective truth, there 
can't be a reality, because in the last analysis, I have to decide what to 
believe.  You could present me with the evidence, you could present me with 
the arguments, you could present me with all the theories and how they fit 
the data, but in the last analysis, I, and only I will have to make the 
decision to believe it or not to believe it.  So, therefore, there can't be 
any objective standard and there can't be any universal standard.  Each 
person's standard is his own standard for himself."  
	No one is going to buy that in science because science distinguishes 
between my choice of what to believe on the one hand, and the standard for 
correctness of belief on the other hand.  Of course I will decide what I am 
ultimately going to believe and what I am not going to believe, but that 
means I can decide to believe  what agrees with the real world, and is 
true, or I can to decide to believe what disagrees with the real world, and 
hence is false.  The fact that I am making the decision does not imply that 
there is no correctness or incorrectness to the decision. The same thing is 
true with respect to values.  The mere fact that I am going to decide what 
values to espouse and what values to commit myself to has nothing to do 
with the question as to whether or not there is an objective, universal 
standard.
	As we will see in detail in chapter II, there are two basic attitudes 
toward religion.  There is the pragmatic attitude and the realist attitude.  
One either looks at religion as a tool for self-realization, for self-
actualization, for development of character, all as part of our cultural 
heritage. Or, one looks at religion as the picture of reality that we live 
in.  Now then, from this point of view, if someone is going to look at it 
as reality, reality now not only includes factual reality, not only where 
did the world come from, how is it governed, where is it going, what is the 
essence of mankind and so on. It is also going to give us an objective 
account of what are values, of what are obligations, and what are goals 
that are universal and binding.  So, in a rather convoluted way, we can 
come back in the end to the question of relevance.
	If one is committed to understanding the world in which we live, if 
one wants to grasp reality mentally so as to live in it consciously, then 
discovering the truth of religion, if it is true, becomes one of life's 
most relevant projects.  If there is a possibility, more than just a 
logical possibility, but if there is some evidence for the truth of Judaism 
in particular, then one has an overriding interest, it seems to me, in 
sifting that evidence, in investigating the possibility so as to come to a 
reasoned and informed conclusion as to whether or not it is true.  Because, 
if it is true, then with respect to the first half of this discussion, 
given our concerns it will be tremendously relevant.  Secondly, with 
respect to the second half of the discussion, it will then become the 
standard of relevance, and it will dictate the ultimate meaningfulness and 
significance of our lives.

SUMMARY
There is controversy in particular value judgments, but that does not 
contradict the existence of objective values. Nor does the fact that each 
person must make his own value commitments contradict objective values; 
just as in science each person decides what he will believe and yet there 
is a standard of correctness, so too for value. 

===========================================================================

Chapter II:  Religion: Pragmatism Or Truth?

	There are two fundamental attitudes towards religion.  I believe that 
they are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, that is to say, that everyone 
adopts exactly one of these two attitudes.  I call them the pragmatic and 
the realist.  Now, what I will try to do in this chapter is to describe to 
you these two attitudes, and to evaluate whether they are on a par or 
whether one is more fundamental, more appropriate, or more justified.  
Then, we will describe how the more fundamental of the two attitudes should 
be implemented and practiced.
	The pragmatic attitude starts with the self. I am a person with 
goals, desires, hopes, fears, projects, scruples and so on.  There are 
various things that I want to accomplish, and I look at the world as a set 
of resources to accomplish my projects.  All of human history and human 
culture can be seen as a means, or tools which I select to further my 
goals.  
	This attitude, the pragmatic attitude, can be applied, among other 
things, to religion.  Religion can also be used to serve goals. It can 
unite society by coordinating activities and creating  mutual understanding 
and support. It can serve personal goals by increasing sensitivity, 
providing a feeling of oneness with the universe, strengthening courage, 
and so on.  (Sometimes these goals are combined.  If someone convinces the 
rest of his citizens that he is a demi-god, then he will have both a 
political and a personal benefit!)  
	The pragmatic attitude towards religion leads to the expectation that 
different cultures, different times, and different periods will have 
different forms of religious expression because their goals, needs, and 
values will be quite different - we expect the religions of ancient Egypt, 
ancient Rome, and modern Los Angeles to differ from one another.  
Similarly, we expect the religious expression of an individual to vary 
through his lifetime.  The goals and aspirations of a seventeen year old, a 
thirty-five year old and a sixty year old are usually different.  
	Pragmatic religious expression would likely be eclectic.  There is no 
reason to be bound by any one particular tradition.  If a Hindu prayer is 
inspirational on Tuesdays, and a Moslem ritual on Thursdays, and the Jewish 
Sabbath on Saturdays, there is no reason not to combine them.  Indeed, 
there is no reason to be bound to tradition at all - religious creativity 
will be encouraged to develop new forms of expression. And of course the 
pragmatic attitude  includes the ' null' option where no religious 
expression whatsoever is found relevant to any of one's goals, and 
therefore religion is abandoned altogether.  
	
SUMMARY
The pragmatic attitude takes religion as a means to personal and social 
goals. Pragmatism expects variations in religious practice in different 
cultures, individuals, and periods of life. All religious traditions and 
new creativity provide materials for the individual's religious expression. 
For some, zero religious expression will best serve their goals.
	
	The second is the realist attitude.  The realist wants truth.  Every 
religion has some story to tell.  Where did the universe come from?  What 
is its fundamental nature?  What forces guide its development?  What is the 
nature of the human being?  What will the future be?  The realist wants the 
religion whose story is true.
	[I am skirting a difficult problem here: are pragmatism and realism 
really distinct? One might say that among my goals is to know the truth. 
Then pragmatism defined as seeking means to achieve my goals will include 
realism. But it is not obvious that we want truth as a goal. We all 
appreciate that truth is an indispensable means to my other goals; perhaps 
this is all we want from truth. In any case, if you think that truth can be 
a goal, then think of pragmatism as defined to exclude truth, i.e. 
pragmatism means the assessment of everything as a means to achieving my 
goals other than acquiring truth. Then the two positions will be distinct.]  
	Now put this way, it is obvious that everyone is a realist and 
everyone is a pragmatist.  Everyone has goals, desires, hopes, and 
projects, and looks to his culture as means and materials to further those 
projects.  Similarly, everyone has an interest in the truth, since truth is 
an indispensable means to achieve other goals.   When I say that these two 
attitudes are mutually exclusive, what I mean is what a person will do if 
he is forced to choose.  
	So, for example, suppose that you are exploring different religions 
and you come across one which as a pragmatist is ideal - it inspires you, 
it ennobles you, it increases your sensitivities, and it furthers the 
social projects in which you are interested.  It fits your personality like 
a glove.  It's just that there is no evidence whatsoever that its account 
of the world is true.  In fact, there may be considerable evidence against 
it.  In such a condition you would have to choose between pragmatism which 
is satisfied, and realism which is not.  
	You could have the same conflict working in the opposite direction.  
You could come across a religion where there is a complete misfit in 
pragmatic terms: it dashes your hopes, it violates your scruples, it 
requires a reorganization of your world view, your goals and your focus.  
But the evidence seems to indicate that its picture of the world is true.  
Under those conditions you again have to make a choice between pragmatism 
and realism, and there the criteria obviously will conflict.  So that when 
it comes to crucial choices of this kind, all people adopt one or the other 
of these two attitudes: the pragmatist or the realist.  
	
SUMMARY
The realist attitude assesses religion in terms of the truth of its 
description of  the world. The two attitudes will conflict for religions 
which are pragmatically useful but lack evidence of truth, and for 
religions which are pragmatically useless but do possess evidence of truth. 
Then a choice must be made between the attitudes. 

	Now, it is obvious that there are hundreds of millions of pragmatists 
at the very least, and hundreds of millions of realists.  The world has 
many people of both types.  The question is, are these two attitudes 
equally appropriate and equally valid, and people are split in terms of 
their personalities and preferences, or, is one or the other more 
fundamental and more appropriate?  
	It seems to me that the fundamental attitude with which one must 
begin any investigation is the realist.  As long as there is the 
possibility of truth in any investigation, one has the responsibility to 
search for the truth.  Only if we can conclude that there is no truth to be 
had is it justifiable to make our decisions on a pragmatic basis. 
	I will give you some examples of why this is so.  Imagine that you 
are a teacher and that you have caught one of your students cheating.  You 
call in the parents for a conference, and you tell the parents that their 
child has a problem: "Your child cheats on exams, copies homework from 
other children," and so on.  Suppose that the parents say that you are a 
liar, and that you have a vendetta against their child.  Furthermore, they 
tell you that they have an uncle who is on the school board, and that if 
you keep persecuting their child, they will have you fired.  Why would we 
not respect that sort of reaction?  Because the child's cheating is a 
matter of fact. You presumably have evidence of the cheating.  A parent who 
disregards the evidence and believes what he thinks it is convenient for 
him to believe, is regarded as irresponsible and irrational for so doing.  
	Similarly, some people who smoke have said to me that smoking isn't 
really injurious to your health.  All the research is phony, it is paid off 
by underground left-wing groups who want to discredit the big tobacco 
companies. Why don't we credit that type of response?  Because the danger 
to your health is a matter of fact.  If there is evidence the very least a 
person must do is survey the evidence, and if he has an objection to it, 
offer it in logical terms, and not just dismiss it on an unfounded charge 
of bias or fraud.  
	We don't credit pragmatic responses when there is evidence available 
which could lead to the truth.  Any investigation must begin with the 
realist attitude.  If and when the realist attitude comes up empty - if the 
investigation leads to the conclusion that there is no truth to be had - 
then of course we fall back on pragmatism.  There is nothing left to do.  
But, the realist approach must be applied at the outset.  From the 
philosopher's point of view, it is especially unfortunate that the vast 
majority of pragmatists, vis-a-vis religion, are so by default.  They have 
never undertaken any serious investigation.  They simply assume that there 
simply is no truth to be had, and therefore fall back on what is useful for 
their life projects.  What we are going to do is pursue the realist 
attitude to see how far it can take us.  
	[The responsibility to seek the truth is of course only one 
responsibility among many, and it may be overridden when it conflicts with 
a more pressing responsibility. For example, suppose seeking the truth will 
cost my life! Also, there is considerable discussion of the foundation of 
the responsibility to seek the truth. As mentioned in the last [ ], it is 
be a crucially important means to our other goals, and it may itself be a 
goal. This is a theoretical matter which does not touch its validity. In 
our case, since the utility of having the truth is infinite (see the 
discussion of Pascal's wager  in chapter III), the responsibility to seek 
the truth obviously applies.]
	
SUMMARY 
In any investigation upon which a decision will be based we are required to 
start with realism. To make a decision pragmatically without considering 
the evidence of truth is irrational and irresponsible.  	
	
 	 One immediate consequence of approaching religion as a realist and 
searching for the truth is to be prepared to reject falsehood.  One cannot 
be searching for the truth unless one is prepared to reject inadequate 
ideas as false.  In any area where we believe that there is a truth, we 
recognize that in the collection of contradictory opinions, if they truly 
are contradictory, no more than one can be true.  
	We do not accord equal intellectual status to groups such as The Flat 
Earth Society which believes to this day that the Earth is flat.  And 
whereas we may not throw them in jail or recommend that they be exiled or 
censored, we certainly do not accord their opinion equal intellectual 
status.  We are not likely to offer them equal time to teach their opinions 
in the schools, or to write their alternative textbooks, because what they 
believe is nonsense.  We react similarly with people who don't believe in 
the reality of the Holocaust.  We are not likely to give their views equal 
intellectual weight because we are dealing with a matter of fact, and the 
evidence is against them.  To be searching for the truth means to be 
prepared to reject falsehood.  
	Now, when it comes to religions, and I am talking now about the major 
world religions, they contradict each other on some crucial aspect of 
belief.  That is to say if you take any two of the major world religions, 
there is some proposition about which they disagree. And that being the 
case, no more than one can be wholly true. For, if religion A wholly true 
then, each of the others is wrong at least on the proposition in which it 
disagrees with religion A.
	For example, according to Catholicism, a certain man was G-d.  
According to Islam, no man ever was G-d and no man ever could be G-d. Islam 
believes that Mohammed was a true prophet while Catholicism denies this.  
They cannot both be right. At least one of them has to be wrong.  Hinduism, 
in the mainstream of Hindu thought, believes that the world is infinitely 
old, that there was not a creation at a finite time in the past.  Since 
Catholicism and Islam share a belief in creation, and Hinduism rejects it, 
that means that no more than one of the three can be wholly true.  Buddhism 
goes further and denies the existence of a creator altogether.  (Hinduism 
would allow a creator who has always been creating the universe from 
infinity.)  Then, no more than one of the four can be wholly true.  Since 
Judaism believes in creation of finite age, that no man was G-d and that 
Mohammed was not a prophet, Judaism is opposed to all four. That means that 
no more than one of these five can be wholly true.  
	And so it goes. Take any major world religion and it will contradict 
the others on some fundamental aspect of belief. Therefore no more than one 
can be wholly true. (Of course, as I'm sure you have picked up, it is 
possible for none of them to be wholly true.)  So if we are looking for the 
truth, we cannot give equal weight to all religions (unless we find that 
they are all false). If one is wholly true then the others are not. 
	Now, a common response to this observation is to say that maybe we 
could look at religions in terms of what they share.  Perhaps there is a 
certain common core to all religions, a general sense that there is a 
superior power, and an appreciation of the spiritual and the moral aspects 
of life, a sense that our material world is not self contained and that it 
really is the surface of something that is much deeper.  Perhaps we could 
take this common core which all religions share, approach it realistically, 
see it as the truth, and then with regard to the other matters in which the 
religions differ, look at them as matters of style.  
	Matters of ethnicity, which really are not crucial, do not have to be 
regarded as true and could be selected on the basis of pragmatism.  We 
could have a split methodology - realists for the core and pragmatists for 
the trappings.  Does it really matter whether you eat meat on Fridays, 
smoke cigarettes on Saturdays, or have one month a year in which you fast 
all day long?  Those are surely not matters of truth, those are purely 
matters of style.  
	This suggestion is attractive until you start to pin it down in 
detail.  What exactly should go into the core (the core being beliefs 
shared by all religions)?  Can any of the accounts of our origins go into 
this core?  Obviously not, since, as we just pointed out, different 
religions have radically different views about the origins of the universe: 
created by a personal being a finite number of years ago, or going through 
infinite cycles, or existing independently without the guidance of an all 
powerful being, and so on. There will be no scriptures that can go into the 
core because no scriptures are agreed upon by all religions.  There will be 
no prophets in the core  because no prophets are recognized by all 
religions.  
	An account of the soul?  Sometimes religions share a word without 
sharing a concept because it is difficult to translate from one language to 
another. It may be said that all religions recognize the "soul," but when 
you look to see what they think the soul is, you get so radically different 
a picture, that there is no common concept underlying the variety.  
	Is the soul a personal spirit whose personhood, whose uniqueness is 
essential and infinite - eternal - and never to be destroyed as you have, 
for example, in Judaism?  Or, is the soul an illusion, something which must 
be stripped away so that one achieves a consciousness that does not 
distinguish one significantly from a rock, a praying mantis, or a sea gull 
as you have in some Eastern religions?  Is the ultimate relationship with 
G-d like a drop of water falling into an ocean, which many religions have 
as their metaphor for mystical union with G-d, where the individuality of 
the drop is lost entirely? Or is it the Jewish conception - the attachment 
of one thing to another, like gluing a pebble onto a wall, where the pebble 
becomes part of the wall, while at the same time its unique contours are 
preserved?  The mere fact that religions may share a word called "soul" 
doesn't mean that they share an underlying concept.  
	To what can one look forward in the future?  Will this physical world 
continue to exist forever as some have it, or will it be radically 
transformed and exist in another form as Judaism has it?  Or, will it be 
totally obliterated as some forms of Christianity have it?  Since religions 
differ on this matter, nothing about it can go into the core.  
	As soon as you pin down religious ideas in detail, you find that the 
differences are radical, and that nothing can be claimed to be shared by 
all religions.  Even the suggestion that perhaps religions share a 
commitment to morality turns out to be superficial in this way.  All 
religions might agree that it is wrong to steal.  But when you ask for the 
concept behind the rule, why one shouldn't steal, you get radically 
different views.  For example, mainstream Hinduism sees stealing as an 
action which reinforces the ego.  The ego is the great enemy of achieving 
nirvana.  Every person's goal in this world is to achieve nirvana which is 
some sort of experiential state for himself, some sort of bliss.  
Therefore, stealing for a Hindu ultimately is pragmatically ruled out.  It 
is bad for you. You are depriving yourself of achieving the greatest 
happiness, the greatest bliss, the greatest tranquillity of which you are 
capable.  The ultimate justification for not stealing is pragmatic.  
	Now, when you take that same rule in Jewish terms, you get an 
entirely different underlying conception.  In Jewish terms, stealing is 
wrong because morality is paramount.  Morality is not justified because it 
contributes to happiness. A pragmatic reason not to steal isn't moral at 
all.  A person who never steals because he believes that there are 
policemen watching him all the time, and he believes that if he steals he 
is going to be put in jail, hasn't begun to become moral. Any kind of self-
serving justification from a Jewish point of view is to misunderstand the 
fundamental concept of morality altogether. A mere behavioral rule does not 
give the core any religious content. 
	So the idea that religions have a common core which could be declared 
true and that the rest is just trappings is a mistake.  The hearts of 
religions, their most fundamental beliefs contradict one another. Therefore 
we are thrown back on the radical position that if we are looking for 
truth, we must be ready to declare falsehood when we discover it.  
	
SUMMARY
The search for truth requires the rejection of falsehood. Religions 
contradict one another, so not more than one can be wholly true; to find 
one wholly true means the others are not. The idea of a common core to all 
religions fails since the contradictions between religions prevents the 
proposed core from having any content.
	
	So then, the question is how should we look for truth?  How should we 
pursue it?  And, if we are looking for the truth and we are to be objective 
and open-minded, shouldn't we give equal time to all of the candidates?  
Shouldn't we take time to familiarize ourselves with not only Judaism, but 
also Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism, Confucianism, and 
Shintoism (just to mention the major world religions)?  But, to become 
thoroughly familiar with the inner workings of a religion, as I am sure you 
know, is not a trivial matter.  Even with six months for each religion, 
which is probably too short, you are talking about a four year 
investigation.  Most people just don't have the time. Well, I hope to show 
you on general intellectual grounds that we can be objective and open-
minded and yet drastically reduce the scope of the investigation.  
	The method of searching for truth, in my view, is the scientific 
method.  It is the only method which we have. With all its limitations and 
all of its weaknesses, it is the only neutral method we have in searching 
for the truth.  The trouble is, the scientific method is very poorly 
understood. (That includes scientists. The mere fact that you can do 
something does not mean that you understand what you are doing and why you 
are doing it.)  So, I will take the remainder of this section to describe 
to you how the scientific method works in detail, and show you how it 
applies to the study of religion.  And you will see, I hope, that when we 
apply the scientific method, the scope of the investigation can be 
drastically reduced.  
	The first element of the scientific method is that for an idea to be 
taken seriously as true, there must be positive evidence of its truth.  
Whoever offers an idea and claims that it is true, must present positive 
evidence of its truth.  If that sounds obvious to you, consider the 
following.  I want you to meet uncle Paddy from northern Ireland who 
believes in Leprechauns.  I asked him once: "Uncle Paddy, do you really 
believe in Leprechauns,   little green men who scurry behind the furniture 
and eat up the crumbs that you leave on the dining room table at night?"  
And he said: "Yes, absolutely, I believe in Leprechauns."  So I said to 
him: "Uncle Paddy, do you have any evidence for Leprechauns?  Did you ever 
see any?  Did you set up a high speed  camera and catch them in flight?  
Did you ever find wee little foot prints in the dust?"  He said that he had 
no evidence whatsoever.  So I said to him: "Then why do you believe in them 
if you have no evidence?"  
	He answered me: "Can you prove that there are no Leprechauns?  Can 
you refute the existence of Leprechauns?"  Now, I must say that gave me 
pause.  Can I prove that there are no Leprechauns?  How would I do that?  
Then I realized that no, I cannot prove that there are no Leprechauns.  So, 
Uncle Paddy said: "Well    then why are you prejudiced against them?  You 
cannot prove that they do not exist, so you should treat them on a par with 
everything else.  Why do you just dismiss them?"  Now, is Uncle Paddy 
right?  (Try this on your scientist friends and see what kind of an answer 
you get!)  
	Uncle Paddy is wrong, and I will explain why.  I could go on to ask 
Uncle Paddy: "Could you please describe the Leprechauns in which you 
believe.?"  And he will say: "Oh yes, they are three inches tall, little 
green men, and wearing conical hats."  So I ask him: "Uncle Paddy, what 
about four-inch purple Leprechauns     wearing three-cornered hats?  What 
about five-inch Leprechauns, brown, wearing cubical hats?"  "Oh no,"   
Uncle Paddy will answer, "Just my little green men."  So, I will ask uncle 
Paddy: "How did you decide to believe in your Leprechauns and reject the 
others?  Can you prove that the four-inch and five-inch Leprechauns do not 
exist?  What about pixies?  What about trolls?  What about centaurs?  What 
about unicorns?  Surely there is an infinity of alternatives with all sorts 
of imaginative (to use a neutral word) alternatives.  How did you decide to 
believe in these and not those?"  
	Suppose that Uncle Paddy, sensing the weakness in his position, says: 
"Okay, okay, I have decided to become an ultra liberal - I believe in all 
of them!" Then we can make the situation is even worse by making the 
alternatives conflict so that it is impossible to accept all of them. One 
says that pixies are stronger than trolls and the other says the opposite. 
Then Uncle Paddy must choose to reject at least one of the alternatives, 
and that choice will be without reason.  Only positive evidence could 
provide a reason, and  he has no positive evidence. 
	If I am looking for truth, if I am trying to fulfill my 
responsibility to find the truth, I need a reason for my selection.  I need 
a reason for my choice, and in this realm, there is no reason to be had.  
That is why we do not pay attention to ideas without positive evidence.  It 
is correct not to credit ideas lacking positive evidence, and the reason is 
not because we know that they are false.  I will say it again, I cannot 
prove that there are no Leprechauns.  That is not the reason for rejection 
of belief.  The reason is that I have no positive evidence to believe in 
them.  And without positive evidence, it becomes one of an infinity of 
choices for which I have no justification of choice.  So even without 
refuting them, I disregard them when they do not present positive evidence 
because I have no responsibility to accept them.  
	That is the reason for the first wing of the scientific method, and 
believe it or not, this observation, as simple as it is, already suffices 
to rule out some candidates. The Far Eastern religions - Confucianism, 
Taoism, and  Shintoism - offer no positive evidence of truth.  They present 
themselves as noble, beautiful, uplifting, and inspiring ways of life. They 
claim to create harmonious attitudes and feelings of oneness with nature 
and so on.  In other words, they present themselves as pragmatically very 
successful, and in fact they may be pragmatically superb, but they do not 
offer any evidence of the truth of their stories about the world.  They 
don't say that if you practice our rules that you will be healthy, you 
won't have accidents, there won't be famine, or pestilence, or war, or 
earthquakes in your country, or that you will win the universal respect of 
mankind.  They do not make any predictions at all.  They offer no positive 
evidence of truth.  
	Therefore, a realist who is looking for the truth need not go to the 
east and spend six months mastering Shintoism, because there is no positive 
reason to accept it.  Now, I will say it again, I am not claiming that 
Shintoism is false.  I do not know it to be false. I cannot refute it.  
But, it is on a par with Leprechauns.  If they do not offer any evidence 
for the truth, then I, who am searching for the truth have no 
responsibility to take it seriously.  It becomes one of an infinity of 
alternatives and I have no grounds for a choice.  So then, the 
investigation has now been reduced by three-eighths!
	
SUMMARY
We search for truth by using the scientific method. The first element in 
the method is to require positive evidence of truth - not merely the 
impossibility of refutation. Positive evidence is necessary because without 
it there is an infinity of alternatives with no reason for choice. Since we 
are trying to fulfill our responsibility to believe the truth, we need a 
reason for our choice. The Far Eastern religions offer no positive 
evidence, so we have no need to consider them in our investigation.
	
	The next aspect of the scientific method is that when a religion, a 
theory, or a hypothesis offers evidence, the evidence must be unique.  It 
must be evidence which that religion, theory, or hypothesis can explain and 
no one else can explain.  Otherwise, it does not distinguish the opponent 
from its competitors.  In science this is described as a crucial 
experiment.  Suppose I have two theories, A and B, such that both agree 
that if you heat up this liquid for ten minutes, it will turn red. Heating 
up the liquid is probably a waste of time, because it will probably turn 
red and I won't know any more than before I did the experiment.  What I 
really want is a case where A says that it will turn red and B says it will 
turn blue.  Then I have something, because no matter what happens, (at 
least) one of the theories is going to be in trouble. (And I say in trouble 
specifically.  It does not mean that it will be false, but it will be in 
trouble because there will experimental evidence against it.)  What you 
want is a piece of evidence which one of the competitors can explain and 
the other cannot.  Then you have a differential between them.  
	Now, there are religions that offer evidence of their truth, but the 
evidence is not unique in this way, and therefore, not relevant for a 
realist who is trying to ascertain which of the alternatives is superior. 
So, for example, Islam.  One of the two main pieces of evidence that Islam 
offers for the truth of its religion is the rapid conquest of Mohammed's 
followers.  Within a century they had conquered all of North Africa, as far 
east as India, and penetrated into Europe.  Their claim is that such a 
rapid conquest is impossible unless G-d helped.  
	Now, how do non-Moslems look at that piece of evidence?  A non-Moslem 
will ask: "Well, what about Alexander?  Alexander conquered roughly as much 
of the world and he died at age thirty-two.  He did it much faster.  Must 
you say that Alexander's gods were helping him?  The Romans controlled more 
of the world and did so for three hundred years.  Must we say that the 
Roman gods are also true and were helping the Roman armies?"  We don't have 
to accept the truth of Islam to explain rapid conquest.  It happens too 
often.  There must be some other explanation for rapid conquest.  Once we 
can explain rapid conquest without appealing to Islam, rapid conquest 
ceases to be evidence for Islam.  Unique evidence is something which one 
theory can explain and other theories cannot explain. 
	[The other piece of evidence offered for Islam, in case you are 
interested, is this. If you master Arabic and read the Koran you will see 
that such a book could not have been written by a human being. Only G-d 
could have written it. I will leave it to you to evaluate this sort of 
"evidence."]
	For another example - now this is a burlesque but it makes the point 
in a dramatic way - there are certain groups which offer what they call 
direct evidence of the truth of their religious beliefs.  They will tell 
you: "We do not ask you to take anything on faith, you do not have to trust 
any scriptures or prophets. Just come and join the ashram, sit cross legged 
on the floor, eat mushrooms, say "om," get up at two-thirty in the morning 
for cold showers, and after a month you are going to feel very different.  
Indeed, we will tell you how you are going to feel, we will predict it for 
you.  Now try it out, we don't even charge rent Follow our rules for a 
month and see if you do not feel exactly the way we describe you are going 
to feel."  
	So the searcher for truth thinks to himself: "Wow, this is terrific.  
No leap of faith.  Nothing irrational.  I am the test of my own experience, 
so I will have the direct evidence.  I will feel it."  So, he joins the 
ashram for thirty days and he sits cross legged, eats mushrooms, takes cold 
showers and so forth, and indeed, after thirty days, he feels quite 
different.  In fact, he feels exactly the way they said he would feel.  
Then he concludes, "Well here it is, I have the truth in my own 
experience."  
	Is that valid?  No, that is not valid at all.  The fact that they 
could tell you how you will feel after thirty days of following their 
regimen means nothing more than they have some practical, psychological 
knowledge.  Maybe they have tried it, and they themselves experienced how 
it feels.  Maybe they had some genuine psychological insight.  What does 
that have to do with the truth of their religious ideas?  Do I as a Jew 
have to deny that if you sit cross legged, say "om," and take cold showers 
you are going to feel the way they say?  I don't have to deny that.  I can 
accept that, and so can a Christian, a Moslem, and an atheist.  Therefore, 
it is not unique evidence.  It is not evidence that only they can explain.  
All of us can agree to this sort of evidence, so it doesn't count for them 
or against anyone else.  It does not help us select them as more likely 
true than any of the other competitors, and therefore it is irrelevant.
	Now, Hinduism and Buddhism both offer evidence of the truth of their 
religions, but the evidence is all in terms of personal experience.  If you 
meditate long enough on the sound of one hand clapping, something will 
happen to your mind.  Indeed, it will.  You will think and feel quite 
differently.  So what?  Does that mean that there is a transmigration of 
soul, or that there is a great  god-head in the sky, or that you are in 
touch with eternal reality, or anything else?  What does one thing have to 
do with the other?  They have discovered that certain mental exercises 
result in certain forms of experience.  Since I as a Jew do not have to 
deny the existence of  sartori - I might not feel that it is very valuable, 
but I do not have to deny its existence - or nirvana, or any other stages 
of mystical experience, their claiming and proving that it exists has 
nothing to do with the truth of their religion.  Only evidence that others 
reject that comes true counts as support for your particular idea.  
	
SUMMARY
The second element in the scientific method is that the evidence offered 
must be unique - explained only by the religion (or other proposition) in 
favor of which it is offered. Evidence of conquest, or evidence in personal 
experience, is not unique. Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism offer evidence 
which is not unique and therefore need not be considered in this 
investigation. 
	
	And finally, the evidence that is offered must be true.  It is fine 
to make predictions, even unique predictions, but if they do not come true, 
then, of course, you are in serious trouble.  Certain Christian sources  
assert that the reason the Jews are in exile is because they have not 
accepted the Christian Messiah. They predict that the Jews will remain in 
exile until they convert. Now, that is the right sort of prediction, that 
the Jews will be in exile until they accept the Christian messiah.  Here, 
at least the logic was right because that is a prediction that no one else 
would credit.  No Hindu would have any reason whatsoever to expect Jews 
will stay in exile until they accept the Christian Messiah.  He would have 
no reason to believe that.  Nor would a Buddhist, a Moslem, a Shintoist, a 
Taoist, a Confucianist, or an Atheist. Certainly Jews will not credit it. 
So that is the right sort of prediction to make: a prediction that no one 
else will credit.
	But, since 1948 (the formation of the state of Israel), that 
prediction has been wearing a bit thin.  All right, in 1948 we didn't have 
Jerusalem.  Since 1967 (Israel conquered Jerusalem in the Six Day War) it 
has been wearing even thinner.  Still, there was always the Soviet Union 
holding on to its Jews making it impossible for those Jews to come.  So 
there was a last ditch hold-out position.  In the last few years even that 
has   disappeared.  (There has been massive Soviet Jewry immigration into 
Israel since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The Jews in Russia are free 
to leave.)  This prediction has simply come out false.  The fact that there 
are Jews who refuse to leave their penthouses in Manhattan in order to come 
to a smaller dwelling in Tel Aviv could not exactly be regarded as a 
punishment.  That is not what the Christian writings predict. They say that 
we will be punished in exile for not accepting the Christian Messiah, and 
that has not happened.   

SUMMARY
The scientific method holds that to be seriously considered for truth, you 
must present positive evidence, the evidence must be unique, and the 
evidence must be true. Judaism is the only religion which meets all three 
conditions. It is the only one which offers positive evidence which is 
unique and which came true. (The evidence is presented in chapters III-VII 
below.) Therefore, as realists, we are faced with only two possibilities - 
either the evidence for Judaism will be enough to convince us that it is 
true, or we will give up the search - give up being realists - and fall 
back on pragmatism.  So the investigation of Judaism is all that is 
necessary to satisfy the responsibility of realism.  

===========================================================================

Chapter III:  Belief and Action:  Criteria for Responsible Decision 

  	The Torah presents itself as a system with a variety of virtues: It 
is beautiful, inspiring, challenging, moral, profound, sensitizing, et 
cetera; and it is also true. Here I am going to deal only with truth.  All 
the rest  is correct, but I'm not going to deal with that.  I am limiting 
myself  to dealing solely with the question of truth.  The responsibility 
to investigate truth is one by which we are bound; it is something that is 
required of us. Here I am going to try to fulfill that responsibility. 	
	 First of all, when I talk about the Torah being true, I am limiting 
myself to the descriptive parts of the Torah.  Some parts of the Torah are 
not candidates for  truth.  There is poetry, all sorts of commands, 
prescriptions,   and so on.  Whether they are true or false is a very nice 
philosophical question, but I am going to side-step it.  We are talking now 
only about the descriptive part of the Torah, that is to say, the portion 
of the Torah which describes facts: This is how the world came into being; 
these historical events took place including perhaps miraculous historical 
events, prophecy, revelation, wars, famines, migrations; this is the nature 
of the human being; this is the nature of the soul; these are the 
predictions for the future, e.g. the coming of the Messiah, what happens 
after death; these are the forces that affect human history; this is the 
way in which G-d interacts with man and so on.  These are all statements 
which are presented as descriptions of facts.  Our question will be: What 
reason is there to accept them as being true?
	However, much experience has taught me that to start an investigation 
into the truth of Judaism is fruitless without agreeing first on our 
standard of truth. Because, when I present considerations, evidence, 
arguments, and justifications, and we don't agree upon the standards by 
which those arguments should be evaluated, we end up arguing at cross 
purposes to one another.
	What standards should we have for verifying these purported truths?  
There is a standard due to Descartes that is subject to much discussion, a 
standard for knowing anything.  Descartes said that to know something means 
to be able to absolutely refute any conceivable alternative.  If I claim 
that I know A, to substantiate my claim to know A I have to be able to 
defeat any alternative absolutely. So that if I claim to know A, you can 
defeat my claim to know A if you can propose another alternative B.  All B 
has to have to qualify is to simply be  possible.  If I can't eliminate B, 
and eliminate it absolutely, then I should withdraw my claim to know A.  
That is the Cartesian standard.
	Now, I am going to reject that standard and I'm going to reject it on 
two grounds.  This will be very important because all of us have to a 
certain extent absorbed the Cartesian standard almost as a matter of 
instinct.  When someone puts forth a claim to know something, or puts forth 
an argument or puts forth evidence, the natural response is to try to 
defeat it based on the Cartesian standard. ("But isn't it still possible 
that something else is true?")  So, it is important for us to agree at the 
outset that we are rejecting the Cartesian standard.  
	The first reason for rejecting the Cartesian standard is that if you 
really live by that standard, you don't know anything!  Any claim to 
knowledge can be defeated by using the strict Cartesian standard.  
Descartes himself worried about this.  How do you know that you are not 
dreaming at the present moment?  What could you do to prove to yourself, 
absolutely, that you are not dreaming right now?  Pinch yourself?  Couldn't 
you pinch yourself in a dream?  Could you prove to yourself that in three 
minutes you won't wake up and find yourself in the twenty-first century 
saying to yourself: "Ah, that's what I get for reading historical books.  I 
dreamt myself back one hundred years to some crazy place with inadequate 
air conditioning," and so on.  Now according to the Cartesian standard you 
don't know that you are awake because here is an alternative, a conceivable 
alternative, that you are really sleeping.  You cannot eliminate it 
absolutely and therefore you do not know that you are awake.  
	[Of course, Descartes thought he could prove that (most of the time) 
we are really not sleeping. But today no one credits his proof - we cannot 
prove that we are not sleeping.]
	Bertrand Russell's example was to ask whether you know that the 
Universe is really more than five minutes old.  Five minutes old.  So you 
say, well of course I remember what happened to me yesterday.  But, the 
suggestion is that you came into existence five minutes ago with those 
memories programmed into your brain.  So you say: "Well look, I have a tape 
of the concert of the Grateful Dead, and this is a forty-five minute tape, 
so there must have been at least a forty-five minute concert to tape it 
from."  The answer is of course no, the world came into existence five 
minutes ago with the tape and its magnetic impressions already  on it.  
"But look, there are partially decayed deposits of Uranium, and next to the 
Uranium itself are the standard decay products in the normal proportions."  
Again, the suggestion is that this happened five minutes ago with the decay 
products placed next to the Uranium with the correct proportions.  So, here 
is a conceivable alternative.  You think the universe is millions, or 
billions of years old. The conceivable alternative that the universe is but 
five minutes old, having come into existence with all those features which 
you think are evidence of greater age. You can't eliminate it absolutely. 
So, according to Descartes then, you don't know that the universe is more 
than five minutes old!
	You can go on with just about everything that you believe, and if you 
have a good enough imagination, you can think up some alternative which you 
can't eliminate absolutely, and you can defeat every claim to knowledge.  
So, the Cartesian standard to knowledge is fruitless.  It is hopeless.  It 
deprives us of everything that we think we know.  Since Descartes started 
this game, for the last 350 years people have been trying to think up a 
different standard, a different criterion for knowledge.  There is no 
accepted answer to Descartes except the judgment that he is surely wrong, 
and that we will someday find an acceptable standard.  That is one reason 
for rejecting the Cartesian standard of knowledge.
	
SUMMARY
We are investigating the truth of the descriptive portions of the Torah. 
The first step is to agree on the standard by which evidence will be 
evaluated. The Cartesian standard is: to know anything we must eliminate 
every alternative possibility absolutely. One reason for rejecting this 
standard is that it wrongly implies that we know almost nothing.


	There is another reason which applies more specifically to religion.  
Whatever is the case in making up our minds about theoretical knowledge, 
when we consider life, when we come to making practical choices, we have a 
quite different standard for making those decisions in a responsible 
fashion.  The standard we employ in making responsible decisions is high 
probability vis-a-vis alternatives.  If I have to decide what to do, and I 
know that what I do depends on my circumstances - i.e., what the facts are 
- and I don't know the facts for sure, I investigate until I have high 
probability of one alternative vis-a-vis other alternatives, and then I act 
on it.  If I do so I have acted responsibly, and if I don't do so I have 
acted irresponsibly.  
	This is true for all of my decisions: what profession to master, 
where to live, whom to marry, what to do with my spare cash, how to handle 
my health and so forth.  In all cases, for myself, and especially when I 
owe you something, you expect me to act responsibly with respect to the 
obligation that I have to you.  That is the standard up to which I am held.  
I cannot plead that I didn't have a Cartesian proof and that is why I 
didn't act.  
	So, for example, I borrow your car, and you tell me: "Listen, you can 
use the car, but you should know that the brakes might have a problem.  So, 
if you hear a squeak or something, take it to the garage and have it fixed 
before you have an accident."  Then you go off for a month's trip.  You 
come back and you notice that sitting in front of your house is what once 
was your car.  Now it looks like an accordion - folded.  So you ask me what 
happened, and I say: "Well, I had an accident - the brakes slipped."  You 
say to me: "But, I warned you.  I told you that the brakes might be weak.  
Did they squeak?"  I reply: "Yes, they did squeak."  You ask me: "Well, did 
you take them in to be fixed?"  I reply: "No, I didn't take them in to be 
fixed."  You ask me: "Why not?" and I tell you: "Well, it is still possible 
that the squeak didn't mean that the brakes were weak.  It's possible that 
the squeak was caused by a loose spring or something else.  I didn't have 
any proof that it was the brakes."  
	I don't think that you would be amused!  So I didn't have any proof, 
but the probability was that it was the brakes.  After all, you told me 
that they were probably weak, and we know that weak brakes squeak.  Given 
the information that I had, the alternative with the greatest probability 
was that it was the brakes.  I certainly should have taken it in to get it 
fixed!  When I have a decision to make, the responsible way to make the 
decision is on the basis of the highest probability of truth vis-a-vis 
alternatives.
	Now, the key point here is that religion is both a matter of 
theoretics (Is there a G-d?, Did He reveal himself at Sinai?, Did He create 
the world in such and such a fashion?, What is the nature of the soul?) and 
a matter of decision.  Religion is in part a matter of how one chooses to 
live.  Soon it will be the Sabbath. You will have to decide, shall I light 
up a cigarette or shall I not light up a cigarette.  During the week you 
will have to decide, shall I have a cheeseburger or shall I not have a 
cheeseburger.  These are life decisions.  The criterion for making a life 
decision responsibly is to make the decision on the basis of high 
probability of truth vis-a-vis alternatives.  A person who waits for the 
Cartesian standard to be fulfilled, a person who waits for an absolute 
refutation of all possible alternatives, is a person who is not behaving 
responsibly.  
	Imagine a doctor.  You go to the doctor with a terrible pain in your 
lower right abdomen.  The doctor says: "Is this appendicitis or isn't it 
appendicitis?  Look, it could be an attack of nerves.  It could be an 
ulcer.  It could be psychosomatic.  It could be all sorts of things.  Do I 
have any proof that it's appendicitis?  I don't have any proof.  It could 
be all sorts of things."  Meanwhile, the person dies of a ruptured 
appendix.  What would you say?  We would say that he is irresponsible.  You 
don't wait for any proof if you have high probability of the truth vis-a-
vis the alternatives.  That is what determines responsible action.  
	So, whatever is the case with respect to theoretics, let others worry 
about that.  We are people living our lives and making decisions.  In 
particular, we have to make decisions about religion.  If so, the decision 
needs to be made on the basis of high probability of truth vis-a-vis 
alternatives, and therefore that is going to be our standard.  When I argue 
that Judaism is true, or argue that some particular aspect of Judaism is 
true, I feel I have fulfilled my responsibility if I have argued that it 
has the highest probability of truth vis-a-vis alternatives.  
	For example, I will be arguing in favor of a certain proposition A, 
and I will present my evidence and someone will say: "I see your evidence, 
but isn't it still conceivable that A is still false, even in light of the 
evidence?"  My answer will be: "Yes, it is conceivable. We are not trying 
to defeat every conceivable alternative.  We are only trying to defeat 
other alternatives which are more probable than  A.  It is not enough to 
defeat A by thinking up something conceivable.  That is too easy and is not 
to the point.  What someone has to think up is a competitor to A which has 
more positive evidence in its favor than A does.  That is much more 
difficult." 
	Here is another way of seeing this point. Suppose someone takes the 
position of a skeptic. (Some say that this is what Socrates did.) "I really 
don't know what the truth is. But you say that you do know. Well I am 
prepared to listen. Tell me what you think the truth is, and why you think 
it is the truth. I am prepared to be convinced if you can prove it. I am 
not going to accept what you believe just because you believe it - there 
are too many different beliefs for that. But if you can prove it, I will 
agree." So you present your evidence, your proof, and his response is: 
"That doesn't really prove it because something else still could be true." 
	Now what is wrong with the skeptic? What is wrong is that he puts all 
the burden of proof on you. What we need to do is be skeptical of his 
skepticism! If I present some positive evidence that my belief is true, it 
is not enough for him to merely point out that it might still be false: he 
has to present positive evidence that it is false. The mere fact that it 
might be false is not enough for him to reject it. His absolute skepticism 
- his demand for absolute proof - is unjustified and unreasonable. The 
reason that it is unjustified is that we are looking for evidence which 
justifies action. We should ask the skeptic: "All right - we gave positive 
evidence of truth. If you had to act, would that evidence suffice? Sure, 
what we believe could still be false. But the evidence is strong enough to 
require us to act as if it were true. And if you did not act this way, you 
would be acting irresponsibly. That is enough for us."     
	
SUMMARY
 The second reason for rejecting the Cartesian standard for knowledge is 
that religion is a matter of how we act, and we justify action in terms of 
the highest probability of truth vis-a-vis alternatives. Thus to attack a 
particular proposition for which we provide evidence, it is not enough just 
to present a possible alternative. One must present an alternative with 
greater positive evidence.

	Now there is one natural response to this argument. I will present it 
and rebut it. The one natural response goes as follows: A person says: 
"Look, if I claimed to believe in G-d you could ask me how I know; namely, 
what evidence I have, what proof I have, what kind of justifications I 
have.  If I claim to be an Atheist, you could also ask me how I know; 
namely, how do I know there is no G-d, what kind of proof do I have, what 
kind of evidence do I have?  But, I don't claim anything.  You see, I 
protect myself from demands like that.  I don't claim to know that there is 
a G-d, and I don't claim to know that there is not a G-d.  I am an 
Agnostic.  As an Agnostic, I freely admit my ignorance.  Together with 
Socrates, I claim that I don't know.  Surely you cannot ask me to justify 
that!  What should I justify, not knowing something?  I simply don't know.  
I am at least honest enough to admit that I don't know.  How then can you 
ask me to make justifications, proofs and arguments when I'm simply 
confessing my ignorance?"
	That observation is a mistake, or perhaps I should say that it is 
misleading.  It is true that intellectually, in terms of belief, there are 
three possible positions with respect to any particular assertion.  I can 
either believe A, I can disbelieve A, or I can be in doubt over A and 
neither believe it nor disbelieve it.  That is how it is in terms of 
belief, but, in terms of action, there are not three positions.  There are 
only two positions.  You either act as if A were true or you act as if A 
were false.  There is no middle position.  
	Maybe you can say with respect to the Torah  being true: "I don't 
know, maybe it is true and maybe it isn't true.  I really haven't made up 
my mind.  I really haven't sorted out the issues.  I don't know."  But, six 
days from now you will either smoke the cigarette during the Sabbath, or 
you will not smoke the cigarette during the Sabbath.  There is no third 
middle ground that I'll neither smoke it nor not smoke it.  There is no 
middle ground.  You either live as if it were true or you don't live as if 
it were true which means that you are forced to make a decision.  There is 
no escape from making a choice.  Now, with respect to that choice, you can 
be asked to justify yourself. You could be asked to justify  your action.  
Because it is a choice, the justification  must be based on the highest 
probability vis-a-vis alternatives.  
	To take a simple example, let's say there is an unsubstantiated rumor 
that the Arabs have put poison into the water supply of Jerusalem.  Now, it 
is only a rumor, but it is after all a rumor.  Those types of rumors don't 
surface every day.  You then ask someone what  he thinks about this rumor, 
and he says: "Well, I really don't know, I am an agnostic.  I don't know 
whether it is true or false.  After all, I don't know who started or spread 
the rumor.  It hasn't been substantiated."  As he is telling you this he 
goes over to the sink, draws himself a glass of water out of the tap and 
drinks it down.  Now, he may say that he hasn't made up his mind, but the 
truth is that he must have made up his mind or he wouldn't have drunk the 
water!  
	Your actions commit you to one position or the other position vis-a-
vis the proposition even if you say that you are intellectually neutral.  
Most people, the vast majority of people, use agnosticism simply as a 
dodge.  It is very rare to meet an agnostic who takes precautions.  The 
agnostic eats his cheeseburger on Yom Kippur (the Jewish day of judgment in 
which the Jewish people are required to fast) while at the beach without a 
thought.   His agnosticism is simply a way to protect himself against 
criticism.  "You are asking me to justify myself and I don't make any 
claims and therefore I am free to eat the cheeseburger."  It is not quite 
that simple.  
	If you really don't know whether religion is true or false, that 
ought to show itself in some kind of positive behavior.  Perhaps taking 
some precautions, or perhaps mounting a serious investigation, and in the 
meantime, during the investigation, maybe playing it safe by not eating the 
cheeseburger.  It is very rare to find an agnostic who does this, which 
means that either the agnosticism is just a pose, or it is the result of a 
real intellectual confusion.  The person thinks: "Since I am an Agnostic, 
therefore I do not have to do anything." That is not correct as you see 
from any example where a person would be an agnostic about something that 
made a difference.  If you were an Agnostic about the poisoned water, you 
would not drink it!  
	 It would seem that if one really were a true Agnostic, he would 
logically have to live his life religiously.  Let me bring this point home 
to you as follows.  Some of you may have heard of Pascal's Wager.  He used 
the following type of  analysis. Christianity is either true or false, and 
I don't know.  If Christianity is true and you live it, you go to heaven.  
If Christianity is true and you don't live it then you go to hell. A 
positive infinity and a negative infinity.  If Christianity is false and 
you don't live it, so you get a certain finite benefit - you did away with 
certain unnecessary restrictions on your life.  If Christianity is false 
and you do live it, then you have a certain finite loss - you lived 
according to restrictions which were unnecessary.  So, he said, clearly it 
is to your benefit to live Christianity because the potential benefit is 
infinite, and the potential loss is finite.  Whereas if you don't live it 
the potential loss is infinite and the potential benefit is finite. 
	This argument is correct if you make one assumption and that is what 
Pascal missed.  You have to assume that Christianity is the only possible 
option; that it is the only competitor for your allegiance.  If there are 
other possibilities, such as Islam, Buddhism, Shintoism, Confucianism, 
Taoism, and maybe even Judaism, the argument works just as well for each of 
them and leaves you with no direction as to what to do.  Every one of these 
promises an infinite benefit or an infinite loss depending on how you live 
vis-a-vis its practices.  
	So, Pascal's argument in its own context is a mistake because he is 
relying on an assumption which he couldn't prove.  But for us this is no 
problem. We are not trying to prove that one should live Judaism without 
evidence. On the contrary! We are trying to fulfill our responsibility to 
find the truth. We do that by finding the alternative with the best 
evidence. Now  I argued above that there are no competitors, in terms of 
evidence, to Judaism.  So, therefore, in terms of religion, it's Judaism or 
nothing.  
	At this point an argument similar to Pascal's comes marching back in, 
and marching in validly.  If there is only one competitor that you regard 
as relevant, because it presents evidence, and that is Judaism, then the 
potential benefits to living as if Judaism is true are infinite, and the 
losses of living it if it's false are finite.  Therefore it is better to 
live it than not to live it. This means that the agnostic cannot avoid the 
hard choice of how to live just because he claims not to have decided to 
believe or disbelieve.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
	[Strictly speaking, the use of Pascal's argument does put the atheist 
at a disadvantage. Just because he does not offer infinite consequences for 
different patterns of behavior, it seems that it becomes obligatory to live 
as if the Torah is true, no matter how poor the evidence is for the Torah's 
truth. This seems like too cheap a victory! There are (at least) two ways 
to block this conclusion. One could question the fixing of consequences:  
why not consider an option which has a god who infinitely rewards directing 
belief and action by absolute proof disregarding the mere balance of 
evidence, and punishes the opposite? Alternatively, one could allow the 
atheist infinite consequences also. For example, he might hold certain 
moral obligations infinitely important. If we execute a Sabbath violator, 
and if the Torah  were not true (G-d forbid), the atheist might hold this 
to be an infinitely bad result. (Remember that in decision theory it is 
subjective evaluations which count. The theory tells you that if you value 
the consequences in this way, then your decision should be that.) Then the 
decision between the Torah and atheism would be made on the same grounds as 
the decision between the Torah and other religions, that is on the basis of 
the best evidence.] 

SUMMARY
The agnostic can be intellectually uncertain and so not need to justify his 
non-belief. But he will have to choose how to live, and he needs to justify 
that choice. A genuine agnostic about religion would be expected to 
investigate and take the precaution of living religiously.  	
 
	One last  point.  Some people are disturbed by a false distinction.  
They say: "Look, if it's a matter of limited importance where to invest my 
money, which profession to train in, or perhaps even whom to marry, these 
are all limited decisions.  They are decisions that can be reversed.  I can 
invest $10,000 in AT&T, and if I lose it, it's not the end of my life.  
Hopefully I'll make more money in my lifetime.  If I train for a profession 
and it turns out that there is an oversupply, I can train for another 
profession or move to a country where the profession is needed.  If I marry 
someone and it is a mistake, I can get a divorce  and marry someone else.  
If it is a limited decision, a decision of limited importance, then maybe I 
should make it on the sole basis of high probability vis-a-vis 
alternatives.  But, you are asking me to make a decision about my whole 
life.  This is my whole life, it changes everything that I do, my values, 
my conduct, and so on.  Surely for a decision like that I ought to have 
more than just high relative probability.  For that I ought to have a solid 
proof, or at least something that is very high in probability.  Shouldn't I 
have higher standards when it comes to my whole life?"  
	I think that this is a mistake, for three reasons. First, even the 
decision to lead a religious life-style is reversible.  Some people 
experiment and then decide it is not for them. So that difference between 
this decision and others is not true. Second, living a religious life does 
not entail changing everything else. Religious people have families, 
professions, vacations, computers, etc. etc. Of course, some activities are 
changed, and priorities are different. But then every decision in life 
brings some changes. There may be a quantitative difference here - 
religious living has comparatively many changes. But it is not enough of a 
difference to justify a completely different criterion for making the 
decision.
	  The third reason is this: Even if the stakes are enormous, if they 
are balanced between the two alternatives, then we still use highest 
probability to make our decision. You can see this from the following 
example. Let's suppose you go to the doctor and he does a checkup of your 
physical condition.  He says that there are symptoms here of two possible 
diseases. You definitely have one of the two diseases, but it is not clear 
which one you have. It might be A or B. If you have either disease you will 
need surgery.  If you don't have any surgery, you will be dead in two 
months.  If you have disease A then you need surgery A'. If you have 
disease B then you need surgery B'. If you get the wrong surgery (say you 
have disease A and they do surgery B') then you will also die in two 
months.   So, we have a real dilemma here.  Should we do any surgery,  and 
if so, which?  
	Now let's suppose that given the symptoms, and comparing the symptoms 
with other people who have had the symptoms, it turns out that for people 
in your circumstance there is a 52% chance that you have disease A and a 
48% chance that you have disease B. That is only a six percent difference.  
That doesn't amount to any proof that the surgery is best, or which surgery 
to do.  Would you say "Ah, well, I don't have any proof that  surgery is 
right for me, so therefore I won't take it."  I doubt it!  All the evidence 
tells you that without any surgery you will be dead in two months! 
	Would you say: "But I don't know which surgery to do - I don't have a 
proof which is best?" If the statistics show that surgery A' gives you a 
four percent edge on survival, then the four percent edge, which is all 
that is available to you under the circumstances, is worth grabbing.  Here, 
the fact that it is survival, that it's my whole life, and that it is not 
just a question of relative inconveniences does not change the criterion of 
choice at all.  The criterion of choice is: How can I get a higher 
probability of survival?  The relative probability is only four percent and 
that doesn't matter.  I want that extra four percent probability!
	Sometimes I put it this way.  Suppose that you're hanging over a 
cliff, and that you're holding on to a branch of a tree waiting to be 
rescued, but it is not quite clear that the branch will hold you 
indefinitely.  It is creaking, and there is another branch that you could 
switch to without risk of falling, but it is not clear to you that the 
other branch is stronger.  Suppose that you know something about trees and 
you estimate that the probability of the second branch being stronger is 
maybe three percent greater than the probability of the strength of the 
branch you are holding onto.  Do you say: "Well, it's my life.  Since it's 
my life, I want proof that it is stronger.  I don't make moves with my life 
unless I have proof that it is better."   Of course not.  You have a three 
percent increase on the probability of surviving on the second branch.  YOU 
MOVE!  You purchase a three percent increase in your probability of 
survival.  So, the fact that the stakes are large, in this case the largest 
possible, survival, doesn't change the criterion of choice at all.  The 
criterion of choice is always the same - higher probability of  truth vis-
a-vis the alternatives.
	[Of course, the alternatives and their consequences need to be 
carefully specified for the analogy to work. I am describing both 
alternatives - Torah and atheism - as offering infinite consequences. (See 
previous [ ]) So the analogy works like this: right surgery/right branch 
gets life, wrong surgery/wrong branch gets death;  living according to the 
true religion gets infinite good, living according to the false religion 
gets infinite bad. In this case it is correct to go with the alternative 
with the better evidence even it is only a little better. Sometimes it is 
objected that if there is a balance between the infinite consequences, we 
should allow other differences to affect the decision, e.g. the (finite) 
costs of living a religious life-style. The analogy fails, they say, 
because I have left out the relative costs of the two alternatives. 
Presumably switching branches costs nothing, and the costs of the surgery 
are not mentioned. What if it costs $100, or $10,000, or $1,000,000 to 
switch branches, or to have surgery A' in stead of B': surely there is some 
price at which the added few per cent probability of survival would not be 
worth the cost? This objection admits two replies. First, the decision to 
sacrifice the few per cent advantage may reflect a finite value for one's 
life! People risk their lives for all sorts of trivial reasons! Second, it 
is not clear that the religious life-style has an extra cost. If we take 
the statistics of violence, drug abuse, alcoholism, divorce, suicide, 
illiteracy, etc., it seems that the religious life-style may be a bargain!] 
	
SUMMARY
The fact that the choice of religion affects one's whole life - values, 
behavior, priorities, etc. - does not change the criterion for the choice. 
The reason is that the consequences of making the right or wrong decision 
are equally great. Thus highest probability vis-a-vis alternatives applies 
to the choice of religion just as it does to all other decisions.
	
	So, we will be looking for a sufficiently high probability of truth 
vis-a-vis alternatives.  Now, the specific strategy that we are going to 
use in verifying the Torah has two facets that I want to explain to you.  
First, some parts of the descriptive portion of the Torah can be 
investigated directly, e.g. statements about historical events. Some of 
them are predictions that were made about times which have already past and 
so can be investigated at present. On the other hand, some of the portions 
of the descriptive content of the Torah cannot be investigated directly: 
what happens to the soul after death; all predictions still to be fulfilled 
in the future, for example, there will be a Messiah one day, haven't 
occurred yet.  Those that can be investigated directly, we will 
investigate. What about the ones that cannot be investigated directly?  
	The answer here is as follows.  We have a single coordinated body of 
information.  Whenever you have a coordinated body of information, some of 
which you can test directly and some of which you cannot test directly, if 
the portion that can be tested directly tests true, then that gives 
credibility to the rest. You do not artificially select, and say: "That 
which I have tested I believe.  The rest of it I haven't tested, so I have 
no reason to accept it."  On the contrary, if the portion that can be 
tested tests true, then it lends credibility to the rest.  
	This is true in any area of life.  So, for example, in science, take 
any theory.  A theory has an infinity of consequences.  You never test any 
reasonable proportion of that infinity! We don't say: "Well, Einstein 
predicted that when light pass the sun, it will be slightly warped.  We 
tested it on fourteen occasions and so we know that on those fourteen 
occasions the light rays bent.  What about the rest of the time when we 
were not looking?  Oh, then I don't have any reason to believe anything 
because I didn't test any of those times."  What we say is that the portion 
which we tested is an indication of the reliability of the rest. Similarly 
with respect to an encyclopedia, or a newspaper, or any other source of 
information: when they tell you things that you directly test, and they 
test true, that gives them a certain credibility.  You then extend that 
credibility to the rest.  
	  Suppose someone says: "I don't believe anything unless I test it 
myself.  I don't trust anybody else's opinion, and I don't trust anybody 
else's research.  I only believe what I saw myself." He will believe next 
to nothing about the world.  I usually ask such a person if he knows who 
his parents are. How do you know? Have you done a DNA test?  Probably not. 
It is pretty expensive and pretty rare. You probably trust them because 
they told you.  But, they could be lying. You didn't fingerprint of your 
mother when you came out!  So how do you know that it is your mother?  It 
is because she told you so many things and usually she is credible.  It is 
still conceivable that you were adopted, but it is very unlikely, and that 
is good enough for you.  
	What about the past in general?  You can't go back and observe the 
revolutionary war.  I'm speaking as an American now, our revolution, the 
one that we won.  You trust it because people wrote books about it.  There 
are maps.  There are letters.  There are artifacts.  That is to say that 
you trust someone else's observations, someone else's reports.  Do you know 
that there is such a place as China?  How do you know?  You were not ever 
in China (most of you anyway).  Do you know the boiling point of Mercury?  
How do you know?  You read it in a book, that is to say you trust the 
author of the book, the scientist who performed the experiment.  
	We are always accepting the statements of other people.  We don't do 
it blindly.  We know that some people lie.  We also know that some people 
are competent in certain areas and incompetent it other areas, and we may 
accept their statements in one area and reject then in other areas.  We are 
selective with respect to what we believe.  But we must extend general 
credibility to a source on the basis of testing some of the assertions of 
that source.  If you don't do that, you will be hamstrung and not know 
anything at all.  
	 This is, in fact, the way in which we operate.  That is how we make 
our decisions in any other area of life.  If I have to decide what to eat, 
what profession to go into, or where to live, that is how I make those 
decisions.  A person who makes decisions in every other area of life on 
this basis, and when it comes to religion says, "Oh no, for religion I have 
different standards. Here I want a much more strict accounting. I want an 
independent proof of every assertion,"  such a person is playing fast and 
loose.  Such a person uses one standard with respect to every other 
decision, but with respect to this decision, he is using a different 
standard.  That sounds like special pleading: he is trying to protect 
himself against the conclusion.  If it were not special pleading, then why 
didn't he use the same set of standards across the board?  Now, I am only 
asking that a person use the same standards with respect to religion that 
he uses with respect to other decisions.  
	
SUMMARY
The descriptive portion of the Torah can be divided into that part which 
can at present be investigated directly, and that part which cannot. If the 
investigation of the first yields sufficient evidence to accept it as true, 
then the second is accepted as credible also on the grounds of belonging to 
the same body of information as the first.


	The other feature, the general outline of how we are going to apply 
this strategy, is as follows.  Let's suppose that you have an area of life, 
and that you think that in this area you know how to explain the phenomena 
that you observe. It could be the behavior of billiard balls on a billiard 
table, certain types of chemical reactions, pictures of particles scattered 
in a cloud chamber, the behavior of missiles and so on.  You have what 
looks to you to be a catalog of all the relevant causal agents for that 
realm.  Then you come across a new phenomenon which seems to belong to the 
same realm, and for which your catalog of agents is insufficient.  Now hear 
me well when I say that the catalog of agents is insufficient.  I don't 
just mean that you haven't figured out yet how to explain it, I mean more 
than that.  I mean that you have an argument which shows that your causal 
agents cannot explain it. What do we do under those circumstances?  
	I'll give you an example.  In the early 1920's, there was an 
investigation of the structure of the atom.  There was a period when people 
thought that the nucleus was composed solely of protons. Now protons are 
positively charged, and the law of electrostatics is that like charges 
repel.  The question was, how come all those protons are sitting buddy-
buddy in the nucleus?  Why aren't they repelling each other all over 
creation?  
	Now, at that time, the only two non-dynamic forces that were in the 
catalog of science were electrostatics and gravity.  Electrostatics are 
pulling them apart.  Could gravity be holding them together?  That  is 
impossible because gravity's order of magnitude is weaker than 
electrostatics.  The standard example is this.  You have a bar magnet, you 
hold it over an iron nail, and as you get closer and closer to the nail, 
suddenly the nail will jump up to the bar magnet.  Now you can look at this 
as a tug of war.  On the one hand you have the bar magnet pulling it up.  
On the other hand, you have the whole earth pulling it down, and the bar 
magnet wins very easily.  That gives you an idea of how much more powerful 
electrostatic forces are than gravity.  
	So, why are the protons sitting together in the nucleus if 
electrostatics are pushing them apart and gravity cannot hold them 
together?  What is the answer? The answer is the only thing it could be.  
There must be another force. The nuclear force.  We have to expand our 
catalog of forces because the forces we have in it cannot possibly explain 
this phenomena.  The phenomenon is reliable, and therefore we must have 
missed some other causal agency which is responsible for this phenomenon. 
That is how we operate in all of life.  It doesn't have to be something as 
sophisticated as science.  For example, so and so was murdered.  I checked 
the butler, I checked the driver, and I checked the delivery man.  They all 
have air tight alibis.  What do I conclude?  It must be somebody else.  
These people couldn't have done it.  I'll have to go look for somebody 
else.  
	Now, we have a similar structure.  We are going to take a look at 
Jewish history.  In particular, we are going to look at unique features of 
Jewish history, features which separate Jewish history from the history of 
all the other nations.  I mean this in a strong sense.  Of course, 
everybody's history is different from everyone else's; otherwise it 
wouldn't be theirs, it would be someone else's!  I mean that Jewish history 
has features which are different from the features which all other nations 
histories share.  There are certain characteristics which all other nations 
have in common, and Jewish history is distinguished from them in those 
respects.  Now, if I look at history and that is what I find, I have to ask 
myself for a causal agency which can explain it.  
	Let me make this vivid for you.  Imagine a Martian visiting Earth and 
being introduced to all the flora and fauna, and in particular being 
introduced to mankind, and studying the history of various civilizations 
and forming certain regularities.  Maybe they won't be very profound, deep, 
or theoretical, but still: this is the way nations react to famine, to war, 
to peace, to success, to failure, to cultural achievement, to cultural 
stagnation, to empire, to dissolution of empire and so on.  Now, the 
Martian investigates the Chinese, the Romans, the Nigerians, the Eskimos, 
the Incas and so on.  Imagine that he has done that for every culture and 
civilization except for the Jews and he has formulated his rules for how 
human beings respond to various life circumstances. 
	Then he comes to investigate Jewish history.  Now, there are in broad 
terms, two possibilities here.  Either he will say, "Oh yes, more of the 
same. What happened to the Jews in the fifteenth century is similar to what 
happened to the Incas in the tenth century.  What happened to the Jews in 
the nineteenth century is similar to what happened to the Chinese in the 
fourth century.  You can see parallels.  Things are pretty much the same." 
Then you would expect Jewish history to be explained by the same forces, 
the same powers, and the same causes that explain everyone else's history. 
That is one possibility.  
	The other possibility is that the Martian will say, "This is 
absolutely unique. It contradicts all my expectations.  It doesn't fit into 
the patterns of other nations and civilizations.  It is something brand 
new."  I am going to argue that it is brand new - that an honest Martian's 
perspective would lead to the conclusion that Jewish history is unlike any 
other nation's history with respect to the way in which they are all alike.
	If so, what must the Martian conclude?  The Martian must conclude 
that there is  something unique that is producing this unique historical 
record.  The kinds of causes that led to the rise, development, and fall of 
other civilizations, all of which have patterns in common, are not 
responsible for the development of the Jewish civilization because it is 
unique in these respects.  So that, he will have to add to his catalog  
agencies, some new agency, call it X, and by looking carefully at the kind 
of uniqueness that we are talking about, he can read off it certain 
characteristics that X must possess, because X has to be responsible for 
this unique phenomena, and therefore, it must have certain characteristics.  
	
SUMMARY
If we have method of explaining a type of event and we find an event of 
that type which our method cannot explain, we must expand the method to 
include something which will explain the new event. The methods of 
explaining the history of other nations and cultures will not explain 
Jewish history. Hence something must be added to explain Jewish history. 

	Let me just illustrate for you how a portion of the argument will go.  
I am not presenting the argument, I am not defending the argument, I am 
simply illustrating the methodology.  I will take much longer to present 
the details in a much more comprehensive fashion later.  I am merely 
illustrating so you understand the general method.  Look at the survival of 
the Jewish people over the last 2000 years.  I will argue that it is 
unique.  No nation underwent that kind of historical and cultural pressure 
and survived.  There is nothing remotely approximating what they 
experienced.  It is unique.  If it is unique, then some agency is 
responsible for it. That is the X that is being added to the catalog of 
historical  agents.  
	What must this X be like?  Well, what did it do? For one thing, it 
maintained the existence of a civilization under conditions that should 
have lead to its disappearance. What must such a force be like?  It must 
have some sort of considerable energy or power at its disposal.  This is 
not a small effect. This is maintaining a civilization involving millions 
of people over thousands of years.  
	Secondly, this power must have some considerable intelligence at its 
disposal.  It is maintaining a civilization! It is maintaining a complex 
pattern of human behavior, human belief, certain values, a certain 
literature, a certain world view and so on.  So, this power must have some 
considerable intelligence at its disposal.  Third, this power must also be 
interested, in particular, in this specific civilization.  After all, it is 
only this civilization that this power causes to survive.    
	So, from this unique effect - that is to say, the existence of a 
civilization in conditions under which other civilizations have 
disintegrated - you can infer certain that such a force must have a certain 
amount of power, intelligence, and a commitment to the Jewish way of life. 
Otherwise it would not explain the existence of this civilization. Now 
those are descriptions of G-d.  That is how you can take a unique factor of 
Jewish history,   explain it by postulating a force that is responsible for 
it, and then infer from the unique phenomena some minimal characteristics 
of that force and arrive at a direct conformation of G-d's existence.  
	 	
 SUMMARY
If Jewish history cannot be explained by other methods, then we infer a new 
causal agency. That agency must have certain characteristics to be able to 
explain Jewish history - power, intelligence and a particular concern for 
Jewish survival must be among them. These are descriptions of G-d.  

===========================================================================

Chapter IV:  True Predictions

	We have two conclusions from the last two chapters. (1) To act 
responsibly we must seek the truth and use our best estimate of the truth 
as our basis for action. Action on the basis of pragmatic considerations 
without regard to truth are irresponsible. Similarly, waiting for absolute 
proof before acting is irresponsible. (2) The exact weight of evidence 
required to mandate action cannot be stated precisely (and is even somewhat 
controversial). I will try to show that there is enough evidence to meet 
whatever standard you actually use in making your decisions. So the appeal 
is to consistency: If you stick to your usual standards and act 
responsibly, then you must live according to the Torah.  
	Now we will begin a review of the evidence. I will start with two 
cautionary remarks. First, when I present evidence, the significance of the 
evidence is that it adds to the probability of the Torah being true. To 
respond that it is still conceivable that the Torah is false is quite 
correct,but irrelevant.  The goal is not to remove every conceivable 
alternative, it is to present the Judaism as a more probable alternative.   
	Second, we are now gathering evidence.  To gather evidence means no 
one piece of evidence will carry the case by itself.  This is similar to a 
courtroom procedure.  If you want to convict a murderer, just finding his 
fingerprints at the scene of the crime isn't enough, just finding a similar 
weapon to the one that caused the murder in his house is not enough, just 
having a motivation is not enough, just his having been seen at the place 
of the murder at the time of the murder is not enough.  But, when you put 
them all together, it can be enough.  So, again, it will not be relevant to 
respond that "This piece of evidence is not enough to justify believing 
that the Torah is true."  Of course it isn't.  No one piece of evidence is 
enough.  It is all the evidence together which is enough.  We won't begin 
to sum up all the evidence until the last chapter. The point, then, is for 
each piece of evidence to be seen as relevant, to see that the most likely 
interpretation of the evidence is that the Torah is true.

SUMMARY
The purpose of the evidence is to show that the Torah is more probably true 
than any alternative. Citing merely conceivable alternative is not 
relevant. This conclusion is based on the sum of all the evidence. No one 
piece of evidence can justify the conclusion by itself. 

	 In Deuteronomy 28-30 there is a prediction of what will happen to 
the Jewish people if they don't live up to the standards of  the Torah. It 
predicts conquest accompanied by wanton slaughter of the population: men, 
woman, children, old, young, and so on. It predicts an exile resulting in 
world-wide scatter, and that during this period of world-wide scatter, Jews 
will have no independent government.  One result of the exile is that some 
Jews will be brought back by boat to Egypt to be sold as slaves, and they 
will not be purchased.  Nevertheless, the Jewish people will survive, will 
never completely be destroyed, and will ultimately return to the land of 
Israel.  It also predicts that the conqueror will speak a language that the 
Jewish people don't understand.
	Now as we said in chapter II, what is crucial about this prediction 
is that it should be a unique prediction, namely, a prediction that no one 
else should believe. From no other perspective should such a prediction 
make sense.  Because if it is a prediction that other people can believe in 
or that other people can credit, it no longer functions as a crucial 
experiment. It no longer distinguishes between what you are claiming and 
what others can claim. So, let's ask ourselves about each of the details in 
this prediction, whether it could have been explained by a sociological 
analysis of the times, or by a competing ideology - or whether it is 
something that someone could explain only from the Jewish point of view.
	[Of course, if someone should accept our prediction from our sources, 
then his making that prediction cannot count for him against us! If 
Christians and Moslems accept Deuteronomy 28-30 and predict that the Jews 
will be exiled as a result of their failure to live up to the Torah, when 
that prediction comes true it does not give Christianity and Islam positive 
evidence against Judaism, since they took the prediction from us.]
	I should mention that this prediction was written at least two 
thousand years ago.  Jewish sources say it was written 3300+ years ago.  
Others might disagree as to when the Bible was written, as to how many 
authors it had, how many editors it had and so on, but no one believes that 
the account of the Roman conquest and exile was written after the Roman 
conquest.  
	Now, let's see which of the details of this prediction could have 
been explained by an observer with a point of view other than that of the 
Torah.  The prediction of conquest was not a very daring prediction.  
Everybody gets conquered sooner or later.  
	There was a prediction of total destruction: a decimation of the 
population and exile.  That was rare in the ancient world.  It happened, 
but it was rare because the purpose of conquest was economic.  Typically it 
was a question of acquiring colonies and taxing them.  You can't tax people 
if you slaughter the population and exile them. Now, I'm not talking about 
theft.  Of course you want to take all the gold and silver, gems, fine 
linen and so on. You may take the young, fine, strong men off as slaves.  
You may want to take the good looking, young woman for sexual purposes.  
But, you don't wantonly slaughter the  rest of the population because there 
is no point in destroying your tax base! During their 300 years of rule, 
the Romans did this only to Carthage and the Jews.  So, the prediction of 
the wanton slaughter of the population and exile were predictions that 
could not be anticipated to really occur because they were not the normal 
procedure in the ancient world.  
	Now, let's take the prediction that the conqueror will speak a 
language that you don't understand.  Why should I think that? Couldn't you 
be conquered by a neighbor?  Neighboring countries typically understood one 
another's languages. There was enough commerce and enough travel back and 
forth for them to be familiar with one another's languages. Couldn't we be 
conquered by a country that spoke an "international language?"  Many Jews 
understood Greek. Greek was in those days similar to what English is today. 
Business contracts, trade and diplomacy were conducted in Greek.  Had any 
Greek speaking nation conquered and exiled us, this prediction would have 
been false. It just so happens that the Romans conquered us and they spoke 
Latin.  Latin was a language with which Jews were not familiar.  
 	If you are going to be exiled, who says that you are going to end up 
all over the world?  Why should that be an automatic consequence of exile?  
Not everyone who was exiled from their countries ended up with identifiable 
communities all over the world.  Even when the Babylonians exiled us 500 
years earlier, we didn't end up all over the world.  The vast majority of 
the population was taken off to Babylon, a large group went to Alexandria 
in Egypt, but there were many places in the world where there were no 
identifiable groups of Jews.  
	If they were going to end up in exile, how could one predict with 
confidence that some of them will be taken back to Egypt in boats to be 
sold, and that there will not be anybody there to buy them?  Why should one 
think that?  It is true that there was a slave trade flourishing and that 
there were known slave routes, but who is to say that it would definitely 
happen?  
	If you are going to predict exile scattered all over the world, how 
can you be sure that at no point will any Jewish society form an 
independent government in some portion of the earth's surface?  Don't 
forget, we are talking about two thousand years ago.  Two thousand years 
ago the world wasn't organized with maps and boundary lines so that every 
square millimeter of the earth's surface belongs to one nation or another, 
and sometimes to two or three.  On the contrary, there were vast areas of 
the earth's surface that were unclaimed, unsettled, and simply wild; for 
example, parts of Russia, Northern Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and 
Central Africa.  Who is to say that Jewish exiles would not form an 
independent society in one of these places?   
	Now that means that for each of these predictions, if I don't have a 
Jewish perspective, and I look at it neutrally, or I look at it as a 
Buddhist, a Hindu, or a Taoist, a Confucianist, or later as a Christian or 
Moslem, I would expect them not to occur, and I would not be able to 
explain them if they did occur.
	If I were to assign probabilities to each of these detailed 
predictions from any of those non-Jewish points of view, the probabilities 
would be very low. Total destruction and exile, let's say that this 
occurred in 10% of all ancient wars.  Then  a non-Jewish observer would 
give it a probability of 1/10.  That the conqueror should speak an unknown 
language.  I don't know how often that happened, I mean neighbors often 
conquered one another.  Let's say generously that it happened one fourth of 
the time giving us a probability of 1/4.  Being scattered all over the 
world as a result of exile, as far as I know, didn't happen at all.  I 
don't know what probability to give it, so I will be generous and give it a 
probability of 1/10.  To take a nation that is scattered all over the world 
and thus be unable to organize itself into an independent society, again, I 
don't know what the probability of that would be, so I'll give it a 
probability of 1/4. To survive under these conditions and return to one's 
land has never happened in the history of the world - strictly speaking we 
should give it a probability of zero! But let's be generous and say 1/10. 
	Now, when you have predictions for a sequence of events, and each 
event has a probability, and you want to know the probability of them all 
coming true, you simply multiply the probabilities.  So, we simply multiply 
1/10 * 1/4 * 1/10 * 1/4 * 1/10  and we come out with a probability of 
1/16000.  This is a very small number.  That is the confidence that a 
neutral observer would have in this prediction.  What is the likelihood 
that a prediction like this would come true?  One chance in every sixteen 
thousand tries.  Given the evidence the observer had to go on, there is no 
way for him to explain why they occurred.  
	But, they all happened.  That being the case, this is what I called 
earlier a unique prediction.  It is a prediction that no one else would 
make.  Had anyone seen the prediction before it happened, the response 
should have been that this is fantasy.  No one else would be able to 
explain why this should happen. Therefore, when it comes true, it 
contributes to the truth of Judaism.  It is a relevant piece of evidence.  
	[Three technical remarks. (1) Many details from Deuteronomy 28 have 
been omitted. There are two reasons: either the language in which they are 
expressed is poetical and cannot be precisely defined (and thus we cannot 
prove that the text means specifically what in fact happened), or they are 
predictions which are very likely to happen in the context of destruction 
and exile, so that they would not significantly lower the probability. (2) 
Some of the probabilities above are conditional - world-wide scatter given 
exile; no independence given world-wide scatter; survival and return given 
scatter. Only if they are understood this way is it appropriate to multiply 
them to get the probability of all the events occurring. My numbers are 
meant as (overly generous) estimates of these probabilities. (3) The 
probabilities are for the predictions coming true; they are not for the 
predictions having been made. We can easily think of reasons why someone 
would want to make a frightening prediction, but we would be very surprised 
if what was predicted occurred.]  
	Now could it have come true by accident?  Yes, it could have. I 
freely grant that because we are not playing Descartes. We are not 
interested in a mere a possibility. We are interested in a possibility for 
which there is more evidence. Anything can  happen by chance, but the 
likelihood of this happening by chance is one in sixteen thousand. What 
this indicates is that whoever wrote this had access to a source of 
information beyond the natural.  What that source was and how to describe 
it we don't know so far. We are only drawing minimal inference from the 
events.  That seems to me to be what the evidence indicates. 
	Finally, I will repeat again that I am not trying to prove that 
Judaism is true based on this one prediction.  One true prediction does not 
prove that a theory is true.  I'm merely pointing out that this is relevant 
evidence.  The full justification will come later when we take all the 
evidence together. But this is certainly a piece of objective evidence 
which ought to interest us.  It ought to show us that the quest of the 
realist to find a truth which can be justified is not a quest in vain.  
 SUMMARY
We are looking for positive unique evidence of the Torah's truth. Each 
piece of evidence must increase the probability that the Torah is true. To 
do this, it must not be explained by any other point of view. One such 
piece of evidence is the prediction in Deuteronomy 28-30 that the Jewish 
people will be conquered, slaughtered, exiled, scattered world-wide, never 
achieve independence, survive and return to Israel. No other point of view 
would give such a prediction a probability of greater than 1/16000. That it 
came true is positive unique evidence.  

===========================================================================

Chapter V:  Archeology  

	There is another question that is related to what I am doing and I 
must address it; that is, the Bible as accurate history.  After all, I am 
talking about the descriptive portion of the Torah as being true.  That   
includes descriptions of fact.  Since questions have been raised about the 
factual accuracy of the Bible as an account of ancient history, we ought to 
discuss that for a bit.
	The Bible talks about the lives of the Patriarchs, wars, migrations, 
famines, marriages, and all kinds of other events in ancient history.  How 
reliable is that record?  Here is a popular way to investigate the 
reliability of the Bible.  The Bible is what is in question and therefore I 
should not assume that it is true. Now, if I can find other ancient 
records, for example, ancient hieroglyphics, Syrian records, or Babylonian 
records, then I could check the Bible against them.  If the Bible agrees 
with them, that is indication and evidence that the Bible is correct.  If 
the Bible disagrees with them, then that shows that the Bible is incorrect. 
That is an objective, neutral way of assessing whether the Bible's account 
of history is correct or incorrect.  
	Does that strike you as fair?  I should hope not because it isn't 
fair.  The mere fact that the Bible would contradict the ancient Syrian 
records doesn't prove that the Bible is wrong.  Maybe the ancient Syrian 
records are wrong!  A mere contradiction only shows that somebody is wrong.  
Why assume that the Bible is wrong?  That would just be a hidden prejudice 
against the Bible.  When there is a contradiction between the Bible and the 
ancient sources, then the question has to be raised: How can we best 
understand the nature of the contradiction, and which source do we rely 
upon?
	Now, in making that evaluation you must know one fact - all ancient 
histories were written as propaganda. This is something upon which 
historians and archaeologists agree. The function of ancient histories was 
to glorify contemporary powers.  After all, the scribes were their 
employees. You see this, for example, in the following type of historical 
chain of events.  You read in the hieroglyphs that Pharaoh X raised a great 
army and conquered a number of provinces, and his son Pharaoh  X Jr. raised 
even a larger army and conquered more provinces.  Then, there is a hundred 
year gap in the history.  What happened during that 100 years?  For that 
you have to go to the Babylonian records.  That is when the Babylonians 
were kicking the stuffing out of the Egyptians.  The Egyptians don't record 
that because that doesn't glorify their empire.  They just leave it out.  
	An example is the question of the Exodus. Why is it that no ancient 
Egyptian records mention the Exodus? (Except for the Ipuwer Papyrus, and 
dating that is a problem. However, this papyrus, it is interesting to note, 
contains an ancient Egyptian's eyewitness report of disasters that the 
Jewish tradition claims occurred to the Egyptians prior to their departure 
from Egypt [the Ten Plagues]. Among the descriptions on the Papyrus are the 
Nile flowing with blood, hail storms that devastated Egypt's crops, and 
inexplicable darkness.)  The answer is that the Egyptians never recorded 
their defeats. Therefore, since the Exodus was a massive defeat, you would 
not expect them to record it. So, its absence from their records is not 
evidence against the Exodus.  
	
SUMMARY
If there is a contradiction between Jewish Biblical history on the one 
hand, and the description you find in other ancient sources on the other 
hand, we must not assume that the Bible is wrong, but rather look for the 
best way to resolve the contradiction. Since the other ancient sources were 
written as propaganda, they are likely to be at fault.
	
	Now if we are talking about the accuracy of ancient history, the key 
question is archaeology.  Archaeology is supposed to uncover the actual 
evidence that these events occurred or didn't occur.  I am going to give 
you a brief review of the situation in archaeology with respect to the 
Biblical narrative.  Most of this is referred to in a book called Biblical 
Personalities in Archaeology by Leah Bronner.  She does not represent an 
Orthodox point of view, and therefore her testimony is probably even more 
valid in your eyes.  I am mentioning that she doesn't represent the 
Orthodox point of view because if you read the book, I don't want you to 
think that I agree with everything she said.  However, she does cite an 
enormous amount of interesting material.  
	One hundred years ago it was assumed that Biblical history going back 
roughly to the time of King David and Solomon is more or less accurate.  
Bertrand Russell wrote in his History of Western Civilization that we can 
presume that David and Solomon were real kings.  But, beyond David and 
Solomon, there was no evidence for anything whatsoever, and the prevailing 
view was that it was myth.  It was simply stories invented to glorify 
mythical, that is to say non-existent, ancestors so as to create a great 
history for a nation. Many nations did that, such as the Greeks, and it was 
assumed that the Jews did it as well.  
	One of the ways that you can tell if this myth-making goes on is that 
the people writing the myth project into the past their own conditions of 
existence. They didn't know that 500-1000 years before life was very 
different. They assumed that life was more or less the same as their 
conditions of life and projected backwards. Then, what we find from 
archaeology is that the conditions were quite different from what was 
described in the myth, and we know therefore that it was a myth. For 
example, they may have projected back weapons that they didn't have, 
domesticated animals that they didn't have, trade routes that they didn't 
have, settlements that they didn't have and so on.  That is how you 
determine if it was myth.  So there was the same assumption about the 
Biblical account of history before David and Solomon.  
	 But in the case of the Bible, archaeology has revealed the exact 
opposite.  Archaeology has uncovered a myriad of details, details that the 
Bible records about the quality of life and the conditions of life of the 
Patriarchs which turn out to be accurate to the last detail. These details 
are accurate in ways that are utterly inexplicable if you think that this 
is a normal process of myth formation.   
	So, for example, Abraham in all his wanderings is never associated 
with the Northern part of Israel, only the Southern part of Israel.  Now in 
the period to which Abraham is assigned by the Bible, the Northern part of 
Israel wasn't settled.  Later, when supposedly the myth was being made up, 
it was settled.  If someone were writing it later, and projecting his 
conditions of existence on the past, there would be no reason for him to 
discriminate against the Northern part of Israel.  
	 Another example: the names Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Lavan, and Joseph 
were in common usage in the Patriarchal period and dropped out of usage 
thereafter. These names appear in archaeological inscriptions from that 
period and no later period.  In the Bible those names are used only in the 
book of Genesis.  Now, somebody five hundred years later is supposed to be 
making up this myth.  How is it that he just happened to get right names 
for that period of time?
	It was custom in that period of time that if a couple was childless, 
the husband would take a handmaid of the wife as a concubine and have 
children with her.  It was a custom limited to that time and did not exist 
in later centuries.  In the Bible, we have Abraham and Jacob doing this.  
If this had been made up five hundred years later and projected onto the 
past, it would be inexplicable how they could have gotten this right.  
	If a handmaid had a child in the manner just described, the law of 
the time forbade expelling of the child of the handmaid.  This explains 
why, when Sarah told Abraham to throw Ishmael out of the house, the Torah 
says that it was "Very evil in Abraham's eyes."  It was very evil because 
it went against the local prevailing law.  It wasn't forbidden in later 
centuries, but in that century it was forbidden.  
	An  argument  that they used that the account depicted in the Bible 
was a myth was the idea of camels being domesticated.  The Patriarchs are 
described as having used camels for transportation.  It was assumed that 
this was an anachronism.  Camels were domesticated later, but of course the 
later people didn't know that their ancestors didn't have camels, and if 
they had camels they would of course have pictured their ancestors as 
having camels.  Their great ancestors couldn't be less than they were.  
	But, it turns out that this was just archaeological ignorance.  We 
have the eighteenth century B.C.E. Canophorin tablets in Northern Syria 
which list the domesticated animals and in which the camel is specifically 
mentioned.  Another archaeological discovery depicts a camel in a kneeling 
position.  A seal dating back to this period depicts a rider sitting on a 
camel.  So, it turns out to be an accurate report of the details, not a 
later anachronistic projection into the past.
	There are many examples dealing with Joseph.  Take for example the 
price of a slave.  Joseph is sold for twenty pieces of silver.  That was 
the accurate price of a slave in Joseph's time, and at no other time.  
Slaves were cheaper beforehand, and they got increasingly more and more 
expensive later.  Imagine someone five hundred years later putting in that 
detail.  How would he know what the price of slaves were five hundred years 
earlier?  He certainly wouldn't get it right by accident.  
	You have the same thing regarding sleeping in Egypt on beds.  In 
Palestine at that time they slept on the ground, and in Egypt they went to 
sleep on beds, and so therefore the Torah mentions explicitly that when  
Jacob was in Egypt, he died on a bed. 
	The investiture of Joseph as viceroy in Egypt follows the pattern 
from that period. He stood before Pharaoh and had to be shaved because the 
Pharaohs in that period were shaved.  He had a collar put around his neck 
and a ring put on his finger. There are hieroglyphs of that specific 
procedure, and of riding in a chariot second to the king. All of these 
details are accurate.  
	Now, that means that at least the details of life are corroborated by 
archaeology. So, the normal assumption that this was written later and 
projected on the past simply doesn't hold up.  It is simply not correct.   
	
SUMMARY
Many nations created myths about the lives of their ancestors by projecting 
later conditions of life onto earlier periods of history. Archeology proves 
that the Bible did not project anachronisms in this way.
	
	Now, I will not say that there are no problems.  There are some 
problems.  Some of the problems have to be looked at very carefully to 
understand what kinds of problems they are.  For example, the Exodus.  This 
is a textbook case.  If the Exodus took place, what kind of archaeological 
evidence would you expect to find?  You are talking about a large number of 
people leaving Egypt. You would expect to find implements, clothing, 
vessels, weapons, and these sorts of things scattered all over the desert.  
What about bones?  People die, especially if they were in a desert for 
forty years.  The truth is though, we don't find anything.  Nothing as of 
yet has been found as archaeological evidence of the Exodus.  
	Is this then evidence against the Torah's account? It depends on what 
you tested.  Are you testing the Biblical story?  If you are testing the 
Biblical story, you have to test it in its own terms.  You have to accept 
all of it.  It will do no good to take one element of the Biblical story, 
and then graft onto it other non-Biblical hypotheses and then test the 
conglomerate, because that is a conglomerate that no one believes in.  
	Now in the case of the Exodus the Torah says explicitly that during 
the forty year period their clothing and their vessels didn't wear out.  
Now, if you are going to look through the desert for scattered clothing and 
vessels, then you are not testing the Bible.  The Bible would say that you 
won't find anything!  The Bible says that they are not there.  If you are 
looking for clothes and implements, you are testing the assumption that 
there was an Exodus as the Bible says together with your naturalistic 
account of the evidence which the Bible denies.  Nobody believes that! To 
test the Biblical story you have to take it in all its own details. 
	Similarly with the bones.  The Midrash asks, how did the people in 
the desert die?  Each year on the ninth of Av they dug a mass grave, 
everybody laid down in the grave, and in the morning those who survived got 
up, and the rest that were dead were covered up and that was their grave.  
They didn't die from time to time, everyday more or less scattered all over 
the desert.
	Furthermore, the Sinai desert is a big place and sands shift over 
time.  We are talking about sands shifting over a period of three thousand 
years.  Where exactly would you dig?  How deep should you dig?  How many 
holes should you put down to have a chance of finding anything?  It is not 
even thirty-nine burial places because in certain places they stayed for 
many years.  There are maybe twenty burial places in the entire Sinai 
desert.  How many holes do you need to put down to have a reasonable 
probability of finding twenty burial places, each burial place being the 
size of  three square blocks?  So, the fact that they haven't found the 
kind of evidence they are looking for is no proof whatsoever.  It is not 
even evidence against the idea of an Exodus.
 	
SUMMARY
When testing a Biblical statement against the archeological evidence, one 
must use the whole Biblical statement with all its details. One cannot take 
part of the Biblical statement and add non-Biblical naturalistic details 
and test the combination since no one believes the combination.

	Kathleen Kenyan excavated Jericho. She says the best date we have for 
the entry of the Jewish people into the land of Israel is 1400 B.C.E.  She 
says that there is a hundred and fifty year gap between the destruction of 
Jericho and the entry of the Jewish people into the land. Therefore she 
concludes that the Jews couldn't have been the ones responsible for 
destroying Jericho. They just attributed it their ancestors in order to 
glorify them.  
	Now  how does she arrive at her conclusion that Jericho was destroyed 
no later than 1550 B.C.E.?  [For the details of what follows, see Biblical 
Archeological Review, March/April 1990 pp. 44-56.] She based her argument 
on the absence of imported Cypriot pottery. A certain style of pottery from 
Cyprus was imported into the area from 1550 to 1400 B.C.E., and she found 
none of it at Jericho. Therefore she concluded that Jericho must have been 
destroyed earlier than 1550 B.C.E. 
	But this conclusion is very weak. It can be attacked in at least four 
different ways. (1) Method: conclusions based on what you don't find are 
always weak (see below). (2) She herself says that Jericho was not on any 
of the major trade routes - is that where you expect to find imported 
pottery? (3) She sank two shafts into what she herself describes as the 
poor section of the city. Is that where you expect to find imported 
pottery? (4) She totally ignored the dating of local pottery which had been 
found in earlier excavations which do come from dates later than 1550 
B.C.E.
	Now bear in mind that she was knighted by the British government for 
her contributions to archeology! I won't speculate what leads to this kind 
of sloppy argumentation. But surely we don't have to give up our views in 
the face of criticism like this!  
	What has happened in Biblical archaeology in the last one hundred 
years is that it started with a completely negative mind set: none of the 
Biblical narrative happened, it was all made up. Little by little, piece by 
piece,  that mind set has been refuted in a myriad of details. That doesn't 
mean they are giving up entirely, they are still holding on to some of the 
things which they feel haven't yet been established.  But this should give 
us two consequences. One: the trend is gradual verification. There is 
gradual archaeological corroboration of the statements that are made about 
history. Two: it should give us some insight into their mental set. They 
started off with a complete negative, and they are grudgingly admitting 
piece by piece that  some parts have been verified. That means to say that 
they are imposing an unreasonable standard of proof for the Bible.  
	Archaeology can sometimes establish a positive.  If you find 
something such as a city that was burnt, pillaged, or destroyed, you could 
assume that there was some sort of military action.  It is very difficult 
for archaeology to establish a negative - for archaeology to establish that 
something didn't happen.  In order for that, you need to know that if it 
happened I ought to find it here in such and such a place.  That is a very 
tricky judgment.  Even if it happened, how do you know you ought to have 
found it here?  Maybe you will find it someplace else.  Maybe this isn't 
the place that you thought it was.  There are some cities that have gone 
through three or four identifications. Remember: they assumed that there 
were no domesticated camels because they didn't happen to find that 
cylindrical seal, or that particular hieroglyph.  Then they found it and 
discovered that there were domesticated animals.  
	So beware of archaeology when it claims to find a negative.  To 
establish that a war didn't take place or that a settlement wasn't there, 
or that so and so wasn't the king is very difficult.  When archaeology 
claims to establish a positive, then it is more credible.  Of course, even 
then it requires interpretation of what was found, and that is not 
completely reliable.  In any event, I think we are in a position to say 
that archaeology is no longer the great problem it once was.  Archaeology 
is still in progress.  New insights and new deductions are still being 
drawn and there is a lot yet to be learned from it.  
	I will end this chapter with one little insight that is due to 
William Albright which I think is fascinating for a general picture of 
ancient history.  Albright has a proof that there was an influence of the 
Jews on the Greeks.  The names of the Hebrew letters are words in Hebrew.  
Aleph, Bet, Gimmel, Dalet and so on all have meanings in the Hebrew. The 
names of the letters in Greek are obviously related to the names of the 
letters in Hebrew: alpha, beta, gamma, delta and so on. But, those sounds 
in Greek have no meaning in Greek.  Alpha and Beta are not a Greek words. 
Where did they get those names for their letters?  Albright says, and this 
has been accepted by the historical archaeological community, they got them 
from the Jews.  Perhaps indirectly the Philistines took them to Greece and 
gave the letters to them, but it ultimately comes from the Jews.  
	Now if the very names of the letters of the Greek alphabet came from 
us, what else came?  We know that there was some influence and that they 
took something from us.  The names of the letters in your alphabet are 
pretty fundamental.  Who knows whatever else they could have taken?  
Instead of thinking that the Greeks may have influenced Judaism, there a 
new sector of research investigating ways in which the Jews influenced the 
Greeks!   

===========================================================================

Chapter VI:  Revelation and Miracles - The Kuzari Principle


 	I will now be presenting a key argument originally formulated by the 
Kuzari concerning the belief in miracles.  The Bible records many 
miraculous events. Verifying these reports is necessary: first, to verify 
the Bible as an accurate record of historic events, and second, as evidence 
for G-d's intervention in history.  Therefore, this argument plays a 
crucial role in the overall assessment of evidence for the truth of the 
Torah.  
	I will present this argument twice because it is not a simple 
argument. First I will present it incompletely in outline form, and then I 
will take you through it in detail.  We begin by taking a miracle which is 
described as occurring to a large number of people, in our case the entire 
generation.  Take, for example, the revelation at Sinai.  There are people 
who believe that the revelation at Sinai occurred.  I'm not going to assume 
that because people believed it that it must have occurred.  That is called 
"begging the question."  However, it is a fact that there are people who 
believe it occurred.  
	Now they believe it because the previous generation taught it to 
them.  Likewise, that generation believes it because the previous 
generation taught it to them.  So you have a chain of generations of 
believers going back in time.  That is a fact.  The question then is, how 
did the chain get started?  Who were the first believers?  How did they 
arrive at their belief? 
	Again, oversimplifying, this is only the outline:  There are two 
broad possibilities.  One: the event at Sinai took place and people 
witnessed it, and that caused their belief. Or two: the event did not take 
place.  If the event did not take place, then someone invented the story 
and convinced the people to believe it. 
	The Kuzari's argument proceeds by investigating the second 
alternative, that the event didn't happen, that the story was made up and 
was sold.  The argument shows that the second alternative is not credible.  
It is not credible to believe that the story was made up and then sold.  If 
you can defeat the second alternative, that leaves only the first 
alternative, that it happened and was witnessed.  That is the structure of 
the argument.
	
SUMMARY
In oversimplified terms: the belief in the revelation at Sinai must have 
started in one of two ways. Either the revelation took place and its memory 
preserved, or it did not take place and someone invented the story and 
convinced others to believe it. The Kuzari's argument discredits the second 
alternative and thus establishes the first.

	The account of the second alternative proceeds as follows.  This is 
incomplete and is only an outline.  Imagine someone making up the story and 
trying to sell it.  He is going to come to a group of people and he is 
going to tell them that sometime in the past their ancestors stood at a 
mountain and heard G-d speak.  He is not talking about people in China or 
Tibet.  He is talking about the ancestors of his audience.  He is claiming 
that G-d revealed Himself to all of their ancestors simultaneously and by 
so doing founded a new religion.  
	What is the question with which the audience will confront him? The 
obvious question is: If this happened to our ancestors, how is it that no 
one knows about it but you?  What happened to the memory of that event?  
Everybody simply forgot it?  They were more interested in the soccer 
scores?  No one told us about it?  The whole religion just disappeared? It 
is simply not credible to tell an entire nation that their collective 
ancestors witnessed such an earth-shattering event and that it was 
forgotten. It would be impossible to explain why the memory of the event 
disappeared. Therefore, says the Kuzari, the person inventing the story and 
trying to sell it will never succeed.  
	To give you a simple parallel, suppose someone told you today that 
five hundred years ago gold grew on trees throughout Romania.  Gold grew on 
trees for twenty years and then there was a blight that killed all the gold 
trees.  Would you believe it?  Would you have to go to an encyclopedia and 
look up Rumanian history?  I don't think that you would need to investigate 
the history of Rumania. If such a thing had happened, you would already 
know about it.  It would have been so spectacular that everyone would know 
about it.  The books would be filled with it; novels would have been 
written about it; there would be botanical research projects to find out 
what happened to the gold trees and how to reproduce them.  It is not the 
kind of thing that people forget.  
	Similarly, the revelation of G-d to an entire ancestry of a nation is 
not the kind of event that would be forgotten; and therefore if a person is 
inventing the story and trying to sell it, he will not be able to sell it 
to his audience.  The reason is that he will not be able to explain why no 
one else remembers that incredible event. That means that the alternative 
of making it up and selling it is not credible.  If that alternative is not 
credible, we are left with only one alternative, and that is that the event 
really happened and that people witnessed it.  That is the general 
structure of the argument in an incomplete and outlined form.

SUMMARY
The story could not be invented and people persuaded to believe it because 
whoever tried to invent it would not be able to explain why no one else 
remembered it. Since he cannot explain that, he would not be believed. Thus 
the other possibility must be true: the event must have occurred.

	Now, let me take you through the argument in detail.  It will be 
considerably longer this time.  The first point again: we have a chain of 
generations going backwards in time who believe that these miracles took 
place: Revelation at Sinai, the crossing of the Red Sea, the plagues in 
Egypt, the manna and others.  Today, this group constitutes hundreds of 
millions of people.  (Some Jews, and some Christians, some Moslems, etc.) 
The question is: How did that belief originate?  It is not of interest now 
that there are non-believers.  There will always be non-believers.  There 
are even non-believers in the Holocaust. What is at issue is that there are 
believers, a considerably large number of believers, and we want to explain 
the fact that they believe it.  It is a psychological and sociological fact 
that they believe it.  How did this belief first arise? 
	Now, the principle that the Kuzari uses put into modern language is 
as follows.  I beg you to look at it, hear it, and pay close attention to 
all of the details in it because I have written this as carefully as I can.  
Let E be a possible event which, had it really occurred, would have left 
behind enormous, easily available evidence of its occurrence.  If the 
evidence does not exist, people will not believe that E occurred.  
	Let's consider a possible event, that is to say an event about which 
we don't know whether or not it occurred. Let's suppose it is an event 
which if it had occurred, it would have left behind enormous, easily 
available evidence of its occurrence.  Well, if we don't have the evidence  
then we will not believe it occurred. 
	That's what the principle says. Let's try to put it in simpler terms. 
Someone is trying to convince me that a war, or an earthquake, or something 
like that happened. If he is right that it (the war, earthquake, etc.) 
really happened, I should know about it already. I shouldn't need him to 
tell me. Then the principle tells me that I will not be convinced by him. 
The problem of the missing knowledge will prevent me from believing him.     
	Of course, when I say that "people will not believe,"  I don't mean 
that no one will believe. After all, there are people who believe in flying 
saucers, or that they are Napoleon, or that the Miami Dolphins will win the 
Super Bowl! What I mean is that you will not be able to get the vast 
majority of a nation to accept such a view about their own ancestors when 
no one in fact remembers it. 
	So, for example, here is a possible event of the right type: a 
volcanic eruption in the middle of Manhattan in 1975.  If that had 
happened, that would have left behind enormous, easily available evidence 
to all of us in 1995.  If a volcanic eruption had really occurred in 1975, 
there would be newspaper reports, books, there would be signs in New York 
of the lava under the concrete and so on. And I could say to myself: "If he 
is right that the volcanic eruption really happened, I should know about it 
already. I shouldn't need him to tell me." That is why we would not believe 
someone who tried to convince us that it happened. 
	Similarly with gold growing on trees throughout Romania five hundred 
years ago.  Even if the event took place five hundred years ago in such a 
remote spot as Rumania, the social memory of that event would have left 
behind enormous, easily available evidence of its occurrence. And we could 
make the same observation: If gold really grew on trees we should know 
about it ourselves without this person having to tell us.  
	That is the kind of event that we are talking about.  An event  
which, if it had happened would have left behind an enormous amount of 
easily available evidence of its occurrence.  I stress this because the 
counter-examples that people usually think of are mistakes because they 
will not respect the definition.  
	 
SUMMARY
If people believe that an event occurred, then their belief must be 
explained. The Kuzari principle says that one kind of event will not be 
believed unless it occurred. That kind is: an event which, if it had 
occurred, would have left behind enormous, easily available evidence of its 
occurrence. Thus, for an event of that kind, if people believe that it 
occurred, then it must have occurred.

	The application of this principle to public miracles follows 
directly.  A public miracle, especially a miracle which is described as 
occurring to an entire nation, is the kind of event which if it had 
happened would have left behind enormous, easily available evidence of its 
occurrence. The evidence would be in the form of social memory, just like 
the evidence we would have had of gold growing on trees throughout Rumania.  
People don't forget things like that.  Therefore a public miracle, public 
in the large sense of the whole world, or a whole nation, is the kind of 
event which, if it did happen, would leave behind enormous, easily 
available evidence of its occurrence. If the event did not take place, and 
therefore the evidence was missing, you couldn't get people to believe in 
it.  That is how the Kuzari principle applies to public miracles.
	Now, let me explain to you how limited this principle is.  This 
principle states a limit on human credulity.  People throughout history 
have believed a wide variety of crazy things.  This principle says that 
there is a limit to how foolish people will be.  They will believe a wide 
variety of crazy things, but not every crazy thing.  There is a limit. The 
limit is an event which if it had happened would have left behind enormous, 
easily available evidence of its occurrence, and which in fact didn't 
happen and therefore the evidence was missing.  
	Let me give you some examples.  In the Middle Ages, people in Europe 
believed in dragons.  Doesn't that demonstrate that you can sell anybody 
anything? Think about the kinds of beliefs that they had about dragons.  
Here is one belief that they never entertained.  People did not believe 
that a dragon marched into downtown London in the middle of the day, burnt 
hundreds of people to death with its fiery breath, knocked over buildings 
with its tail, and then drowned in the Thames.  Why not?  If you can sell 
people anything, if you can make up any story and get credulous people to 
believe it, how is it no one ever believed that?  
	What kinds of stories did they believe about the dragons?  Sir 
Galahad comes riding in from the forest, his armor is dented, he's bruised 
and bleeding.  "What happened Sir Galahad?"  "I had an encounter with the 
dragon."  Well, maybe he did and maybe he didn't. The listener have no way 
of checking it out. Even if it did happen, it wouldn't leave behind 
enormous, easily available evidence to him of its occurrence. Since it 
doesn't meet the condition of leaving behind enormous, easily available 
evidence, you can sell him anything.  As long as the audience would have no 
access to evidence even if the event occurred,  the audience has to decide 
whether to trust the witness or not.  If he is tall, if he is handsome, if 
he writes sonnets, if he is good at jousting, then maybe I will believe 
him.  Why?  Because he describes an event which even if it had happened, 
would be inaccessible to me.  If you describe it as inaccessible, you can 
sell anything.  
	Achilles comes down from the mountain and he says, "I just met Athena 
and she gave me a new strategy for the war."  Now, if you are in the Greek 
camp down below, you have no access to evidence.  You don't know what 
happened on the mountain top.  At that point, all bets are off.  At that 
point you can get people to believe without limit.  Only when you have an 
event which meets the Kuzari's conditions, an event which if it had 
happened would have left behind enormous, easily available evidence of its 
occurrence to the audience, are you out of luck and not able to sell it.  
That is what the Kuzari says.  
	 Take, for example, Christian "miracles."  Many people feel that if 
we had a good reason to believe in miracles, we would be embarrassed by 
Christian claims to miracles. There are two things wrong with this worry.  
	Number one, we have no commitment against Christian miracles.  As far 
as we are concerned, maybe the Christian miracles did take place, because 
in Judaism, miracles alone prove nothing. It says in Deuteronomy, Chapter 
13, that there will be false prophets who will do miracles!  So, if someone 
tries to prove that he has a message from G-d by strolling on the lake, 
that proves nothing. It could be that he is one of the false prophets who 
does miracles. So I have no particular commitment against Christian 
miracles. If they happen to have occurred then they would qualify for 
Deuteronomy 13.  
	Number two, the Christian miracles were by and large semi-private 
affairs witnessed by no more than a few thousand people. Now a few thousand 
people, if you are making up the story fifty years later, is by no means 
the entire ancestry of a nation. The audience will ask themselves: "If it 
really happened, must I assume that everyone would have believed it and 
then created a social memory which would have been available to me today?  
Maybe the story was incredible to them?" Perhaps so, and then the Kuzari 
principle does not apply. Only if the audience is convinced that if the 
event had happened they surely would have known of it does the principle 
apply. In this case the audience would not necessarily have been convinced. 
	
SUMMARY
The Kuzari principle applies to public, especially national, miracles, 
since they will create social memory of their occurrence. It does not apply 
to beliefs in dragons, Greek gods, or Christian "miracles" since even if 
they had occurred, they would not have left sufficient public evidence of 
their occurrence. 

	Now, some people confuse the Kuzari's principle with its converse in 
the following way.  They say you are trying to claim that enormous, easily 
available evidence is very powerful, powerful enough to wipe out all 
opposition, powerful enough to settle all issues.  What about people today 
who do not believe in the Holocaust?  The Holocaust took place only fifty 
years ago.  There is enormous, easily available evidence of its occurrence.  
You could talk to thousands of survivors who are still alive today.  There 
are books, records, photographic materials, death camps that you can visit, 
and yet there are people today who don't believe in the Holocaust.  Doesn't 
that show that enormous, easily available evidence doesn't settle all 
questions?  
	The answer is yes, it does show that, but that is not what the 
Kuzari's principle says.  Now listen carefully, this is a point of logic.  
The Kuzari's principle says that for an event which if it had occurred 
would have left behind enormous, easily available evidence of its 
occurrence, and didn't occur, you can't get people to believe in it 
	What would you need to show that this principle is false?  You would 
need an event which did not occur, and yet people believed in it.  That 
would show that the principle is false.  You would need an event which you 
would expect to find evidence for, the evidence is missing because the 
event did not happen, and yet people managed to believe in it. Now with the 
Holocaust you have the opposite.  Here you have an event which did occur 
and yet people don't believe it did.  That is not a counter-example to the 
principle.  It is the opposite.  
	Now some will say: "Okay, that is a fine point of logic, it did 
occur, it didn't occur, you do believe it, you don't believe it, but still, 
isn't it really the same thing?  Doesn't it come down to the same thing 
that such evidence doesn't settle all questions?"  
	The answer is no, it does not come down to the same thing.  There is 
a crucial difference between the Kuzari's principle and the case of the 
Holocaust. The reason is that everyone has to sift and be selective when he 
considers evidence. Sometimes evidence is fabricated, sometimes the 
evidence is irrelevant, sometimes it is misinterpreted.  You cannot simply 
buy all presented evidence and take it uncritically.  We are always 
sifting, rejecting some, and accepting  some.  When we come to the 
Holocaust, these nuts say we know that sometimes evidence is fabricated or 
misleading: in this case all of it is fabricated or misleading.  In other 
words, they are taking a normal part of human cognitive life and simply 
blowing it beyond its appropriate boundaries. They say that sometimes you 
have to reject some proposed evidence; in this case they want you to reject 
all the evidence.  
	Now that you can imagine happening at least on the fringes of 
society. But the case of the Kuzari is the opposite. To violate the Kuzari 
principle we have to believe something for which all the expected evidence 
is missing.  If it were true that there ought to be evidence, and there 
isn't any evidence, we would never accept a belief.  That is not part of 
our normal cognitive life. We are never confronted with a case where if it 
had happened the evidence ought to be all over in front of me and there is 
no evidence, and yet I leap over that hurdle and believe. Therefore, the 
disbelievers in the Holocaust are irrelvant to the Kuzari's principle. 
	[Some will wonder whether we have avoided the objection only by 
defining the event positively, i.e. as the occurrence of the Holocaust. 
There is no reason in principle, they will say, that we could not consider 
the non-occurrence of the Holocaust as an equally bona fide event. How 
would we avoid the objection then? Well, let's try to see how the objection 
would go. 
	The non-occurrence of the Holocaust (the second World War without the 
massacre of 6,000,000 Jews) is a possible event. If it had happened - if 
the second World War had not included the massacre of 6,000,000 Jews - then 
there would be enormous, easily available evidence of that event. The 
evidence would be in the form of histories of the second World War making 
no mention of the Holocaust. The absence of the event from the histories 
would surely be compelling evidence that the event did not take place. 
Since the evidence is in fact missing -  the histories of the second World 
War do in fact include the Holocaust - the Kuzari principle says that 
people should not believe in the event. That is, they should not believe in 
the non-occurrence of the Holocaust.   
	I think this argument is correct: the Kuzari principle predicts that 
you cannot get people to believe that the Holocaust did not occur. But the 
prediction is in fact correct! More than ninety per cent of contemporary 
Americans believe in the Holocaust. The Kuzari principle does not say that 
no one will accept such a belief. For any kind of craziness you can find 
some believers! It says that a whole society will not accept the occurrence 
of an event when it lacks the evidence it should have had if the event had 
occurred. That has not happened in the case of the Holocaust. And even if 
it were to happen in the future (G-d forbid) that a great number of 
Americans come to disbelieve the Holocaust, that would still not be 
directly relevant to our use of the Kuzari principle since the Holocaust 
did not happen to their ancestors. Since to them it is a foreign event, 
perhaps they can explain to themselves why they do not possess the expected 
evidence. This will have no bearing on the ability of the descendants of 
the witnesses themselves to explain their lack of the relevant evidence.]
	
SUMMARY
To contradict the Kuzari principle we would need an event which did not 
happen, and would have left behind enormous evidence if it had happened, 
and yet people believe it happened. The holocaust is the opposite: it did 
happen, and some people do not believe it. Therefore the holocaust doe not 
contradict the Kuzari principle. Those who reject the Holocaust take normal 
caution with respect to evidence and irrationally expand that caution to 
reject all evidence for the Holocaust. Nothing comparable could lead to 
violating the Kuzari principle. 

	Now let's examine the principle itself. What kind of principle is 
this?  At base it is a principle of empirical psychology.  It is a 
principle describing  how people come to believe things. It says that under 
certain conditions, beliefs won't form.  People will not come to believe in 
events that the Kuzari's principle forbids.  
	Why should we accept this principle?  After all, everything relies on 
this principle.  Could we defeat it?  Here is one way not to go about it.  
We should not say: "You are telling me that just because it is an event 
that if it had happened would have left behind enormous, easily available  
evidence, that you can't get people to believe it?  I don't think that is 
right.  I can imagine very well that a very influential priesthood, or a 
very powerful leader, or a person whom you would think has magical powers, 
convincing people to believe in even things like that.  I don't think there 
is any limit to what the populace can believe.  I think I could even write 
a very convincing novel describing such a case and get it pulished."  
	Does your ability to imagine such a case defeat the principle?  The 
answer is no.  This is a principle about real people in the real world.  
The principle doesn't say anything about your imagination.  People can 
imagine all sorts of things.  They can even imagine impossible things. 
People have imagined squaring a circle;     it just happens to be 
mathematically impossible.  I know people who imagine machines that run 
without loss of any energy.  There are people who design them every year.  
The Second Law of Thermodynamics says that it is impossible, yet they do it 
anyway.  
	 The limits are on your imagination are is of no interest.  The 
question is: Do real people in the real world accept beliefs like that?  
The only way to defeat the Kuzari's principle is to find real cases.  Real 
cases of communities that have come to believe events which if they had 
happened would have left behind enormous, easily available evidence of its 
occurrence, and didn't happen, and therefore the evidence wasn't present.  
I have never yet come across such an event, nothing even remotely 
resembling such an event.  
	I'll give you some more examples of non-contenders.  People say: 
"Didn't the vast majority of Germans believe that the Jews stabbed Germany 
in the back during the first World War?  Didn't they believe that Jews had 
control of international business and banking?"  Of course they believed 
those things, but put yourself in the position of the average German 
shopkeeper or bus driver.  You are told thirty years later that the Jews 
stabbed us in the back in the first World War.  (Even the description is 
important.  When someone stabs you in the back, you don't see them.)  What 
kind of back-stabbing are they describing?  Do they say for example that 
during the first World War that Jews lay down in front of German tanks and 
stopped them from moving?  No, they don't say that, because they know that 
if they say that, no one will believe it.  After all, the soldiers in that 
war  were still alive.  They know that didn't happen.  No, they stabbed us 
in the back. They covered their tracks and nobody ever caught them.  
Because if you claim that it happened in public, nobody will believe you.  
	Again, put yourself in the position of the average German shopkeeper 
and bus driver.  You are told that the Jews control the international 
business community.  Could you get evidence about that?  Of course not, 
there is no way for you to check that claim.  Even if it were true you 
would not have the evidence. Then people will believe anything. As long as 
you make the claim something which, even if it were true, your audience 
would not have the evidence, then the audience has to decide whether you 
are credible or not and people can make awful mistakes about that.  
	That is why the claim of the Nazis that the bigger the lie the more 
successful it will be is wrong.  It is a mistake, because a really big lie 
would have been to lie about something that everyone experienced.  They 
didn't do that, because you can't lie about that which everyone 
experienced, because if it had happened would have left behind enormous, 
easily available evidence of its occurrence.
	Some people ask about the massacre in Tiananmen Square.  Almost 
everyone in China believes that  the students massed against the soldiers 
and attacked them and the soldiers fired in self-defense.  Correct, but if 
you live in Shanghai, could you get evidence as to what happened in 
Tiananmen Square?  How would you get it?  There is no evidence available to 
you except what is played out on Chinese television, and that is 
controlled.  So again, the vast majority of people in China would not have 
evidence even if the massacre occurred. Under those conditions you can sell 
them anything.
	 Someone once asked me if there wasn't a belief in ancient times that 
human beings spoke with animals via a common language.  Now that is 
presumably a false belief about the whole of human ancestry.  Isn't that 
something that would have left behind evidence?  The answer is no.  If you 
date the event, when did they say it happened?  If you check  the records 
of  those ancient people and ask when they say it was that human beings 
spoke with animals, they always place it so far in the past that there is 
no information that survives to them from that time. Of course, if you 
place it that far in the past, you have then made it something which, even 
if it had happened, would not have left behind enormous, easily available 
evidence of its occurrence to this audience.  If this audience has no 
access to the evidence you can sell them anything you want.
	So, the principle asserts that you cannot create beliefs of this 
kind.  The principle rests simply on the experience of mankind that people 
don't believe these sorts of things.  If they don't believe these sorts of 
things, then when you have such an event, as for example a public miracle, 
if people do believe it, the alternate scenario of its having been made up 
has now been discredited.  That being the case, the only thing that is left 
is to accept the event as having occurred.  
	 
SUMMARY
The Kuzari principle concerns the psychology of belief formation. It says 
that real people in the real world do not believe an event occurred if, had 
the event occurred, they should possess evidence which they inexplicably do 
not have. Imagined belief of such events is not relevant to the principle's 
claim that real people do not accept such beliefs. 

	Now there are two qualifications.  First of all,  when you have an 
account of a miracle, part of  what you rely upon is the reliability of the 
description of the miracle.  Maybe something happened, but who says that 
the description of what happened is accurate?  Maybe the people who 
witnessed it misunderstood it.  Maybe they misperceived it.  What criteria 
do I need in order to lend credence to the particular description of the 
event that I get from the witnesses?  
	It seems to me that an eye witness report is made compelling by the 
following factors. Calm: If they were upset, anxious, afraid, if the event 
astounded or stupefied them, that may cast some doubt on their ability to 
describe the event appropriately.  Repetition: rarely are miracles 
repeated.  If they were repeated, the more times that they are repeated, 
the more credible and compelling the eye witness account becomes.  
Corroboration: How many people witnessed the event?  If it is one or two 
then it becomes less compelling.  If it is thousands or tens of thousands 
it becomes more compelling.  Irrelevance of expertise:  You do not want a 
witness drawing a conclusion which he is not equipped to draw.  If I visit 
an atomic laboratory, and I come out and you ask: "Was the cyclotron on?"  
And I say "Well, the machine in the corner was blinking its lights red and 
blue, but I don't know if it was the cyclotron or whether it was a coffee 
machine.  I don't know what it was. I can't tell those things!"  You do not 
want a witness drawing conclusions that he does not have the expertise to 
substantiate.  Absence of self interest:  If a person has an interest in 
telling the story one way or another, then you can suspect that he is 
motivated by self-interest.  
	Now, I said the presence of these factors makes the report 
compelling.  What does that mean if one of the factors is missing?  Does 
that mean that the report is worthless?  No, it just means that it is less 
compelling.  It does not mean that it is valueless.  It does not mean that 
it has no evidential strength.  It just means that it is not as compelling.  
When you have all of these, then you have a compelling report.
	Now Rav Yehuda Halevi, who created this argument, applied it most 
directly to the miracle of the manna.  If I were looking at the Bible for 
outstanding miracles, I don't think that I would choose the manna.  It is 
not so spectacular, they just ate something they found on the ground every 
morning for thirty-nine years. (After the Jews left Egypt, they traveled in 
the desert for forty years.  During most of this journey the Jews were 
without food, so G-d provided the Jews with the miracle of the manna, a 
life-sustaining substance that was found on the ground every morning). The 
reason he chose this is because it fits the conditions that we previously 
described perfectly.  
	It is something that happened thousands of times.  Maybe the first 
few times they were astounded or stupefied and in shock, but after the 
thousandth time or the ten-thousandth time, I cannot imagine that they were 
still in such shock that they could not calmly investigate what is taking 
place. You have here repetition galore.     Corroboration? It is something 
that was witnessed by an entire nation. You cannot find much greater 
corroboration than that.  Irrelevance of expertise?  You do not have to be 
an expert to know that every morning you woke up, scooped the stuff off the 
ground and ate it and it nourished you.  That is not drawing conclusions 
about cyclotrons.  
	As far as the application of self-interest is concerned, this can be 
ruled out in the following manner.  We are talking now about an event being 
misreported.  How could self-interest have created the story of the manna 
if it didn't happen?  It couldn't have been created later than the event 
even if they had wanted to make it up, because that is a direct application 
of the Kuzari's Principle.  If you make it up later, people will ask you, 
if it really happened to all of our ancestors, how come no one knows about 
it but you?  It is not the kind of event you can make up because if it had 
happened, it would have left behind enormous, easily available evidence of 
its occurrence, and if it didn't occur, then there is no evidence of its 
occurrence. So, you could not make it up later.  
	Could self-interest have produced a false report while the event was 
going on?  Clearly not.  We are talking about an event which repeated 
thousands of times.  It was experienced by an entire nation.  Who is going 
to make a false report of it when everybody experiences it every day and 
sees that the report is false?  So, even if there were self-interest, it 
could not play a role here in creating a false report of the event.  
Therefore says the Kuzari, the manna is the strongest candidate for a 
credible miracle.  It is credible because of its public nature, and the 
reports about what happened are credible because they meet all the 
conditions we have discussed.
	
SUMMARY
The report of a miracle is compelling if the witnesses were calm, there was 
repetition, the report is corroborated, expertise is not needed to make the 
report, and there is no self-interest in making the report. Weakness or 
absence of any of the factors weakens the credibility of the report without 
destroying it entirely. The manna is a miracle whose report is compelling.

	Other miracles, like the Revelation at Sinai and the crossing of the 
sea, are somewhat less compelling. They happened only once and they took 
place at a time when the people were in a very agitated state of mind.  
Therefore, one would have to scale down the credibility of the detailed 
reports.  Still, that some sort of astounding, miraculous event took place 
is something which all the reports have in common and which is directly 
verified by the Kuzari's Principle.
	There is also a kind of domino effect here.  If you have one miracle 
which you can strongly substantiate, one miracle for which the argument is 
perfect, once you breach the natural order, it then becomes possible to 
accept the account of other miracles more easily. I'll give you an analogy. 
Suppose you have a person whom you believe to be honest in a business and 
there is money missing from the business.  Someone accuses this honest 
fellow.  You are not likely to accept the accusation even if there is some 
evidence that he was in the right place at the right time.  You say: "I 
know him to be an honest fellow. Therefore I cannot suspect him."  
	Now, let's suppose you find one incident in which he is known to have 
cheated.  Just one.  That changes the entire picture.  Now you know that he 
isn't completely honest.  Then, when you have evidence that he was in the 
right place at the right time, you take it seriously.  Once you broke the 
consistent picture of honesty, then he becomes suspected of any misdoings 
that take place.  
	Similarly here: if you can believe in nature without exception, it is  
difficult to argue that there was a breach of nature.  But once you have 
argued successfully that there was a single breach of nature, it becomes   
easier to argue for other breaches of nature in the future.  So, if you 
take the argument for the manna to be extremely powerful and conclusive, 
then the amount of evidence you need for the other miracles is reduced.
	
SUMMARY
Even if detailed reports of certain miracles have less than perfect 
credibility, the general description that something miraculous took place 
may have strong credibility. If one miracle (e.g. the manna) is credible 
enough to be accepted, then the standards of evidence for other miracles 
are reduced.

	Now let me come finally to the most natural and strongest opposition 
to this argument.  Let's go back to the revelation at Sinai.  I said that 
there are two possibilities: Either the event took place or  it was made 
up.  If it was made up, then you have to hop over the obstacle that you 
can't get people to believe this sort of thing.  
	Now the objection will be that this is too simplistic a 
classification, that there is really a third intermediate level. They 
didn't just make it up.  Something happened, and that something was 
gradually transformed by telling the story, adding, and embellishing.  The 
gradual transformation of imperfect information went together with wishful 
thinking, glorifying your ancestors, and all the other motivations. This 
kind of gradual embellishment is well known by anthropologists. It is 
called myth formation and it definitely takes place  in other nations.  Why 
can't stories like the Revelation at Sinai, or the manna, or the crossing 
of the Red Sea have at their base that some event really did take place, 
but then was gradually glorified into a miracle?
	There are two problems with this  sort of  "explanation."  One 
general problem is this: when you fill in the details of the scenario it 
tends to become extremely implausible. Only by ignoring the details does 
the scenario gain any initial interest. The second problem is equally 
fundamental: If you think that an event which was a natural event gradually 
glorified into this kind of supernatural event, and you think that is 
normal, and a natural process for a society at that time, then there ought 
to be parallels.  The Kuzari's principle is an empirical principle.  You 
can defeat it.  You merely need to find cases.  It is not enough to dream 
up a scenario. You need to find real parallels.  
	
SUMMARY 
For the "explanation" of myth formation to defeat the Kuzari's principle it 
must be plausible and there must be real instances of parallel scenarios in 
history.
	
	Let's take the manna as an illustration of both problems. There is a 
book called The Bible As History by Werner Keller  who claims that the 
miracle of the manna "really took place."  The Jews left Egypt, and there 
are bushes in the Sinai desert to this day which are periodically attacked 
by insects which bore holes in the trunk of the bush.  A sap which is sweet 
and nourishing oozes out, and the Jews ate this sap as they traveled 
through the desert.  He claims that this makes the Bible into History.  (Of 
course this really makes the Bible false.  The Bible doesn't say anything 
about bushes and sap.  The Bible says that they found the manna scattered 
all over the desert every morning. ) Now here is the suggestion.  Every 
morning they went out and ate the sap of the bushes, and then later it 
became gradually transformed into the story of a miracle.  
	Now, as I said, you cannot trust your imagination.  The question here 
is an empirical one.  Let's set up the conditions of the scenario.  The 
people who left Egypt ate the sap.  Did they think it was a miracle?  
Presumably not.  Those bushes have been in existence for over three 
thousand years.  Presumably they were there before the Jews left Egypt.  
Everyone knew about them.  It was a well known desert phenomenon.  For them 
to go out and eat that which everyone knows about, and for them to 
experience it as a miracle with a quite different description is 
incredible.  They knew they were eating sap!  
	They go into the land of Israel.  What do they teach their children?  
Did they tell them a completely different story?  Of course not.  They 
experienced it.  The vast majority of people alive experienced it.  They 
couldn't simply discontinue the old story and make up a brand new story on 
the spot that everybody tells the same way.  No, they must have told their 
children about the same story.  
	Well how did the breakdown occur?  We can imagine little Reuven 
sitting and listening to stories from his great-grandfather.  And the 
great-grandfather has become senile, his mind wanders, he gets the details 
wrong,  he makes up a few things and so on.  Reuven comes the next morning 
to play with his friends and says: "Boy, do you know what great-granddad 
told me yesterday?  He told me this great story about all these things..."  
What will all the other children say?  "Gee, my father never told me about 
that."  They go home and ask their father, and their father says Reuven's 
great-grandfather is 116 years old.  People like that make up stories.  
	One of the things needed is a credible scenario of the story 
developing put into a real social context.  Here it is quite difficult to 
imagine how it could occur. But more than that.  Here you have an event 
that when it was experienced was a natural event, and the event continues 
to occur.  The bushes still exist.  People are still eating the sap from 
those bushes year after year.  The above scenario says that under these 
conditions, the story was gradually elevated into the level of a miracle.  
	Now, I challenge you to find me a parallel.  It is not enough to make 
it up in your imagination.  Find a parallel.  Find a group of people who 
experienced an event as a natural occurrence, who interpret the event as a 
natural occurrence, the event continues to occur regularly in their 
vicinity, and in spite of all that they elevate it into an account of a 
miracle.  If you find such occurrences then that will weaken the argument 
here.  I do not know of any such parallel.  
	
SUMMARY
Werner Keller's "explanation" of the manna fails both requirements: there 
is no plausible account of how the story of eating sap is transformed into 
the story of a miracle, and there are no parallel cases of a continuous 
natural phenomenon being elevated into a miracle. 

	The same has to be true with respect to every scenario.  First of 
all, the scenario has to be initially plausible.  Most scenarios are not 
even initially plausible, but even if they are, there must also be a real 
parallel.    Let's apply this now to the revelation at Sinai.
	 Here is the proposed "explanation" of the belief in revelation at 
Sinai in terms of myth formation. Maybe the Jewish people were in the 
desert and there was a volcanic eruption or an earthquake.  These are very 
startling events.  These are very shocking events.  They might even have 
been regarded as supernatural.  Then maybe later people told them that they 
heard voices, saw visions and so on, and all of that elevated into the 
story of Revelation. This is the sort of "explanation" which myth formation 
offers. Here too the "explanation" suffers from both implausibility and 
lack of parallels.
	 In order to see how implausible the "explanation" is, let's take it 
in two stages. For the first stage, imagine that the story says of itself 
that it has been passed down continuously from the time of the event. In 
other words, the story says: "So-and-so many years ago the entire ancestry 
of your nation stood at a mountain and heard G-d speaking to them. They 
were commanded to tell the story of this event to their children, and they 
to their children, and the nation in fact did this." (There actually is 
something like this in the Torah itself - cf. Deut. 4:9-10, 31: 9-13, 19-
21. But I will not use this below because it is not clear and prominent 
enough.) Now we have to imagine a gradual process of taking a natural event 
and promoting it into a national revelation, ending with the story that 
this national revelation was always known by the nation. But before you 
arrive at the story of a national revelation no one knows about it! How are 
we supposed to imagine that the universal knowledge of the story is 
promoted gradually?
	Now for the second stage, suppose that the story does not say that is 
was passed down continuously, but that the reader or listener will 
automatically assume that it will be passed down continuously. Then we have 
precisely the same problem as the last paragraph: how can a story which the 
listener assumes must have been continuously known be promoted gradually? 
This is the Kuzari's point: a story of a national revelation will not be 
forgotten, and the listener to whom the story is being sold knows this and 
will use it in evaluating the story and deciding whether to believe it. The 
problem of filling in the details of the gradual promotion of such a story 
is a great obstacle to the hypothesis of myth formation.
	
SUMMARY
There is no plausible explanation of how a story which clearly implies that 
it has always been known could be accepted by a people who did not know it. 

	Now for the second problem, the lack of historical parallels. If the 
belief in the revelation at Sinai is the result of myth formation applied 
to a natural event, and if that is a normal sort of thing to happen, then 
it ought to happen more than once.  We are not the only people in history 
that have witnessed earthquakes or who saw volcanic eruptions, or to whom 
typhoons took place, or tidal waves or other events that could be regarded 
as supernatural.  If a belief in a public revelation could be produced by a 
natural event, it should have been produced more than once.  It is very 
suspicious to say that here is a effect of a natural cause, a normal cause, 
fitting in well with human psychology and the normal human environment, but 
it only happened once in the history of the world!   
	This is especially true with respect to a belief like this, because a 
belief in a public revelation is the strongest possible foundation for a 
religion. If somebody goes up on a mountain and says that he heard G-d 
speak, either you believe him or you don't believe him.  It is then open 
for everyone else to doubt it and to say that he either made it up or had 
delusions.  It is much more powerful logically to start out with a belief 
that an entire nation heard G-d speak.  Now if that kind of belief could 
have been made up then it should have been made up more than once.  After 
all, it is logically the most sound foundation for a religion. In addition, 
ancient religions borrowed from one another, they were in contact with one 
another, they had a similar structure; they have the same sort of Pantheon, 
the same sorts of  beliefs. Why wasn't this element ever borrowed?  Our 
belief goes back at least three thousand years.  There was a lot of travel 
through our area of the world.  How is it that no one picked it up?  
	Thirdly, Christianity and Islam desperately need this belief.  
Christianity and Islam in their early stages made strenuous efforts to 
convert Jews.  Now, if you are a Christian or a Moslem missionary and you 
come to a Jew and you tell him that your leader is G-d, or that your leader 
is a Prophet and so forth, the Jew responds: "I don't know about your 
leader, all I know is that my ancestors stood at Sinai, and you agree. You 
Christian, you Moslem agree that my ancestors stood at Sinai.  How can I 
now abandon that?  How can I contradict that?"  What shall the Christian or 
Moslem answer?  That is one of the reasons that they did so poorly in 
converting Jews.  Because the Revelation at Sinai is a foundation that is 
very difficult to contradict.  
	Now, according to myth formation there would have been a perfect 
answer that the Christian or Moslem could have given.  He could have said: 
"You are right, your ancestors stood at Sinai, but it happened again.  
Another public revelation.  All of your ancestors, five hundred years ago, 
stood again at another mountain and heard the second edition, and we have 
the second edition."  Why did they not make up that kind of belief?  If 
this is the kind of belief that you can make up, why didn't they make it 
up?  
	So, if you are working on a scenario about how the original belief of 
the Revelation took place, you have an enormous obstacle to overcome.  The 
more plausible your scenario is, the more difficult it is to explain why it 
didn't happen to anybody else.  You are sort of caught between two 
improbable alternatives.  Either you create a very implausible scenario so 
as to protect yourself from the fact that no one else did it, but then it 
is implausible as an explanation as to how it happened to us. Or you create 
a very plausible scenario, in which case the question why no one else ever 
did it is simply impossible to answer. 

SUMMARY
The "explanation" of myth formation implies that there ought to be 
parallels to our belief in public revelation, especially since this is the 
strongest foundation for a religion, and Christianity and Islam needed such 
a belief to offset Sinai. The lack of such parallels discredits the 
"explanation." In addition, the two conditions of plausibility and 
parallels conflict: the more plausible the suggested scenario, the more 
difficult it is to explain why no one else claims a public revelation. 

CHAPTER SUMMARY	 
The Kuzari's principle is that people won't believe in events which would 
have left behind enormous, easily available evidence of their occurrence, 
and didn't happen, and therefore didn't leave behind enough evidence. 
Public miracles occurring to a whole nation are those kinds of events and 
therefore if they didn't happen then you cannot get people to believe in 
them.  Eyewitness reports are made compelling by the factors cited earlier.  
The manna fits those factors perfectly, therefore the manna is a miracle 
for which the argument works perfectly.  It therefore reduces the level of 
evidence necessary for other miracles.  Then the fact that the Jews have 
believed in these miracles historically can only be explained by 
acknowledging that they took place. 


Chapter VII:  Jewish Survival - The Fact and its Implications

	 This chapter will finish the survey of the evidence. So far, we have 
seen the prediction of Deuteronomy 28-30, a brief survey of the 
archaeological evidence, and an argument for the Biblical description of 
miraculous events.  We will now see three more pieces of evidence and then 
draw  the conclusion.
	Jewish survival has long enjoyed widespread attention.  It is clear 
to all that the Jewish historical experience is unique in ways which cannot 
easily be  explained. This has attracted the ambition of historians of all 
stripes to try the mettle of their favorite theories on this 
extraordinarily difficult historical problem. For Jews, this fact has more 
personal implications. It sets them apart from the common human experience 
and gives them a point of pride in their connection to an indestructible 
people.  In spite of all this professional and personal interest, the 
message of Jewish survival has been doubly missed by historians and (non-
traditional) laymen, Jewish and non-Jewish alike.  
	First, the nature of the fact itself has not been appreciated. Its 
extent - over 3000 years admitted even by the most severe critics - and the 
uniqueness of the enormous historical pressures which should have caused 
the disappearance of the Jewish people, are not appreciated in detail. The 
result is that the superficial suggestions offered to explain Jewish 
survival are taken seriously, when a survey of the details would show them 
to be clearly incompetent. Second, there is a failure to focus specifically 
on WHAT has survived. In particular, no account is taken of the many 
experiments of large populations of Jews with other cultural forms which 
have not survived.    The purpose of this essay is to rectify both of these 
mistakes. We will start with a survey of the features which make Jewish 
survival so difficult to explain. The most popular theories designed to 
explain Jewish survival will then be tested against the fact(s) and found 
wanting.  
 	Jewish history divides into two major periods: from its inception to 
the destruction of the second Temple, and from that date to the present. 
Each period presents its own obstacles to historical explanation. We start 
with a survey of the unique features of each.  
	Ancient Jewish history comprises at the very least 1000 years from 
the time of king David to the destruction of the second Temple. (This much 
will be admitted by all; the prior 800 years from the time of the 
patriarchs is controversial in secular sources and will thus be omitted 
here.) For approximately ninety percent of this period, i.e. for all but 
the exile in Babylon, there was a large concentration of Jewish population 
and an independent Jewish state in the land of Israel. (Of course, 
"independence" allows for significant pressure from empires like Egypt, 
Assyria, Babylon, etc.) 
	What is striking about this period is the unparalleled uniqueness of 
Jewish belief. Principles shared by virtually every ancient culture 
contrast sharply with Jewish sources. The general agreement among other 
cultures is due to two factors. First, their beliefs reflect common 
circumstances (the constants in the human condition in the ancient world - 
birth, death, war and peace, dependence upon poorly understood natural 
phenomena, etc.). Second, cultures in contact affect one another: ideas are 
borrowed and mutually modified. Judaism is assumed to have shared the first 
factor with all other cultures(1), and its geographical position ("the 
crossroads of three continents") made it extraordinarily susceptible to the 
second. Its uniqueness is thus very difficult to explain. What follows are 
six examples of distinctive Jewish beliefs(2).
	1. Monotheism. Polytheistic idolatry is the rule in ancient 
religions. The restriction of worship to a single deity is almost 
unknown(3). The reason is simple: natural phenomena are so disparate that 
they are inevitably assigned to different deities, and then each of those 
deities must be served or else the natural forces under their control will 
injure the errant community. The uncompromising commitment of Judaism to 
one G-d only is without substantive parallel in the ancient world. 
	2. Exclusivity. Each ancient nation had its own pantheon of gods.  
But each recognized the appropriateness of other nations worshipping its 
own pantheon.  The universalism, and consequent exclusivity of Judaism  are 
absent from ancient religions(4).  Thus, aside from Antiochus' attempt to 
eliminate Judaism, there are no religious wars in the ancient world(5)! 
When one country conquered another the second was usually required to 
acknowledge the chief god of the conqueror, and the conquered were usually 
happy to comply: the very fact that they lost the war proved that the 
others' chief god was very powerful. The rest of the religion of the 
conquered nation was left intact. Only the Jews proclaimed a universal and 
exclusive concept of deity: our G-d is the only one, all others are 
fantasy.
	3. Spirituality. Ancient religions associated gods very closely with 
physical objects and/or phenomena. The "god of the sun" is the sun, as god, 
and so with the moon, the sea, the lightening bolt, etc. The same holds for 
physical processes like fertility, life and death. The only ancient 
religion to declare that G-d has no physical embodiment, form or likeness 
is Judaism.      
	4. G-d as absolute. Ancient religions picture the gods as limited in 
power. Many start with a genealogy of the gods. That means that certain 
powers predate them and are out of their control. Only Judaism understands 
G-d as the creator of all that exists and completely unlimited in His power 
over creation.
	5. Morality. The gods of the ancient world are pictured as petty 
tyrants acting out their all-too-human desires in conflict with men and 
with one another. Aside from taboo actions which sometimes overlap with 
moral concerns, no condition of absolute moral perfection applies to those 
gods. Only the Jewish G-d is defined as meeting that description.
	6. Anti-homosexuality. All ancient cultures permitted some forms of 
homosexuality, and for many it had religious application. The only 
exception is Judaism which opposed all forms of homosexuality, whether 
religious or merely hedonistic(6). To ancient cultures, these Jewish 
beliefs appeared absurd. They contradicted the common experience and 
convictions of all mankind. Maintaining them branded Jews as quixotic 
outcasts. The historical problem is to explain how a people originated and 
preserved so extreme a set of beliefs without being overwhelmed by the 
unanimous consensus of all other nations.
	This problem cannot be solved by appeal to the general success of 
Jewish cultural achievement. The Jewish nation did not enjoy any 
outstanding secular success which could have served as the means of 
preserving Judaism. There was no far-flung Jewish empire, no revolutionary 
innovations in mathematics, medicine, economics, architecture, the arts, 
philosophy etc. Had there been such, we might have explained the survival 
of Judaism as a mere accompaniment of an otherwise successful society.  
	One final characteristic of ancient Judaism must be noted. Throughout 
the ancient period Jews experimented with other forms of religious belief 
and practice. The prophets testify to Jewish idol worship. (This must be 
understood as syncretism: not an abandonment of Judaism in toto but an 
amalgamation to local conditions. "The Jewish G-d took us out of Egypt, so 
He is very powerful, so of course we celebrate Passover. However, if you 
want your garden to prosper, a sacrifice to the local baal will help!") 
During the Babylonian exile a significant percentage of Jews intermarried 
and adapted their beliefs to the Babylonian milieu. When Greek culture 
became dominant in the Middle East many Jews became Hellenized. During the 
end of the second Temple, the Sadducees rejected the traditional Oral Law 
and substituted their own adaptations of Jewish practice. Needless to say, 
all these efforts eventually failed. Thus the survival of Judaism stands in 
contrast with those competing Jewish cultural forms which expired.  
	
NOTES from the above section:
(1) This is the assumption of the neutral historian, which we accept here 
in order to show even him the uniqueness of Jewish survival. We know that 
miracles and prophecy made Jewish historical experience utterly unlike that 
of other nations.
(2)See Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1960), chaps. 
II-IV.
(3)The "solar monotheism" of Akhenaton in ancient Egypt is not parallel - 
see Kaufmann, pp. 2, 226-7.
(4) See Genesis 43:32 where Jews visiting Egypt eat separately from the 
Egyptians because the Jews' food is a religious abomination to the 
Egyptians!
(5) See Bickerman, "The Historical Foundations of Postbiblical Judaism," in 
L. Finkelstein ed., The Jews - History, Culture, Religion, v.1, pp. 106-7.
(6) See Greenberg, The Construction of Homosexuality, (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1988).
(7) See for example J.P. Sartre's Anti-Semite and Jew.
(8) Kaufmann, p. 225.

SUMMARY
Jewish belief  was unique in the ancient world in its commitment to 
monotheism, the exclusive, spiritual, absolute and moral concept of G-d, 
and opposition to homosexuality. This unique belief survived in spite of 
continuous contact with powerful foreign cultures, and was not the result 
of other Jewish cultural successes. Jewish experiments with modifications 
of the traditional formula disappeared.

	Now we turn to the second period of Jewish history: from the 
destruction of the second Temple to the present. During this period, Jewish 
communities were widely spread among a variety of antagonistic majority 
cultures, without any central authority or control. What ought to be 
expected of Judaism under such conditions? From the experience of other 
cultures, we should expect large-scale cultural borrowing and influence.  
Yemenite Jews should show the influence of Arab-Moslem culture and 
religion, French Jews the influence of Catholicism, Russian Jews the 
influence of Eastern Orthodoxy, etc. How critical should these influences 
be? 
	Let us take as a comparison the development of Christianity during 
the same period. At present there are hundreds of different Christian 
sects, each with its own version of the original doctrines and events of 
early Christianity. The Trinity is understood in widely different ways by 
Catholics, Presbyterians, Lutherans and Unitarians. the Eucharist is the 
real consumption of the blood and flesh of the founder of Christianity for 
some, a symbolic representation for others, and dispensed with entirely by 
others. This wide variation means that the original information cannot be 
reliably recovered. 
	Now this occurred to a religion which was in a majority position from 
the time of Constantine, with both central authority and control. Whatever 
the details of the historical forces which lead to the loss of their 
origins, those forces should have applied to Judaism with infinitely more 
power. In fact, what happened is the opposite: there is no disagreement 
concerning the fundamentals of Jewish belief, practice and experience of 
1900 years ago. Thus the survival of Judaism during this period is utterly 
unexpected, violating the normal process of cultural transformation.
	(Here we must be careful not to misunderstand the contemporary 
division among the "branches of Judaism". They do not differ concerning 
what Jews of 1900 years ago believed and practiced: there is no doubt that 
Shabbos was celebrated on Saturday, that pork was forbidden, that the 
coming of the messiah and the rebuilding of the Temple were the goals of 
Jewish history, and that they believed every letter of the five books of 
Moses to have been dictated by G-d at Sinai. They differ only concerning 
how much of the Judaism of 1900 years ago should be practiced today. This 
is not at all parallel to Christianity in which matters of equal centrality 
are very much in debate.) 
	In addition, as in the ancient period, this second period saw Jews 
experimenting with modifications of Judaism. The Karaites resurrected the 
heresy of the Sadduces in denying the traditional Oral Law. The Marranos 
tried to deal with the Inquisition by feigning Christian practice in public 
while living as Jews privately. Both of these experiments were historical 
failures: the Marranos have disappeared from the Jewish people, and the 
Karaites are a scattered and dying sect. (The more modern experiments at 
modifying traditional Judaism still exist and thus strictly speaking we 
cannot yet judge their historical fate. But if past experiments are any 
guide....) The survival of Judaism as we know it was not without 
competition from other Jewish allegiances.
	
SUMMARY
The following are the features of Jewish survival which we have surveyed: 
(1) 1000 years of national independence (excepting Babylon), during which 
(2) Jewish belief is of unparalleled uniqueness,  (3) unaccompanied by any 
outstanding secular success, and (4) succeeding in competition with various 
experiments at modifying the content of traditional Judaism. This is 
followed by (5) 1900 years of minority status among varied antithetical 
majority cultures which, (6) by comparison to Christianity during the same 
period ought to have caused the disappearance of Judaism, and (7) again saw  
the failure of experimental modifications of Judaism. 

	Now let us use these aspects of the historical record to test the 
adequacy of the popular explanations of Jewish survival. The most common 
theory of Jewish survival is persecution: the will to spite the oppressor's 
goal to annihilate one's people and culture(7). The idea is that Jews' 
resolve to maintain their unique identity is a response to their being 
defined as alien by the non-Jewish world. If only Jews were accepted as 
equals and given access to non-Jewish society, Judaism would disappear. 
This theory fails on three counts. (a) It does not even apply to the period 
of national independence. (b) The last 1900 years has not been a period of 
uniformly severe persecution. Judaism survived the "golden age" of Spain, 
and traditional Judaism is enjoying a renaissance in contemporary  America. 
(According to the theory, we should have expected the group with the 
strongest Jewish identity disappear the fastest in the absence of 
persecution as the prop for its existence; this is precisely what is not 
happening.) (c) We are not the only culture which has been conquered and 
persecuted. Christianity and Islam conquered and destroyed scores of pagan 
cultures which obligingly ceased to exist. Why did persecution not produce 
their survival? (Or are only the Jews spiteful enough?)
	A second theory to explain Jewish survival asserts that Jews simply 
have a special ability to preserve their culture. (Whether this ability it 
genetic or acquired - a gene or a genius - the theory does not say.) Even 
so vague a suggestion can be refuted by the historical record: if there 
were such an ability, why did it not enable all the Jewish experiments at 
modifying traditional Judaism to survive also? Where are the Jewish 
polytheists of the first Temple, the Babylonian and Hellenistic Jews, the 
Sadduces, Karaites and Marranos? 
	A third type of theory holds that certain aspects of Judaism - 
beliefs, values, laws, customs, social forms, etc. - have enabled it to 
survive. For example, it is asserted that dietary restrictions serve to 
separate Jews from non-Jews and help the former to preserve their identity. 
This type of theory fails for two reasons.  First, no reason is given to 
think that the cited aspects of Judaism should contribute to survival 
rather than being irrelevant or even harmful. For example, a small  group 
of immigrants could find dietary restrictions an embarrassment. The tension 
of being socially isolated could lead to abandoning that practice, which 
would then weaken observance generally and thus hasten assimilation. In 
general, that only Judaism has survived and only Judaism has a particular 
feature A, does not imply that A contributes to Judaism's survival We would 
need independent evidence which shows that A contributes to survival. 
	Second, this theory begs the question at issue in a subtle way. The 
point of the theory is to provide a naturalistic explanation of Jewish 
survival.  Even if the aspects of Judaism cited by the theory do contribute 
to survival, we have to ask how they themselves came to be, and why they 
are unique to Judaism. If we have no naturalistic answer to these 
questions, then the theory is ultimately a failure. (Compare explaining why 
George is the only human to run the mile in three minutes by citing his 
extraordinary leg muscles. If we cannot explain why his legs are so 
uniquely strong, we still do not understand his achievement.) 
	Let us suppose that a list of features unique to Judaism can be found 
which can be seen to contribute to Jewish survival. How is it that only 
Judaism has such features? Surely other cultures had brilliant men capable 
of innovating such features for themselves? If not, surely others could 
have taken them from us? (It will not do to argue, as does Yehezkel 
Kaufmann(8), that the unique aspects of Judaism are due to Moses' genius, 
and that genius has no rules by which its products could be expected. In 
order to be appreciated as such, genius must produce recognizable solutions 
to recognized problems. Otherwise the innovation will not be labeled 
genius, but insanity. If the explanation of Judaism's unique aspects is 
Moses' genius, then others would definitely have learned his techniques 
from us.)
	Finally, there are those who would give up the hope to find a single 
explanation for Jewish survival. They argue that each of the cited 
explanations contribute some portion of the overall effect. Persecution 
does produce some will to resist; Jews are gifted at cultural longevity; 
some features of Judaism naturally contribute to survival and may have 
originated randomly. No one element by itself produces survival - that is 
the reason it was so easy to find counter-examples to the theories based on 
one explanation alone. 
	This approach also fails, on three counts. (a) No evidence has been 
supplied that persecution, and genius contribute to survival at all. If 
persecution promotes survival then at least some of the other persecuted 
cultures should have survived. If there is a Jewish genius for survival 
then at least one of the cultural experiments should have succeeded. And 
the naturalistic explanation of Judaism's unique possession of survival 
characteristics has not yet been provided. Thus in the light of the 
evidence we have three times zero. (b) It is not clear that other cultures 
which disappeared did not share all three features. To assert without proof 
that none of the cultures which disappeared through persecution possessed 
people gifted at preserving traditions and features fostering survival, 
would be mere cultural parochialism. (c) Without specifying the details of 
the combination of the elements of explanation, this approach is too vague 
to be taken as a serious attempt at explanation. What kinds and what extent 
of persecution contribute to survival? What gifts in particular enable 
people to preserve a culture? What features of a tradition contribute help 
it survive? ( This approach reminds me of the remark of one historian: "It 
is true that we cannot explain Jewish survival. But we will!" Translation: 
"I believe with perfect faith that everything can be explained 
naturalistically and therefore there is no need to believe in G-d!")
	
SUMMARY
Persecution and unique abilities do not explain the facts of Jewish 
survival. The appeal to unique qualities of Judaism fails because there is 
no independent reason to think they contribute to survival, and there is no 
account of their origin and uniqueness. Since there is no reason to think 
that any of the theories provides any explanation at all, the combination 
of the theories is no better.

	The moral of this review of failed theories is clear: there is no 
serious candidate for a naturalistic explanation of Jewish survival. How 
then can Jewish history be understood? Only as traditional Jewish sources 
understand it: as G-d's providence manifest through his relationship with 
the Jewish people. When Esther learns of Haman's plot to destroy the Jewish 
people, she asks: "What is this, and for what [why] is this?" She is not 
content with a description of the political intrigue with its social, 
psychological and economic background. Those are relevant, but superficial 
considerations. The underlying causes are determined by G-d's providence - 
what purpose of His these events are designed to serve. Only thus can they 
be truly understood.   
	If Jewish history cannot be understood naturalistically, then the 
blind application of naturalistic methodology to the details of Jewish 
experience is a mistake. Imagine a botanist studying the flora of a garden. 
After he examines and classifies the flowers, shrubs, grasses and trees, he 
comes across a butterfly.  "What sort of plant is this?" he thinks. "It has 
no roots, it flies...!" As long as he tries to apply the methods of botany 
to a butterfly, he will not understand!  Similarly, an attempt to 
understand facets of Jewish history by comparison to those nations whose 
history is naturalistic cannot produce understanding. For example, to 
explain similarity of certain Jewish and non-Jewish ideas by asserting that 
we must have taken our ideas from others just as all other nations do, will 
be a totally unjustified comparison. If we were subject to cultural 
influence like all other nations then we would not be here!
	 Thus the supernatural element of Jewish survival must be squarely 
faced. Since there is no reasonable naturalistic explanation, the unbiased 
investigator must at least seriously entertain the possibility of a 
supernatural explanation and examine it with as much objectivity as one can 
muster. The attitude of the philosopher who said that, had he heard G-d 
speak at Sinai he would have sought out the nearest psychiatrist, must be 
rejected. When a consistent phenomenon defies all recognized explanations, 
other avenues must be courageously explored. In this way a Jew will finally 
discover the ultimate Source of Jewish survival. 
	
SUMMARY
Since Jewish survival currently defies naturalistic explanation, the 
naturalistic model of explanation which works for other cultures cannot be 
confidently applied to Jewish history. The only available explanation is 
Divine Providence. 
	
	 To complete the review of Jewish survival, let's consider now 
another unique aspect of Jewish history: the quality of life. After all, it 
is not enough to merely survive; the quality of life experienced must be 
high enough to make it worthwhile to survive! I think that it can be shown 
that Traditional Jewish communities have enjoyed, uniformly, a higher 
quality of life than the host cultures to which they belong, or among which 
they find themselves.  When I say a higher quality of life, I mean with 
respect to values that even the host cultures would share.  Of course, if I 
define a higher quality of life in terms of keeping kosher, that would be 
ridiculous.  The host cultures don't care to keep kosher, so there is no 
significance to such a comparison. But I mean with respect to values that 
would be acknowledged by the host culture.  Traditional Jewish communities 
have a higher rate of success in implementing those values than do the 
cultures among whom  they live.  
	Take for example violent crime.  The percentage of violent crime - 
murder, assault and battery, rape, and kidnapping - in Traditional Jewish 
communities is, in terms of comparative statistics, simply not as high in 
comparison with the communities among whom we live. Take Brooklyn for 
example. In Williamsburg, Traditional Jews and Puerto Ricans live side by 
side.  Ask the sergeant who runs the local police precinct which community 
experiences more violent crime.  I'm not saying that violent crime never 
takes place in Traditional Jewish communities, but it takes place very 
rarely. Communities living under the same conditions - urban, overcrowding, 
poor facilities, broken streets and so on (the kinds of conditions that a 
liberal sociologist would expect to determine the quality of life) - still 
demonstrate sharply diverging statistics. Those sociological conditions do 
not determine the quality of life in Traditional Jewish communities.  
	This is true not only with respect to violent crime.  It is also true 
with respect to addictions - alcoholism, drugs and so on.  The claim is not 
that there is no alcoholism, but that if you compare the rate of alcoholism 
there is an enormous difference.  In the United States today, one out of 
every fifteen adults is an alcoholic.  That is a figure that Alcoholics 
Anonymous puts out.  In the Traditional Jewish community, if one in fifty 
is an alcoholic that is a tragedy. There are instances, but a disparity of 
a factor of  three is an enormous disparity for people living under roughly 
the same conditions.  
	Take for example literacy.  In a Traditional Jewish community, the 
literacy rate is 100% (aside from brain damaged children, autistic 
children, or children with other severe disabilities).  In the United 
States today, the functional literacy rate is 75%.  In the Scandinavian 
countries it is approximately 90%.  Nowhere in the Western World do you 
have a literacy rate of 100%.
	Take for example Family stability.  The divorce rate in the United 
States is 54%, the same as it is in Canada.  The divorce rate in the 
Traditional Jewish community is certainly less than one third that figure.  
Now, I hope I am making it clear that I am not claiming perfection here.  
We have many imperfections and problems.  Smoking for example is an 
addiction which is rampant in the Traditional Jewish community, and it is a 
tragedy.  But, if you take the overall quality of life with respect to 
those characteristics that even the host culture are interested in, the 
disparity is enormous.  And this is true in not only contemporary times, 
but this is true if you trace back to comparative judgments about medieval 
Poland, the Roman Empire, the Greek periods, or any period for which we 
have reliable historical data.  You find that traditional Jewish 
communities are distinguished sharply in terms of the quality of life which 
they enjoy.
	
SUMMARY
Traditional Jewish communities have always enjoyed a superior (not perfect) 
quality of life with respect to values shared with the host culture. These 
include family stability, literacy and freedom from violent crime and 
addictions.

	Now, these two features of Jewish history that I have mentioned - 
survival and quality of life - constitute a kind of pragmatic success, an 
unparalleled pragmatic success.  We have been able to survive and we have 
been able to produce consistently higher quality of life under conditions 
in which no other civilization, no other culture, no other religion has 
been able to function.  
	[Comparison with the Amish and other similar communities is not to 
the point here. They may enjoy a high quality of life, but they achieve it 
at the price of isolation. Only under their strictly controlled conditions 
do they achieve their success. The point about Traditional Judaism is that 
it enjoys its superior quality of life under the same conditions in which 
the host culture does not achieve a similar quality of life.] 
	How is it that a civilization survives and flourishes?  I am not 
going to say anything profound now.  I only wish I had a profound answer to 
this question!  Rather, I am just going to give you a way of describing the 
phenomena.  
	A civilization is a modus operandi; it is a set of rules for living.  
(Many of those rules are not taught formally, but are implicit in the way 
people behave.) Those rules need to be adapted to the conditions under 
which you live.  If they are well adapted, they will serve you well and 
they will flourish.  If they are not well adapted to the conditions under 
which you live, there are two choices.  Either you modify, or you simply 
disintegrate.  If a civilization is too rigid, and the conditions under 
which it lives change radically, then it will simply fall apart.  If it is 
more flexible, then it can perhaps change its character to meet the new 
conditions.  
	Now here you have a civilization, Traditional Judaism, which has 
lived under the most widely separated conditions that mankind has ever 
experienced.  There was Traditional Judaism when we had our own monarchy 
during periods of success, our own kingdom.  There was Traditional Judaism 
under conditions when we were conquered by outside powers and were under 
the sphere of influence by those outside powers.  There was Traditional 
Judaism under conditions of exile; centralized exile as it was in the 
Babylonian period and enormously scattered exile under the conditions of 
the last two thousand years.  
	How can a civilization survive under such widely differing 
conditions?  If it were rigid and unable to change to meet the new 
conditions, then it would simply fall apart.  If it were flexible and able 
to meet the new conditions, then there ought to be four hundred Traditional 
Judasims today.  Why?  Because, we were living under so widely differing 
conditions, that if we were adapting to meet those new conditions, then we 
ought to have widely different forms of Traditional Judaism.  Neither of 
these scenarios occurred.  How can that be explained?  
	The only way to explain it is as follows, and this explanation will 
beg the larger question.  Traditional Judaism has never adapted to the 
variables in human existence.  Traditional Judaism has adapted to the 
constants in human existence.  It has not adapted to the conditions of life 
that change, it has adapted only to the conditions of life that do not 
change.  Because, if Traditional Judaism adapted itself to living in the 
mountains, then you would have a radically different Traditional Judaism in 
the mountains than you have in the plains or in the deserts.  If 
Traditional Judaism adapted itself to a successful economic period, then 
you would have radically different Traditional Judaism in poorer economic 
periods.  If Traditional Judaism adapted itself to peaceful conditions, 
then when Jews lived under war, you would have to have another  type of 
Traditional Judaism.  If Traditional Judaism adapted itself to living under 
Moslems, then you would have to have a radically different Traditional 
Judaism living under Christians.  
	If Traditional Judaism had adapted itself to the local conditions, 
then you ought to have  many forms of Traditional Judaism today because the 
local conditions varied widely. Traditional Judaism would then look 
something like contemporary Christianity. If you have one basic form of 
Traditional Judaism throughout the world believing in the same basic 
principles, able to marry one another's children, eat in one anothers' 
homes, praying in one another's synagogues, then Traditional Judaism cannot 
be adapted to local conditions.  Traditional Judaism has got to be adapted 
only to the universal conditions of human existence.  
	[The existence of many non-Traditional forms of Judaism does not 
affect this point. If we had followed the norms of human experience there 
would be no single, recognizable, world-wide Judaism which defines itself 
as representing the historically continuous principles of Judaism. That 
other groups have decided to change the historical tradition is true but 
irrelevant. The surprise is not unanimous agreement on Jewish practice, but 
that the diverse conditions of Jewish existence have allowed any continuity 
in representing the historical foundations of Judaism.]
	But that in itself is a puzzle.  Why is it?  What would lead a 
civilization to forgo the advantages of local adaptation?  No one else did 
it.  Everyone else adapted to the local conditions in order to get more 
fruitful interaction with local conditions.  How is it that Traditional 
Judaism should be the only civilization that resists adaptation to local 
conditions and maintains its pristine purity of adaptation only to the 
constants of human existence?  I have no naturalistic answer to this 
question. It is another unique feature of Jewish history.
	
SUMMARY
A civilization is a set of rules for living. These rules will survive only 
if they are not in conflict with the life environment. If they are adapted 
to the variables in human life then, when those variable change the rules 
must change or disappear. The survival of Traditional Judaism in radically 
different environments means that Traditional Judaism, unlike other 
cultures, is adapted only to the constants in the human condition.

	Finally, and I will only briefly assert this and briefly describe it, 
I think it can be argued that Traditional Judaism has had a bigger impact 
on world civilization than any other culture.  This tiny, numerically 
insignificant group of people has transformed world beliefs, world values, 
the world's basic view of existence more so than any other group.  
	Think of what the world was like three thousand years ago and imagine 
a rough progress of development to the present day.  It seems to me that 
the world has been getting more and more Jewish as time goes on.  Three 
thousand years ago everyone was polytheistic.  Today, there are many less 
Polytheists. Perhaps Hinduism qualifies as real bona fide Polytheism.  
Perhaps some strains of Christianity qualify as Polytheism, perhaps not.  
But, from a time when the whole world was polytheistic, the world has 
become largely rid of that particular distortion.  The ancient world in 
which the gods were simply super humans with all the frailties and the 
problems of mankind - fighting with one another and so forth - has largely 
been overcome. If you take the Christians and the Moslems together, you 
have considerably more than one and a half billion people who regard our 
Bible as divine in some sense (even though in many cases they misinterpret 
and misapply it).  
	The concept of justice is essentially a Biblical concept.  In fact, 
it could be argued that morality itself is a Biblical invention.  In the 
ancient world there was no concept of morality.  And in so far as morality 
has become a modern idea to which the vast majority of mankind attaches 
itself, at least as an idea (practice is another matter!) is also the 
Judaising of world civilization.  
	Now all this is an enormous surprise.  Even the Greeks' contributions 
to world civilization are outgrown.  Greek science has now been replaced by 
modern science.  In fact much of what had to be done in the Renaissance was 
to outgrow Greek science.  Greek philosophy?  There are still some who 
study  the ancient Greek thinkers.  But as an impact or as a contribution 
to the living ideology of mankind, the Greeks have simply been passed, as 
the Romans have been passed, and as the medieval period and the Renaissance 
and all the rest have passed.  Only Traditional Judaism is still making 
contributions to the present day quality or conditions of life of world 
civilization as a whole.
	
SUMMARY
Traditional Judaism has made, and continues to make the largest single 
contribution to the development of civilization. This includes the gradual 
passing of polytheism, recognition of the Bible, and acceptance of the 
Biblical concepts of justice and morality. 


===========================================================================

Chapter VIII:  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION


	Chapters IV-VII presented a summary of the evidence.  Now, let's take 
the evidence together and remember what this evidence was supposed to show.  
The first thing that the evidence was supposed to show was the uniqueness 
of Jewish history.  Remember the Martian perspective that we spoke about in 
Chapter I. We imagined a Martian surveying all of human history except for 
the Jews. He would come to recognize various   categories of expected 
events: what happens to peoples under conditions of success or conditions 
of failure, war and peace, famine and exile, health and disease, economic 
collapse and economic prosperity and so on. He would have certain expected 
conditions of development and disintegration of civilizations. We then 
asked: "Would the Martian regard the Jew as more of the same, fitting in 
with the normal regularities that he has come to expect, living under the 
same conditions and types of rise and fall and development and 
disintegration of civilization?  Or, would he regard the Jew as utterly 
unique in human history?"  
	It seems to me that the survey of the features of Jewish history that 
I have presented would lead the Martian to conclude that the Jew is utterly 
unique.  First, the Jew possesses predictions of events that could not have 
been expected to happen and on which a neutral bystander would have put a 
very low probability.  The estimate that we came up with in this essay was 
a possibility of 1/16000 that the prediction in Deuteronomy 28-30 would be 
expected to come true.  And, against all expectations, this prediction came 
true.  
	 Second, the Jew seems to have had in his history miraculous events, 
unique public miracles that other nations don't even claim. Very surprising 
unique events have happened in Jewish history, events which served to 
support Judaism, to enable Judaism to survive, and to rescue Judaism from 
dangerous circumstances.  
	Third, Judaism survived and developed under historical conditions 
which were unique, conditions  which  would have lead to the disintegration 
of Judaism, especially when compared to Christianity.  (The same comparison 
could have been made, by the way, with respect to Hinduism and Buddhism 
which also have disintegrated into hundreds of different sects each with 
its own account of what it stands for.)  
	Fourth, you have a unique quality of life, and fifth, a unique impact 
on world civilization.  All of this would have to lead the Martian to 
conclude that Jewish history is unique.  
	Well then, what shall the Martian do with this unique history?  Again 
we said above, when you have an area of phenomena which you think you can 
explain and then you come across a new phenomenon in the area which all of 
your tools of explanation cannot handle, you need to add something to your 
tools in order to explain the new phenomenon. The example we gave was  the 
case of the nucleus in the atom, when it was inexplicable that all the 
protons should sit there without repelling one another, and physics added 
the nuclear force which holds them together against the force of 
electrostatics.  
	Similarly, if you have a unique historical phenomenon, and it cannot 
be explained by the normal features which produce other historical 
phenomenon, then you have to infer the existence of some other force,   
which is responsible for this phenomenon.  Then from the description of the 
phenomenon you can infer directly at least a minimal description of the 
force that produces it.  It has to be the kind of force that is capable of 
producing the unique features of that phenomenon.  
	The features in question are: an unaccountably true prediction 
against all odds, miraculous events which help to found and support this 
particular religion, the survival of this religion against all historical 
probability, a unique quality of life enjoyed uniquely by this particular 
religion, and the impact of this religion on all of world civilization.  
What kind of force could be responsible for those kinds of effects?     
	Number one, the force must be powerful.  If it has maintained the 
existence of a civilization, if it has produced the crossing of the Red 
Sea, the revelation at Sinai, the manna that people ate and so on, it must 
have considerable power at its disposal.  Number two, it must be 
intelligent. A blind force, or an uninformed force cannot maintain the 
existence of a civilization.  Number three, it must be some interested in 
Judaism in particular.  These things didn't happen to the Hindus or the 
Eskimos or the Chinese. They happened only to the Jews and therefore this 
force must be interested in the Jews in particular.  
	But fourthly, it cannot be exclusively interested in the Jews.  If it 
were exclusively interested in the Jews, it could have transported the Jews 
to some isolated area and maintained them over there and had its particular 
interaction with them over there.  If the Jews were brought to the 
crossroads of three continents, and if in fact they did have an impact on 
the development of world civilization, then apparently that force is 
interested also in the rest of mankind.  It is not exclusively interested 
in the Jews.  It is interested that Judaism should have an effect on the 
development of world civilization as a whole.  
	Now those are all descriptions of G-d, that is, the Jewish conception 
of G-d. Those descriptions of  G-d are directly confirmed by a survey of 
the historical record.  
	
SUMMARY
Judaism is unique in its verified improbable prediction, public miracles, 
survival, quality of life, and world impact. A power capable of these 
effects must be powerful, intelligent, interested in Judaism's survival and 
impact on the world. 

	That much we can directly confirm.  The rest - other descriptions of 
G-d, G-d being infinite, or G-d being creator of the universe and so on - 
are not directly confirmed by the survey of history.  One also finds in 
Judaism descriptions of events that cannot be directly assessed, like the 
descriptions of the future, that there will be a Messiah, or what happens 
to the soul after death - there are no ways to directly confirm these.  
But, as I said at the outset, since this is all part of a single 
coordinated body of information, and since those aspects of the information 
that can be directly assessed are all directly supported by the evidence, 
the rest of the body of information gains credibility by being a part of 
that same body of information, just as it is with respect to any other 
source of information that you evaluate.  If everything that source of 
information tells you which you can verify checks out true, then the other 
things it tells you are credible (unless and until you get something that 
doesn't check out).  In the meantime, the rest gains credibility from the 
fact that whatever which can be checked does check true.  
	This, it seems to me, puts Judaism in the position of having greater 
probability of truth than any alternative.  It surely has greater 
probability of truth than any other religion because as we saw in chapter 
II, other religions don't have any relevant evidence at all. Judaism is the 
only religion that puts itself on the line and offers any evidence, and the 
evidence is quite powerful.  A secular view of the world is inferior 
because all of these events cannot be explained from a secular perspective.  
You cannot explain the survival of the Jewish people, you cannot explain 
the verified accounts of miracles, you cannot explain the correct 
prediction, you cannot explain the unique quality of life, you cannot 
explain the impact that Judaism has had on world civilization, and you 
certainly cannot explain the summation of all of these taken together as a 
whole.  These are a lot of different facts that cannot be explained.  
	Now, have I absolutely refuted the skeptic? Couldn't the skeptic 
still admit that he hasn't explained them, but hold that maybe they will be 
explained in the future?  Yes, it is still conceivable that there is no G-d 
and that these things happen for naturalistic reasons that we simply don't 
have access to at this time. But, I remind you that that wasn't the name of 
the game.  That appeal only satisfies Descartes.  It is still conceivable 
that the favored hypothesis is not true - but that is true for everything 
you believe, everything you know, everything you rely upon.  Everything has 
some conceivable alternative which has not been ruled out absolutely.  
	That wasn't the criterion that we agreed upon.  The criterion that we 
agreed upon was high probability of truth vis-a-vis the alternatives.  The 
reason that we agreed upon that criterion was because Judaism is a 
practice.  Judaism involves decisions.  The criterion to which we hold 
pragmatic decisions is the criterion of high probability vis-a-vis truth.  
Whatever is the case with respect to theoretical beliefs (and philosophy is 
riddled with disagreement about that, and most philosophers disagree with 
Descartes' criterion) that is not relevant to us - we have to decide how to 
live.  Decisions on how to live are made on the basis of high probability 
of truth vis-a-vis alternatives, that is to say, if those decisions are 
going to made responsibly.  That is the criterion to which we hold other 
people. If that is the criterion that we use for responsibility in in all 
other areas of practical life, then it seems to me that we have to use it 
in this area as well.  Therefore, Judaism is the only justified way to 
live. 

SUMMARY
The part of the Torah not directly confirmed by the historical evidence is 
made credible by being part of the same body of information as that which 
is confirmed. Thus Judaism has the highest probability of truth among the 
alternatives (other religions and a secular view). Since Judaism is a 
practice, we must conclude that it is the only justified way to live.
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